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Measuring success in the global
economy: international trade, industrial
upgrading, and business function
outsourcing in global value chains
An essay in memory of Sanjaya Lall
Timothy J. Sturgeon and Gary Gereffi1*
This article contributes to an assessment of the scholarly work of
Sanjaya Lall, especially as it relates to improved measures of industrial
upgrading and technological learning. We argue for the collection of
new statistics, in addition to reworking and linking existing data sets.
Changes in the global economy, especially the rise of global value chains
(GVCs), have created measurement problems that require not only
continued innovation in the use of existing data sources, but also the
development and deployment of new measures that analyze GVCs more
directly. Specifically, we advocate for the collection of establishmentlevel economic data according to business functions. Data collected
according to a standardized set of generic business functions can provide
researchers and policymakers with a better map of the value chain, reveal
the roles that domestic establishments, firms, and industries play within
GVCs, and offer a unique view of the competitive pressures facing
domestic firms and industries.
Keywords: global value chains, international trade, business function
outsourcing, industrial upgrading, technological learning

1.

Introduction

This article contributes to an assessment and celebration of the scholarly
and policy work of the late Sanjaya Lall. As Rasiah (2009) highlights, Lall’s
work was at once broad, deep and intensely focused. Over his long career, Lall
and his many collaborators used the lenses of the transnational corporation
(TNC), competitiveness, globalization and technological learning to uncover
*
Timothy J. Sturgeon is Senior Research Affiliate at the MIT Industrial Performance
Center. Contact: sturgeon@mit.edu. Gary Gereffi,is Director of the Center on Globalization,
Governance & Competitiveness at Duke University. Contact: ggere@soc.duke.edu. We thank
Industry Canada for its support of an early draft of this paper. We would also like to thank
Rajah Rasiah for organizing these special issues and for his editorial work. Two anonymous
reviewers provided helpful suggestions. We owe Peter Bøegh Nielsen of Statistics Denmark our
gratitude for providing us with data from the European Union Survey on International Sourcing,
and for his patience and generosity in helping us with its presentation and interpretation. We
acknowledge Ursula Huws and Sharon Brown for their path breaking efforts and tireless
enthusiasm for the business function approach. Most importantly, we remember the late Sanjaya
Lall for his inspiration, warm collegiality and sparkling intelligence.

the determinants of economic change – or lack thereof – in the developing
world. There is a clear continuity to this intellectual path, one that
reveals Lall’s commitment to empirical investigation, his skepticism of
conventional wisdom, his open-mindedness and his sustained focus on
improving the lot of those in the world who have less.
During his early career, a time when TNCs were driving rapid
economic development in pockets of the developing world, he did
not simply celebrate or demonize their presence in host economies,
but explored both their positive impact (such as local linkages and
technology transfer) and their negative effects (such as crowding
out of domestic firms and international transfer pricing). With the
organizational fragmentation that came with global outsourcing and the
rise of more advanced capabilities in the developing world, Lall added
questions related to globalization and technological learning. What is
most admirable is that Lall adapted his research and shifted his policy
targets as the world economy evolved, while retaining his central focus
on the key agents of change and their implications for developing
countries. This is the path of a pragmatic, observant and curious mind,
guided by a strong moral compass.
The focus of this article is narrower. We assess a single aspect
of Lall’s work, his technological classification of exports, and related
research utilizing international trade statistics, from the point of view
of global value chains (GVCs). We see this work on international trade
as useful, but ultimately limiting. While the techniques for estimating
the technological content of trade can certainly be further refined by
constructing more sophisticated and detailed product-based analyses of
trade flows within or across industries, there is an urgent need to enrich
existing metrics with additional data resources and measures that allow
us to investigate GVCs more directly. In our view, changes in the global
economy, and especially the rise of GVCs, have created measurement
problems that require new information and new methods. In an effort to
be constructive as well as critical, we propose one possible approach:
the collection of economic data according to a generic and parsimonious
list of business functions.

2.

Tracking global shifts: conceptual and
measurement issues

Among the enduring mysteries of political economy is why
some places surge ahead in the global economy while others grow
more slowly or fall behind in relative or even absolute terms. Is it sound
macroeconomic policy, the development of human capital, protection
2
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under the geopolitical umbrella of a superpower, sector-specific
industrial development policies, natural resource endowments, or some
combination that has led to the success of certain countries, especially in
East Asia (Deyo, 1987; World Bank, 1993)? There are also debates about
the optimal industry structures for technological learning and industrial
upgrading. Is a concentrated industrial structure best because large firms
can afford to invest in major research and development (R&D) efforts,
or are open, flexible networks of small and medium-sized firms better
able to identify and fit into the ephemeral niches of a fast changing
global economy (Piore and Sabel, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990)?
The institutional basis for development has also been a topic of much
debate (Evans, 1995; Berger and Dore, 1996; Hall and Soskice, 2001).
For Sanjaya Lall and many others (e.g. Kimura, 2007), learning
is the key to industrial upgrading. For places that are behind, learning
must, at least in part, come from absorbing knowledge created elsewhere.
Many mechanisms for this have been examined, from arm’s-length
technological “borrowing” (Amsden, 1989) through a range of practices
that encompass technology licensing, reverse engineering, the injection
of equipment and know-how through foreign direct investment, and
firm-level adaptation to demands made by both foreign affiliates and
overseas buyers (Gereffi, 1994; Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006).
Answers to these questions are complex, and debates about
what shapes economic development outcomes will certainly continue.
However, we are now at a critical juncture where rising complexity in the
global economy has begun to overwhelm the slow and partial analytical
progress that has been made in the past 25 years. Recent examples,
such as how firms based in the United States, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan Province of China interact with each other and
with local firms to produce Apple iPods in southern China for export
to world markets (Linden et al., 2007), illustrate both the intricacies of
economic globalization and the limits of existing data. In this setting,
some of the core assumptions of mainstream economics – that demand
begets supply, that nations draw mainly on their own knowledge and
physical resources to compete with other nations, that exports reflect
the industrial capabilities of the exporter, that firms and individuals
act independently, rationally and at arm’s-length, and so on – appear,
if not as gross distortions, then as quaint reminders of simpler times.
But if the tools of mainstream economics are being blunted by global
integration, so too are those offered by other social science disciplines,
which typically assume levels of institutional and cultural cohesiveness
and economic autarky that no longer exist.
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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For us, the GVC framework provides a useful guide as we seek
answers to questions about the dynamic political economy of industries.1
GVC analysis highlights three basic characteristics of any industry: 1)
the geography and character of linkages between tasks, or stages, in the
chain of value added activities; 2) how power is distributed and exerted
among firms and other actors in the chain; and 3) the role that institutions
play in structuring business relationships and industrial location. These
elements help explain how industries and places evolve, and offer clues
about possible changes in the future. The chain metaphor is purposely
simplistic. It focuses on the location of work and the linkages between
tasks as a single product or service makes its way from conception to
end use.
The analysis of GVCs identifies new actors in the global economy
(e.g. global buyers and global suppliers) and shows how their emergence
alters the ways that industries are organized and governed across
borders (Gereffi, 2005). Recent theorizing about the governance of
GVCs highlights three key determinants that affect the organization and
power dynamics within GVCs (complexity, codifiability and supplier
competence), and characterizes three distinct business network forms
(modular, relational and captive) that lie between the classic duality of
arm’s-length markets and hierarchies (i.e. vertically integrated firms)
(Gereffi et al., 2005). The GVC governance types were derived from
direct field observation in a variety of global industries, including
footwear and apparel (Gereffi, 1999; Schmitz, 1999; Bair and Gereffi,
2001), horticulture (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000), bicycles (Galvin and
Morkel, 2001), electronics (Borrus et al., 2000; Lee and Chen, 2000;
Sturgeon, 2002), and motor vehicles (Humphrey, 2003; Sturgeon and
Florida, 2004).
Qualitative industry research and conceptual theory-building of
this sort have been extremely helpful in developing the framework, in
identifying emerging trends in GVCs, and in providing researchers and
policymakers with a vocabulary to discuss some of their key features
without getting bogged down in industry-specific nomenclature. The
framework has been used, challenged and extended in recent research
on industries such as tourism (Barham et al., 2007), electronics (Vind
and Fold, 2007), textiles and apparel (Evgeniev, 2008), motor vehicles
(Sturgeon et al., 2008), and coffee and tea (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009),
and in regions such as Latin America (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2007)
and East Asia (Kawakami and Sturgeon, forthcoming).
1

See www.globalvaluechains.org for more detail on this approach and a list of
publications and researchers that directly engage with it.
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A major impediment to using qualitative research and conceptual
theories to support specific policy interventions is the lack of comparable
and detailed data on the industrial capabilities of firms, industries, and
countries and the roles that they play in the global economy. The GVC
framework provides a conceptual toolbox, but quantitative measures are
lacking. While the development of objective, industry-neutral measures
of GVC governance is a laudable goal, and survey questions are currently
being fielded to collect data on the governance character of inter-firm
linkages in both cross-border and domestic sourcing relationships,2 better
information to characterize the roles of firms, regions and countries in
GVCs is urgently needed.
In this article, we examine the state of the art in GVC metrics
and chart a way forward. First, we summarize some of the best recent
academic research that has used official statistics to examine issues
related to GVCs and industrial upgrading, including Lall’s (2000)
technological classification of exports, Feenstra and Hamilton’s (2007)
trade-data archeology, research on intermediate goods trade, and efforts
to enrich trade data by linking it to “micro-data” underlying national
statistics and policy programmes. We then point to what is perhaps the
most glaring data gap of all: the appallingly poor level of product detail
in international services trade.
While the research we review provides useful insights into the
dynamics of GVCs, and helps to identify some of the key drivers of
industrial upgrading, we are left with a dilemma. The rise in intermediate
goods trade strongly suggests that countries no longer rely only or even
primarily on domestic resources to develop and export products to
the rest of the world. Countries and regions do not make products and
deliver services in their entirety, but have come to specialize in specific
functions within larger regional and global value chains. Surging trade
in services complicates the picture. As a result, industrial output and
trade statistics provide a very partial and even misleading view of where
value is created and captured in the global economy.
Even the best trade statistics, as they currently exist, can only
hint at what is happening in GVCs and how this sort of “integrative
trade” (Maule, 2006) is shaping development outcomes. If key GVCrelated questions are not asked on any official survey and do not exist
2

Specifically, Statistics Canada, in an international sourcing survey currently
being tested, asks firms if relationships with important suppliers are simple market
relationships or something more complex, and if transactions involve the exchange of
codified or tacit information.
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on any administrative form, then existing data resources can never yield
adequate results. Thus, there is an urgent need to collect new information.
To illustrate, we present a new business function classification scheme
that is currently being developed and deployed by statistical agencies
and academic researchers in North America and Europe in the hope that
it will soon be standardized and adopted more broadly.3

3.

What trade statistics can reveal about global
value chains

Data on international trade in physical goods and commodities
are available in considerable detail online in the United Nations
Statistical Division’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database (known as
UN COMTRADE). The database contains import and export statistics
reported by the statistical authorities of nearly 200 countries, from
1962 to the most recent year, currently 2006 to 2008, depending on the
country.4 Because these data are collected from many different national
statistical agencies, they vary in quality and coverage. Nevertheless, the
UN COMTRADE database provides information on imports and exports
by value and in some cases by the number of units or volume shipped,
according to seven different product (commodity) lists, the most detailed
being the 2002 Harmonized Tariffs Code list, which at the six-digit level
includes more than 8,000 product descriptions.5
The fine-grained product detail and the ease of access to
COMTRADE data have allowed researchers to create alternatives to
the industry classification schemes that its commodity lists are based
on. While industries are an important and often relevant category, they
typically contain products that are very heterogeneous in terms of
labour or capital intensity, technological content, and so on. This section
examines three distinct approaches to analyzing trade data that shed light
distinct aspects of GVC development and industrial upgrading. The first
is Sanjaya Lall’s (2000) classification of technological sophistication,
which groups products based on their technological requirements.
Increases in “high technology” exports suggest that learning and
industrial upgrading is taking place in the exporting country. Second
is the trade-data archaeology approach developed by Feenstra and
3

See, for example, the National Science Foundation funded Project, “A National
Survey of Organizations to Study Globalization, Innovation and Employment.” http://
www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward.do?AwardNumber=0926746&version=noscript.
4
See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/.
5
The United States data, published by the Department of Commerce, is available
at the ten-digit HTC level, and it includes more than 16,000 product descriptions.
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Hamilton (2006), which tracks highly detailed export flows from
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China to the United
States over long periods of time. This approach reveals that specific
products, rather than broad industries, have been key to upgrading in
these countries (e.g. microwave ovens from the Republic of Korea,
not white goods in general; computer monitors from Taiwan Province
of China, not electronics in general). Feenstra and Hamilton also tie
these exports of narrow product categories to the strategies of United
States retailers and marketers to show how buyer-driven GVCs have
influenced development outcomes in East Asia. The third is work on
the relationship between GVCs and intermediate goods trade. Increases
in intermediate goods trade signals the geographic fragmentation of the
production process driven, we argue, by the increasing importance of
GVCs in international trade.

3.1

Upgrading as learning: Sanjaya Lall’s
technological classification of exports

Gereffi (2005, p. 171) defines industrial upgrading as “the
process by which economic actors – nations, firms and workers – move
from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global production
networks”. Lall et al. (2005) share this view, and start with a reasonable
assumption, that the learning required to export high value added,
technology-intensive products will be greater than for simpler products.
Even if the knowledge embedded in imported intermediate inputs and
machinery and know-how from foreign affiliates and global buyers is
invisible in export statistics, as it typically is, we can at least assume that
technology-intensive exports heighten the potential for rapid learning
by local actors.
To examine the path of technological learning in the global
economy using export statistics, Lall (2000) devised a technological
classification of goods exports. To provide an example of how we can
assess industrial upgrading for export-oriented economies, we examine
shifts in the technology content of China’s and Mexico’s exports over
time. Following Lall (2000), we divide each country’s exports into five
product groupings, which are listed in ascending levels of technological
content: primary products, resource-based manufactures, and low-,
medium-, and high-technology manufactures (see table 1).6 The main
6
Sanjaya Lall (2000) developed this technological classification of exports based
on 3-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories. His article
provides the detailed list of products under each category.
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contributing industries to each category (agro-forest products, textile
and apparel, automotive, and electronics) are broken out to simplify the
analysis.
Table 1. Lall’s technological classification of exports
Classification

Examples
Fresh fruit, meat, rice, cocoa, tea, coffee, wood,
coal, crude petroleum, gas

Primary products (PP)
Manufactured products
RB: Resource-based manufactures
RB1: Agro/forest based products

Prepared meats/fruits, beverages, wood products,
vegetable oils

Ore concentrates, petroleum/rubber products,
RB2: Other resource based products
Simple
cement, cut gems, glass
ManufacLT: Low-technology manufactures
tures
Textile fabrics, clothing, headgear, footwear,
LT1: Textile/fashion cluster
leather manufactures, travel goods
LT2: Other low-technology

Pottery, simple metal parts/structures, furniture,
jewellery, toys, plastic products

MT: Medium-technology manufactures
MT1: Automotive products
MT2: Medium-technology process
industries
Complex MT3: Medium-technology
Manufac- engineering industries
tures
HT: High-technology manufactures

Passenger vehicles and parts, commercial
vehicles, motorcycles and parts
Synthetic fibres, chemicals and paints, fertilizers,
plastics, iron, pipes/tubes
Engines, motors, industrial machinery, pumps,
switchgear, ships, watches

HT1: Electronics and electrical
products

Office/data processing/telecommunications
equipment, TVs, transistors, turbines, powergenerating equipment

HT2: Other high-technology

Pharmaceuticals, aircraft, optical/measuring
instruments, cameras
Electric current, cinema film, printed matter,
special transactions, gold, works of art, coins, pets

Other transactions
Source: Lall (2000, p. 341).

In figure 1, panel 1, we see that in 1988, 45 per cent of Mexico’s
total exports to the United States market were primary products, the most
important of which was oil. In 1993, one year prior to the establishment
of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), mediumtechnology manufactures (mainly automotive products) and high-tech
manufactures (largely electronics items) moved ahead of raw materials
in Mexico’s export mix. By 2008, over 60 per cent of Mexico’s exports
of $234 billion to the United States market were in the medium- and
high-technology product categories, followed by primary products with
20 per cent of all exports (which rebounded from their nadir of 10 per
cent of total exports in 2001) and low-technology manufactures (such
8
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as textiles, apparel, and footwear). Thus, in just two decades, Mexico’s
export structure was transformed from one based on raw materials to
one dominated by medium- and high-technology manufactured items.
Figure 1. Technological composition of Mexico’s and China’s exports to
the United States, 1988–2008
Panel 1: Technological composition of Mexico’s cxports to the United States
70
Primary products

60

Resource-based manufactures
Low-tech manufactures
Medium-tech manufactures

% Export market

50

High-tech manufactures
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10

0

Total
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
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2004
2006
2008
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US$ bn 13 16 18 19 37 43 52 66 80 93 102 120 147 136 138 145 167 184 212 223 234

Panel 2: Technological composition of China’s exports to the United States
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Source: UN COMTRADE (http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQuery.aspx).
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In figure 1, panel 2, we see the composition of China’s exports to
the United States market during the 1988–2008 period. Unlike Mexico,
the leading product category in China’s exports to the United States
market in 1988 was low-technology manufactured goods. These were
primarily made up of a wide variety of light consumer goods – apparel,
footwear, toys, sporting goods, house wares, and so on. These products
accounted for about two thirds of China’s overall exports to the United
States in the early 1990s. By 2008, however, high-technology exports
had increased to 35 per cent of China’s total exports to the United States
market, and were virtually tied with low-technology exports for the top
spot in China’s export mix.
Thus, Mexico and China have had a number of commonalities in
their export trajectories to the United States market during the past two
decades. Both are diversified economies, with a range of export product
types. In both cases, manufactured exports are more important than
primary product or resource-based exports; within manufacturing, highand medium-technology exports are displacing low-technology goods.
While these export data have limitations as indicators of industrial
upgrading, as we will discuss below, both economies appear to be
increasing the technological sophistication of their exports.

3.2

Trade-data archaeology

Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) utilize highly disaggregated
international trade statistics to shed new light on the debate surrounding
the origins of the “East Asian miracle”. Conventional explanations of East
Asia’s economic success, beginning with Japan in the 1950s and 1960s,
and including the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Hong
Kong (China) and Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s, revolve around the
role of markets and states in promoting export-oriented industrialization
in this region. The World Bank and neoclassical economists have
favoured the market-friendly explanation, which focuses on the solid
macroeconomic fundamentals in the early East Asian industrializers
(World Bank, 1993), while other scholars have highlighted the directive
role of the state in promoting this transition (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990;
Evans, 1995). Feenstra and Hamilton offer a contending demand-side
perspective to account for the sustained export success of the Republic
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, which ties their performance
to the retail revolution and the rise of “big buyers” in the United States
(see also Gereffi, 1999).
Using what they call “trade-data archaeology”, Feenstra and
Hamilton recreate the export trajectories of the Republic of Korea and
10
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Taiwan Province of China, not merely at the level of industries, but by
tracing the flow of very specific products over several decades from
the early 1970s to the present. This approach reveals that the Republic
of Korea’s and Taiwan Province of China’s dramatic export success
was actually concentrated in a handful of product categories, such as
garments, footwear, bicycles, toys, televisions, microwave ovens,
computers and office products. The analysis shows that although exports
from Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea were in the
same industries, they specialized in different kinds of products within
these industries: the Republic of Korea’s large vertically integrated
chaebol firms emphasized mass-produced, standardized items, while
Taiwan Province of China excelled in making a wide variety of more
specialized products that fitted the capabilities of the smaller firms that
dominate the island’s diversified economy.
The authors go beyond standard supply-side accounts of East
Asia’s export success, by showing precisely how these exports were
linked to the “retail revolution” in the United States, where retailers
(such as Sears, JC Penney, Kmart and Wal-Mart) and companies with
global brands (such as Nike, Liz Claiborne, Disney and many others) set
up international sourcing networks to tap and expand the global supply
base. It was the dynamics within GVCs, as much as any supply-side
market or state-society characteristics, that fuelled the export-oriented
development model that has been promoted by the World Bank and a
variety of international development agencies since the 1980s. The fact
that both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China developed
these “demand-responsive” economies has important theoretical
implications for economic sociology and international trade theories
alike (Hamilton and Gereffi, 2008).

3.3

Examining intermediate goods trade

Merchandise trade has increased dramatically since the 1970s,
far surpassing pre-World War I peaks in most OECD countries.
Feenstra (1998) notes a sectoral shift in United States imports away
from agricultural products and raw materials and towards capital and
technology-intensive goods. Explanations include trade liberalization,
falling transportation costs, and equalization of gross domestic products
(GDPs) among trading countries, given the tendency for countries of
similar size to trade more than countries of disproportionate size. Of
course, there are many other possible explanations for these shifts,
including rising production skills and better capital stock in poor countries,
and speedier transportation, which opens up trade for perishable goods
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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such as fresh vegetables as well as for goods with very volatile prices,
such as computer memory.
The rise of GVCs is not only enabled by these factors, but is
itself a cause of trade increases. As Feenstra (1998, p. 36) argues, the
geographic fragmentation of production causes increases in the volume
of total trade because intermediate inputs may cross borders several
times before final products are delivered to end users. Thus, the trade
content of an average product rises when it is made in the context of
GVCs.
The fact that intermediate goods trade is rising much faster than
overall trade has stimulated a vast body of research and multiple labels,
including a new international division of labour (Fröbel et al., 1980),
multistage production (Dixit and Grossman, 1982), slicing up the value
chain (Krugman, 1995), the disintegration of production (Feenstra, 1998),
fragmentation (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001), vertical specialization
(Hummels et al., 2001), global production sharing (Yeats, 2001),
offshore outsourcing (Doh, 2005), and integrative trade (Maule, 2006).
Sturgeon and Memedovic (forthcoming), using the United Nations’
broad economic categories of consumption, capital, and intermediate
goods, calculate that global trade in intermediate goods has far outpaced
these other categories (figure 2). This rise is most dramatic after 1988,
when the developing world was linked more systematically in GVCs.
Developing countries’ share of global intermediate good imports rose
from 5.2 per cent to 29.6 per cent from 1988 to 2006, while their share
of intermediate goods exports increased even more dramatically, from
3.9 per cent to 31.7 per cent.
Figure 2. Intermediate, capital, and final goods trade, 1962–2006
(Millions of constant United States dollars)
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Source: Sturgeon and Memedovic (forthcoming).
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While soaring intermediate goods trade is a strong indicator of
the rise of GVCs, their growing dominance of world trade can lead to
odd and confusing metrics. For example, because Malaysia imported so
many intermediate goods for inclusion in exports, its ratio of exported
goods and services to GDP in 2005 reached 123.4 per cent (World
Development Indicators, 2007). Such ratios are not uncommon in classic
entrepôt economies such as Singapore, and Hong Kong (China), and as
a comparative measure of trade integration this is fine, but upon seeing
such statistics without reference to GVCs, one has to wonder how a
country can export more than it produces.
Clearly, the global economy is changing. Rising intermediate
goods trade means that goods are flowing, increasingly, within the
same industry. Research on intra-industry trade (Grubel and Lloyd,
1975; Lloyd and Lee, 2002) has shown steady increases of about 4–5
per cent per year in countries trading the same or seemingly similar
products. This challenged the central tenet of Ricardian trade theory:
country specialization according to factor-based comparative advantage
that would lead only to inter-industry trade. Finger (1975) claimed
that coarse industry classifications disguised vast heterogeneity within
industries; in other words, countries could specialize within the same
industry, especially in intermediate inputs versus final goods.
For Krugman (1991), intra-industry trade is driven by firms seeking
increasing returns from large-scale production, thereby generating
exports, while consumer demand for product variety stimulates imports
of very similar products. Although this work was based on horizontal
differentiation (of similar products), the quality ladder growth models
from Grossman-Helpman (1991), which are formally very similar to
Krugman’s model, have a vertical dimension that includes intermediate
goods. Others have tested and refined these theories in the context of
East Asia’s economic rise (Ng and Yeats, 1999) and provided evidence
of increasing “vertical” specialization in intermediate inputs (Hummels
et al., 2001). Using updated statistics, Brülhart argues that, “since
the 1990s, [the increase in intra-industry trade] appears to be driven
to a significant extent by the international fragmentation of vertical
production chains” (Brülhart, 2008, abstract).
Our argument is that trade statistics can only hint at the changes
occurring in the global economy. Trade statistics alone contain very partial
information about the location of value added, and no information about
ownership of productive assets and output, where profits are reaped,
or how these increasingly complex systems are coordinated. Certainly,
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work will continue on the causes and meaning of inter-industry trade.
But there are limits to what can be learned from trade statistics alone.

4.

Using administrative and micro-data resources to
understand global value chains

Linking trade statistics to other datasets can enhance their
usefulness. Through careful matching, or by taking advantage of
especially rich administrative data,7 researchers can sometimes push
beyond the limitations of published statistics. A host of government
programs collect detailed economic data. Typically more detailed
“micro-data” underlie what is ultimately made available to the public.
While these data are usually confidential, researchers who gain security
clearance and have their proposals accepted by data collection agencies
can gain access, as along as government personnel screen the results
before the research is published. Some micro-data sets have also been
assembled by data agencies and released, with confidential information
removed, as public-use files. Over the past decade, a burgeoning body of
research has relied on government-collected micro-data. In this section,
we provide a few examples.
Feenstra and Hanson (2004, 2005) take advantage of administrative
data from China and from Hong Kong (China) to reveal new information
about the workings of GVCs. Specifically, the data contain re-export
values for Hong Kong (China), and information about factory and input
ownership in China. These data allow the authors to estimate the markup charged by Hong Kong-based GVC “intermediaries” such as Li and
Fung, a trading company. The authors also use these data to calculate
the share of China’s exports to Hong Kong (China) that are re-exported
(45.4 per cent in 1998), an indicator of the important coordination role
that companies like Li and Fung play in GVCs, especially in apparel
and other consumer goods industries. By taking advantage of data that
describe the ownership of factories exporting from China, the authors
are able to show that independent suppliers working under “export
processing” arrangements (i.e. suppliers that are provided with inputs by
intermediaries and their customers) are much more likely to send goods
through Hong Kong (China) for re-export than exporting factories that
are wholly owned by non-Chinese firms.
Feenstra and Spencer (2005) use the same Chinese data, from
1998 through 2000, to explore the relationship between outsourcing
7
Governments collect data for the purpose of administering their programmes
such as tax collection, compliance with environmental protection laws, and the like. For
this reason, such data are typically referred to as “administrative data”.
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arrangements (arm’s-length vs. contractual) and the proximity of
suppliers (onshore vs. offshore) and find that relationships vary according
to the technological sophistication of the product being outsourced. The
more technologically sophisticated the product, the more likely it is that
firms will source from affiliates or outsource to suppliers located nearby.
Dani Rodrick and his collaborators (Haussman et al., 2006) use these
data to show that the basket of goods exported by China is of higher
technological content than would be predicted by its GDP per capita
(using averages for all other countries’ export mixes).
By linking these same data to Chinese input-output data, Dean,
Fung and Wang (2007) estimate that China’s “vertical specialization”, that
is, the use of imported intermediate inputs in exported goods, increased
between 1997 and 2002 in most industries. This is the opposite of what
one would expect. Instead of engaging in progressive import substitution
as domestic capabilities rise, as most theories of development predict,
China increased its reliance on imported intermediates as exports
increased. Here we see that, because of the intricacies of production and
trade networks within GVCs, we cannot assume deterministic causal
linkages between export-led industrialization, the technological content
of exports, and industrial upgrading.
Researchers have creatively used micro-data to explore specific
questions related to GVCs. For example, Bernard et al. (2005) link
administrative data from United States Census mailing lists8 to the
universe of import and export transactions for 1993–2000, revealing a
detailed picture of the characteristics of firms that do and do not trade.
Harrison and McMillan (2006) and others have used the parent and foreign
affiliate micro-data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis surveys on
TNCs to examine the relationship between affiliate activity and United
States employment. Swenson (2005) has examined the permanency
of offshore assembly arrangements using extremely detailed data
from United States International Trade Commission (USITC) reports.
Kletzer (2002) has used micro-data from the Displaced Worker Survey
to explore the experiences of workers displaced from manufacturing
industries associated with increased foreign competition, and has made
policy recommendations based on her findings.
8
We are referring here to the United States Census Bureau’s Business Register,
which is the sampling frame used for the Economic Census. The data included are
business name, address, a unique establishment-level identifier, industry, employment,
and the identity of the firm that owns the enterprise. Data about ownership allows the
enterprises in the Business Register to be aggregated to the firm level. Jarmin and
Miranda (2002) have assembled the Business Register into a time-series for 1976–2002,
referred to as the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD).
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Administrative micro-data from public surveys and linked data
sets can enrich our view of how domestic firms engage with the global
economy. Micro-data collected from TNCs, for example, when combined
with data on international trade, can provide new information about
the cross-border activities of TNCs and how they use local resources
in offshore locations. Such approaches can be difficult to replicate and
extend, however, because not all researchers can access confidential
micro-data, and because the painstaking work of cleaning and matching
raw micro-data files can be very difficult for other researchers to
understand and replicate. Furthermore, unique administrative data sets
tend to be available only for individual countries, and data collected
in support of specific policy initiatives are commonly phased out after
the programmes they were intended to support come to an end. As a
result, studies based on micro-data can have limited scope with regard
to multiple countries and longer-term trends.

5.

What trade statistics hide

The easy availability and richness of UN COMTRADE data has
led to their wide use among researchers and policymakers. However, we
need to keep in mind what trade statistics do not tell us, and even what they
might obscure. First, trade data contain no actual information about the
process by which products are made. Certain production processes, such
as semiconductor wafer fabrication, involve the manipulation of items
so small, or require tolerances so exact, that they have moved beyond the
limits of human dexterity and must always be carried out by machines.
Other processes, such as sewing, have so far resisted automation and
can only be done by hand. But for a very wide range of products and
processes, the labour content of production is variable. The degree of
labour or capital intensity used in production is, in many instances, a
strategic managerial choice rather than an intrinsic characteristic of
the product. Thus, we cannot rigidly associate technological content or
capital requirements with most specific categories or classes of products.
Industries are even poorer indicators of technological sophistication.
Furthermore, the technological content of high-technology exports
may be embodied in imported components, subsystems, or production
equipment. The highest value added elements of high-technology
exports from developing countries are often produced in a third country.
Even if these “high-tech” inputs are produced locally, and final assembly
processes are truly technology-intensive, they may be carried out by
foreign-owned and operated firms with few meaningful linkages to the
local economy. With rising wages, worker militancy, political friction
or even a prolonged natural disaster, such footloose firms might easily
16

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

pack up and move elsewhere. Thus, trade statistics run a real risk of
over-stating the technological competence of exporters, and especially
of local firms.
Even when production is carried out by local firms and is truly
technology-intensive, the reality of GVCs is that the innovative work of
product conception, design, marketing and supply-chain management
may well continue to be conducted outside of the exporting country.
These “intangible assets” cannot be measured by current international
trade statistics. The value of imports plus the intangible assets held by
the most powerful firms in GVCs, such as lead firms with global brands,
suppliers with platform leadership (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) and
large retailers, can be extremely high.
For example, Linden et al. (2007) estimate that only $4 of the
$299 retail price of an Apple 30 gigabyte video iPod MP3 player is
captured in China, where they are assembled and tested by the contract
manufacturers based in Taiwan Province of China, Hon Hai (also known
as Foxconn), Asustek and Inventec. This is, in part, because iPods are
assembled from components made mostly in other countries, such as the
United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. But more importantly, it
is because Apple, which conducts high-level design work and software
development in-house, and orchestrates the product’s development,
production, marketing and distribution, is estimated to capture $80
of the sale price. This study also estimates that $83 is captured in the
United States by Apple’s technology suppliers and by retailers. Clearly,
assigning the $183 per unit wholesale price of exported iPods (as would
be reported in trade statistics) to the Chinese economy misrepresents
where value is created in the global economy. Concluding that Chinese
firms have the capability to develop and market products such as the
iPod, simply because the country is the source of exports, would also
be a mistake.

5.1

A glaring data gap: services trade

The easy availability and richness of UN COMTRADE data has
tilted research on international trade towards the goods sector. While this
work has contributed greatly to our understanding of international trade
and its impacts on various national economies and industries, the lack
of similar detail or global coverage on international trade in services has
created a significant knowledge gap. In the case of the United States, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis collects import and export data for only
17 service product categories (see table 2). Statistics Canada collects
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only 28, and the OECD, which relies on member countries for data,
publishes only 11. Contrast the poor detail in traded services with detail
on goods in the COMTRADE database (8,000 product codes) and the
magnitude of the data gap becomes clear.
Because of this data gap, we lack the basic knowledge about
services trade needed to even glimpse trends in industrial upgrading
driven by services. The paucity of detail in services means that we
have no information about what is happening in the service product
categories that have been mentioned as moving “offshore” from
developed to developing countries, including back-office functions such
as accounting, customer support, R&D and software programming.
Why are the data resources related to services so poor? One reason
is that the data are difficult to collect. While companies might track the
source of every physical input to manufacturing, for warranty or quality
control purposes, services expenditures are typically grouped into very
coarse categories, such as “purchased services”. The absence of tariffs
on services, and their non-physical character, means that when service
work moves across borders, no customs forms are filled out and no such
data are generated. Another reason is that service work has historically
been thought to consist of non-routine activities that require face-to-face
contact between producers and users. Services as different as haircuts
and legal advice have traditionally been consumed, in place, as soon
as they are produced. The customized and ephemeral nature of many
services has led them to be considered “non-tradable” by economists or
at least very “sticky” in a geographic sense relative to the production of
tangible goods. Finally, services have long been viewed as ancillary to
manufacturing, either as direct inputs (e.g. transportation) or as services
provided to people who worked in manufacturing (e.g. residential
construction, retail sales etc.). As such, services have been viewed as a
by-product, not a source, of economic growth. Thus, data collection on
services has been given a low priority by statistical agencies.
Nevertheless, services trade is burgeoning, both domestically and
internationally. Computerization is allowing a growing range of service
tasks to be standardized, fragmented, codified, modularized, and more
readily and cheaply transported between producers and consumers who
might be at a great distance. As in goods production, the application of
information technology to the provision of services allows some degree
of customization within the rubric of high-volume production, or what
Pine and Davis (1999) call “mass customization”. With computerization
and inexpensive data storage, the second defining feature of services, that
they cannot be stored, has also become less true than in the past. With
18
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deregulation, business process outsoucing, and the rise of the Internet,
services have become the focus of intense international competition
and rampant innovation. Clearly, the assumptions behind current data
regimes have changed and statistical systems must catch up.
Table 2. The seventeen product categories collected by the United States
Bureau of Economic Analysis for traded services
Travel, passenger fares, and other
transportation services (1)

Royalties and licence
fees (2)

Education (3)

Insurance services (5)

Telecommunications
services (6)

Computer and information services
Computer and data processing services (7)
Database and other information services (8)

Management and
consulting services (9)

Research,
development and
testing services (10)

Construction, architectural, engineering services (11)

Industrial engineering
services (12)

Operational leasing
services (13)

Installation, maintenance, and equipment
repair services (14)

Advertising services (15)

Legal services (16)

Financial services (4)
Business, professional, and technical services

Other business, professional, and technical services
(17)

Source: United States Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Recent progress has been made in the context of NAFTA. In
the spring of 2006, the United States Census Bureau, in collaboration
with its counterpart agencies in Canada and Mexico, completed the
development of 99 detailed product lists that identify and define the
significant products of about 370 service industries. Work to date on
the North American Product Code System (NAPCS) has focused on
the products made by service industries in 12 two-digit industry sectors
(48–49 through 81). In all, more than 3,500 individual service products
have been defined so far. The NAPCS product definitions are extremely
detailed in terms of what they do, and in many cases do not, include. This
level of detail, if fully deployed, would go a long way toward filling the
data gap in services trade.9
To sum up, data resources are falling behind economic realities.
Innovative work to create new classification schemes from disaggregated
datasets, to mine “micro-data” from government surveys and
administrative records (as well as from private sources), and to combine
and match data to create new data resources, is breaking new ground
and providing important insights. A few of the most severe data gaps
could eventually be filled. However, more needs to be done to collect
9

For more information on NAPCS, see http://www.census.gov/eos/www/napcs/
napcs.htm.

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

19

data specifically designed to provide insights into the characteristics and
effects of GVCs. Work of this sort is proceeding along multiple fronts,
including the surveys that test the GVC governance framework developed
by Gereffi et al. (2005) and the quantification of value capture in specific
GVCs (Linden at al., 2007). Equally important is the ongoing stream of
detailed field-based research on the functioning of GVCs in particular
industries and places (e.g. Kawakami and Sturgeon, forthcoming). In
the next section, we propose another approach: the collection of a broad
range of economic data, such as employment, sourcing locations and job
characteristics according to an exclusive, exhaustive, parsimonious and
generic list of business functions.

6.

Collecting new data on business functions

Vertical fragmentation and the growth of integrative trade – the
very stuff of GVCs – has served to expand the arena of competition
beyond final products to the vertical business function slices that can be
offered (horizontally, to diverse customers) as generic goods and services
within and across industries. This dynamic has raised the performance
requirements for firms and workers that may have been insulated from
global competition in the past. Workers, almost regardless of their role,
can suddenly find themselves in competition with a range of consultants,
vendors, suppliers, contractors and affiliates from places both far and
near. Global value chains raise, among other things, the possibility
that entire societies can become highly specialized in specific sets of
business functions, while others fail to develop or atrophy. Development
paths that include heavy GVC engagement can have positive or negative
consequences for wealth creation, employment, innovation, firm
autonomy, social welfare and economic development (Whittaker et al.,
forthcoming). Despite their growing importance as discrete realms of
value creation, competition and industry evolution, we currently have
no standard method for collecting data about business functions.
While there are a host of business functions that have long been
disembodied from specific industries (e.g. from janitorial to IT to
manufacturing services), qualitative research has shown that managers
often experiment with a wide variety of “make” or “buy” choices and
onshore or offshore sourcing (Berger et al., 2005). Decisions about how
to bundle and unbundle, combine and recombine, and locate and relocate
business functions have become a central preoccupation of strategic
decision-making. Because industry classification schemes typically
describe only the main output or process of the firm, and input-output
statistics refer only to those products that the firm buys or sells, existing
enterprise and establishment-level data resources are not well suited to
20
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capturing the dynamics of business function bundling or revealing the
spatial and organizational patterns that result.
In our view, this data gap will become more important over time
as the capabilities that reside in the domestic and global supply bases
continue to rise, increasing the potential for fragmenting, outsourcing
and relocating a wide variety of business functions. A standardized list
of exclusive and generic business functions is needed. An exclusive list
will have no overlap between categories and will account for all of the
functions of the firm. A generic list will be equally applicable to all firms
and organizations, regardless of industry. The list should be extremely
parsimonious at first, with detail collected only after the main categories
have stabilized through field testing. While this is a difficult and timeconsuming prospect, work to develop business function lists, and deploy
them in surveys, is well underway.

6.1

Developing, deploying and refining business
function lists: a brief history

To our knowledge, the earliest use of a business function list to
collect economic data was for the EMERGENCE Project (Huws and
Dahlman, 2004) funded by the European Commission. This research
used a less-than-generic list of seven business functions tailored to collect
information about the outsourcing of information technology-related
functions, such as software development and data processing. Industryspecific bias in business function lists can simplify data collection and
focus research on specific questions, but the results cannot be easily
compared to or aggregated with other data, and they increase the risk
of creating non-exhaustive lists. When business function lists are nonexhaustive, they leave some functions unexamined and block our view
of how specific business functions contribute to the total employment
or output of a firm. Business function lists should seek to include the
full range of activities that all establishments must either do in-house or
have done by others, regardless of industry.
In his 1985 book, Competitive Advantage, Michael Porter
published a list of nine generic business functions: R&D, design,
production, marketing and sales, distribution, customer service, firm
infrastructure, human resources, and technology development. A list
similar to Porter’s was developed for the European Union (EU) Survey
on International Sourcing (Neilsen, 2008) and adopted by Statistics
Canada for the Survey of Changing Business Practices in the Global
Economy. This list, while not industry-specific in any way, was not
fully exhaustive because it included an “other functions” category. Such
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categories are useful as checks on the exhaustiveness of the list used,
but researchers should then combine them with an exiting category or,
if needed, define a new, exclusive category, rather than accepting an
undefined category of data.
Firms, especially at the establishment level, typically have a
main output, be it a product or service. The main operational function
that produces this output is associated with the firm’s standardized
industrial code. Instead of counting all output and employment under
this classification, as business censuses typically do, business function
lists can be used to measure economic activity (e.g. employment,
occupational mix, wages paid etc.) in other functions as well. In
business function frameworks, this main productive function has been
designated variously as “production” (Porter, 1985), the “core function”
(Neilsen, 2008), and “operations” (Brown, 2008). In contrast, the
EMRGENCE project list (Huws and Dahlman, 2004) and a more recent
list developed by the Offshoring Research Network for the purpose
of detecting R&D offshoring (Lewin et al., 2009) did not include a
category for the firm’s main operational function, but instead used a list
of commonly outsourced functions (product development, IT services,
back office functions, call centres etc.). A business function list cannot
be considered exhaustive unless it includes a category that captures the
main productive function of the firm, a function that can be partially or
even completely outsourced.
The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Mass Layoff
Statistics (MLS) Program has developed a list to collect data on business
functions fulfilled by workers who have been separated in large-scale
layoffs in the United States (Brown, 2008). In the 2007 MLS survey of
establishments, respondents were asked a question about the primary
and secondary roles, or “business functions”, performed by laid-off
workers. According to Brown (2008, p. 56), “ ‘Do not know’ responses
to the business function question remained low [less than 6%], indicating
that the correct person is being reached for the interview and that most
respondents in fact think in terms of business functions”. In other words,
the BLS found business function data to be highly collectable because
company officials appear to recognize the business function concept.
A tabulation of respondents’ literal responses generated a very long,
non-exclusive list of business functions that were then coded by BLS
personnel to create detailed, mutually exclusive categories. This list was
further coded to nine higher-level business functions (named “business
processes” in the MLS), similar to the Porter list. It is the bottom-up
methodology used by the BLS – beginning with literal responses rather
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than using a list that researchers develop subjectively or iteratively with
industry informants – along with its exhaustive, exclusive, and generic
character, that gives us a high level of confidence in the BLS list.

6.2

A proposed list of business functions

The growing use of business function lists in survey research
suggests a need to delve within the firm to observe the details of
organizational design, organizational change, outsourcing and industrial
location. Clearly, new realities are spurring researchers to develop these
new metrics. In our view, the sooner a business function classification
scheme can be standardized and broadly deployed, the better.
Table 3 presents a proposed list of 12 business functions, along with
their definitions. The list adds four business functions to the 2007 BLS
MLS list. First, there is a function called “strategic management”. This
reflects the common separation of the command, control and strategysetting activities of top management from more mundane managerial
Table 3. Twelve generic business functions and their definitions
Business function

Definitions

1)

Strategic management

Activities that support the setting of product strategy (i.e. deciding what “new
product development” works on), choosing when and where to make new
investments and acquisitions, or sales of parts of the business, and choosing key
business partners (e.g. suppliers and service providers).

2)

Product or service
development

Activities associated with bringing a new product or service to market, including
research, marketing analysis, design and engineering.

3)

Marketing, sales and account Activities to inform buyers, including promotion, advertising, telemarketing, selling,
management
retail management.

4)

Intermediate input and
materials production

The fabrication or transformation of materials and codification of information to
render them suitable for use in operations

5)

Procurement

Activities associated with choosing and acquiring purchased inputs

6)

Operations (industry code)

Activities that transform inputs into final outputs, either goods or services. This
includes the detailed management of such operations. (In most cases, operations
will equate with the industry code of the establishment or the activity most directly
associated with the industry code.)

7)

Transportation, logistics and
distribution

Activities associated with transporting and storing inputs, and storing and
transporting finished products to customers.

8)

General management and
corporate governance

Activities associated with the administration of the organization, including legal,
finance, public affairs, government relations, accounting, and general
management.

9)

Human resource management Activities associated with the recruiting, hiring, training, compensating and
dismissing of personnel.

10) Technology and process
development

Activities related to maintenance, automation, design/redesign of equipment,
hardware, software, procedures and technical knowledge.

11) Firm infrastructure (e.g.
building maintenance and IT
systems)

Activities related to building maintenance, and ITC systems

12) Customer and after-sales
service

Support services to customers after purchase of good or service, including
training, helpdesks, customer support for guarantees and warranties.

Source: Adapted from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Mass Layoff Statistics Program.
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functions that can sometimes be located offshore and/or carried out in
supplier firms. The most recent BLS MLS surveys distinguish strategic
management from a set of “general management” functions. Second,
because they typically occur at nearly opposite ends of the value chain,
procurement has been separated from distribution, transportation and
logistics. Third, our list breaks out “intermediate input and materials
production” from operations. This is meant to capture the very common
practice of externally sourcing physical parts or blocks of services
for inclusion in larger products and systems. In the BLS MLS list,
intermediate input production is considered part of operations. Fourth,
because they contain very different activities, firm infrastructure has
been broken out from general management (and corporate governance).
Despite these differences, the lists are compatible, since the functions in
Table 3 can be combined to match the BLS MLS list.

6.3

Collecting data on the geography of
business functions

Although business function data can be used to inform other
research questions, as the BLS’ Mass Layoff Statistics Program does
in identifying the functional role of laid-off workers, our main interest
in using it is to identify patterns of business function bundling (i.e.
organizational design) and the locational characteristics of outsourcing
and offshoring. Because business functions can be bundled and located
differently, we can identify four non-exclusive quadrants for any given
function: 1) domestic in-house; 2) domestic outsourced; 3) offshore inhouse (i.e. the MNC affiliate); and 4) offshore outsourced. However,
it is important that business function surveys that seek to capture data
on global engagement be designed not only to capture all four, but
also the ways that firms combine them. Firms can, and typically do,
combine internal and external sourcing of specific business functions.
For example, some intermediate inputs may be produced in-house while
others are outsourced. Operations may be outsourced, but only when
internal capacity is fully utilized. Firms might combine internal and
external sourcing for strategic reasons (Bradach and Eccles, 1989).
The same can be said of location. Managers can decide to locate
business functions in proximate or distant locations, in high- or low-cost
locations, near customers, suppliers, specialized labour markets, and so
on, but most typically, they combine these approaches and motives. This
is why detailed information about the location of business functions is
of great interest. Surveys that identify sourcing locations and either
domestic or international are not very helpful. Outsourcing from the
24

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

United States to Germany, for example, will likely involve different
functions and have very different and motivations and implications than
outsourcing from the United States to China. But even on the domestic
front, outsourcing to a vendor in the same city is very different from
outsourcing to a supplier located in a distant, rural location.
The surveys on international sourcing fielded by Eurostat,
Statistics Canada and the Offshoring Research Network collect no
data on domestic locations and use predetermined lists of geographic
locations to identify countries of great interest (e.g. India, China), but
combine others into vast, amorphous groupings (e.g. “other Asia”). It is
better, in our view, to ask respondents to provide geographic information
according to city and country. In this way, a single question can begin to
identify, with great precision, both domestic and international patterns
of outsourcing and offshoring. Geographic aggregations can be made
after the fact, and detailed locational coordinates can allow the use of
geographic information system (GIS) software to create and examine a
host of potentially important variables (e.g. clustering, distances, travel
times, prevailing labour market conditions).
Data collected according to business function can provide
researchers and policymakers with a rough map of the value chain;
reveal the roles that domestic establishments, firms and industries play
within GVCs; and offer a unique view of the competitive pressures
facing domestic firms and industries. Over time, it will be possible
to develop a hierarchy of business functions to provide information
about business functions in greater detail, but in the shorter term, a
parsimonious, high-level list can provide important information, such
as an at-a-glance perspective on how enterprises bundle value chain
functions, and a benchmark for how this is changing. As metrics for
the key variables of GVC governance and the five GVC governance
modes described earlier are developed, they can be used to characterize
the internal and external linkages between specific business functions,
testing our assumptions about the relationships between GVC
governance and the “offshorability” and location of work. Nationally
representative surveys can begin to characterize business function gaps
and specializations in specific countries, while international surveys
can develop comparisons between trading partners. When combined
with existing data on employment, occupations, wages, worker career
paths, firm performance, e-commerce, trade etc., new data on business
functions will open up important new avenues for research and policy
analysis.
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6.4

A new European survey on business
functions

To provide an example of the usefulness of business function
data, we present some preliminary data from the EU Survey on
International Sourcing. So far, the survey has been administered in 14
out of 27 European Union (EU) member states and 60,000 responses
have been collected, but only the data from four Nordic countries have
been tabulated (see Nielsen, 2008 for details). Figure 3 and tables 4 and
5 overleaf show the results from Denmark, where the survey was carried
out as a census for all 3,170 private sector non-agricultural enterprises
with 50 or more employees.10 Because a few of the core questions were
mandatory, the response rate for this group of establishments was 97
per cent. The questions about business functions on this survey were
straightforward: Were business functions outsourced domestically or
internationally in the 2001-2006 period (table 4), and if so, what kind
of business partner was used (table 5), and (from a predetermined list)
where were internationally sourced functions located (figure 3).
The data in table 4 show that Danish firms sourced the majority
of business functions in-house. About 88 per cent were not engaged in
international sourcing of any kind. Facilities management was the most
commonly outsourced function (37 per cent), but because vendors provide
these services on-site, the source was invariably domestic. The business
function that was sourced internationally the most frequently was the
“core” function (10 per cent of all firms), analogous to “operations”
in table 3, followed by information technology and communications
(ITC) services. Twenty-nine percent of the 1,567 functions reported
as internationally sourced were core functions, followed by ITC
services (16 per cent), distribution and logistics functions (13 per cent),
engineering functions (11 per cent), administrative functions (10 per
cent), marketing and sales functions (10 per cent), and research and
development functions (9 per cent).
These data support anecdotal evidence that international sourcing
is most advanced in manufacturing (a “core” function for goodsproducing firms). This assumption gains further support when firms
reporting their core function as manufacturing are compared to serviceproducing firms. Only 28 per cent of service-producing firms in Denmark
reported international sourcing of their core function, while 70 per cent
10

The survey was also administered to 1,968 smaller Danish manufacturing and
business services firms. For simplicity’s sake, these data are not presented in this paper.
In general, they show similar patterns, but slightly less domestic and international
outsourcing across business functions than the sample of larger firms.

26

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

of manufacturing firms did so (Nielsen, 2008, p. 24). Table 5 shows that
less than half of the reported international sourcing by Danish firms in
the 2001–2006 period was to independent firms. The bulk of in-house
international sourcing went to existing affiliates, as opposed to recently
acquired or newly established “greenfield” affiliates.
Table 4. External and international sourcing of business functions by
Danish firms, 2001–2006
Business function

Not outsourcedd Domestically outsourced

Internationally sourced

Core function

88%

4%

10%

ICT services

71%

24%

6%

Distribution and logistics

82%

15%

4%

Administrative functions

90%

7%

4%

Engineering

88%

9%

4%

Marketing, sales etc.

91%

6%

3%

R&D

94%

3%

3%

Other functions

96%

4%

1%

Facility management

63%

37%

0%

Source: Eurostat International Sourcing Survey, courtesy of Statistics Denmark (Nielsen, 2008).
Notes:

n=3,170 Danish enterprises with more than 50 employees. Rows may not add to 100%
because a few firms reported more than one source for a given business function.

Table 5. Internationally sourced business functions by Danish firms, by
supplier type, 2001–2006
Business function

Existing
Recently
Recent greenfield Independent firm
affiliate acquired affiliate
affiliate
(< than 50% owned)

Core function

29%

8%

18%

46%

Distribution and logistics

43%

5%

15%

37%

Marketing, sales etc.

48%

8%

14%

30%

ICT services

46%

3%

6%

44%

Administrative functions

50%

3%

13%

34%

Engineering

33%

6%

16%

45%

R&D

34%

8%

9%

49%

Facility management

NA

NA

NA

NA

Other functions

9%

9%

0%

81%

Source: Eurostat International Sourcing Survey, courtesy of Statistics Denmark (Nielsen, 2008).
Notes:

n= 611 Danish enterprises engaged international sourcing.

Figure 3 summarizes the geography of international sourcing by
Danish firms. It shows that new EU member states (mostly in Eastern
Europe) account for 31 per cent of the cases of international sourcing
of core functions during the 2001–2006 period, followed by China (22
per cent) and old EU member states (19 per cent). When the focus is
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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shifted to ITC services, the importance of the new member states falls to
only 8 per cent, while old member states account for 57 per cent of the
cases of international sourcing. India, a country typically identified as a
destination for ITC outsourcing in the popular press and in qualitative
research, is identified as a source country in 12 per cent of the cases of
ITC sourcing, in comparison with only 5 per cent of the international
sourcing cases for core functions. International outsourcing of R&D and
engineering functions is also concentrated in Western Europe (42 per
cent) with China (9 per cent) and “other Asian” countries (8 per cent)
playing a larger role than in ITC services. Interestingly, the role of India
in R&D outsourcing is very small. The combined shares of marketing,
distribution and administrative functions show a more balanced pattern
across locations.
The results presented here are largely unsurprising. They
confirm both qualitative GVC research and, to some extent, popular
perceptions. Of the business functions that are sourced outside of
Denmark, 30% to 50% are outsourced to independent suppliers, a
substantial but not dominant share. Existing affiliates provide most of
the in-house international sourcing, but international acquisitions and
the establishment of new “greenfield” facilities are not unheard of. Core
functions, mostly manufacturing, are the most commonly outsourced and
offshored, followed by ITC services. Functions based on tacit and local
knowledge, such as marketing and sales, engineering, and R&D are less
likely to be internationally outsourced or offshored. Most international
sourcing by Danish firms is within Europe, but China is a popular
location for sourcing core functions (mainly manufacturing). While
India is more likely to be a source location for ITC service functions
(12 per cent of cases) than for core functions (5 per cent of cases), it is
notable that the majority (57 per cent) of instances of international ITC
services sourcing are to the original 12 member states of the EU.
While it is important to have our impressions confirmed, the
greater value of these data is that they establish a baseline for future
research. Is the practice of outsourcing to independent suppliers
becoming more prevalent? Will India grow as a location for ITC
sourcing at the expense of old European Union member states? Will the
outsourcing of engineering and R&D functions grow, and if so, where?
Will service-producing firms increase the outsourcing and offshoring
of core functions (operations)? If these are trends, then how quickly
will they progress? Will Eastern Europe lose out to East Asia? These
are some of the most pressing policy questions of the day. When and if
new rounds of business function data are collected, we will be in a much
better position to provide answers.
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What the Eurostat international sourcing survey did not collect
was employment and wage data according to business function. Such
data would begin to quantify the importance of specific business
functions within firms, industries and countries, and provide a benchmark
for comparison with other countries that could reveal patterns of
organizational design and national specialization within GVCs. It is our
hope that future surveys will collect these data. One way could be to code
census data that reveal performance metrics such as sales, employment
and payroll according to a business function framework.
Figure 3. International sourcing of business function by Danish firms,
2001–2006
Core function
United States
and Canada
4%

ITC services
EU 12 (new
member States)
31%

Other
2%

India
5%

EU 12 (new
Other
United States 1% member States)
and Canada
8%
4%
China
India
4%
12%
Other European
9%

Other European
7%

Other Asian
5%

Other Asian
10%

China
22%

EU 15 (old
member States)
57%

EU 15 (old
member States)
19%

Marketing distribution and administrative functions

R&D and engineering functions
United States
and Canada
5%

Other
3%

India
5%
Other European
6%
Other Asian
8%

EU 12 (new
member States)
18%

Other
2%
United States
and Canada
22%

EU 12 (new
member States)
11%
China
5%

China
9%
India
12%

EU 15 (old
member States)
46%

Other European
9%

EU 15 (old
member States)
30%
Other Asian
9%

Source: Eurostat International Sourcing Survey, courtesy of Statistics Denmark (Nielson, 2008).
Notes:

Other is Latin and South America plus Africa. Other Europe is Switzerland, Norway, Turkey,
the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine and the Balkan states. n=611 Danish enterprises
engaged international sourcing

7.

Conclusions

In the mosaic of value chain specialization and intermediate
goods flows that underlie the most recent trends in global integration,
ownership and capability development cannot so easily be linked to the
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domestic context, even if we allow that it is based in part on “borrowed”
technology. The implications for policy are far-reaching. How can
workers, firms and industries be provided with the best environment for
engaging with the global economy? How can we be sure that enough
wealth, employment, and innovative capacity are generated at home as
global integration proceeds? How much national specialization – and by
extension, interdependence with other societies – is too much? These
are open questions. Even if policymakers seek few direct interventions
in the areas of trade, industrial or innovation policy, global integration
can make the process of economic adjustment more difficult because it
accelerates the pace of change.
Because the picture of global integration provided by current
official statistics is incomplete, the causal links to economic
welfare indicators such as employment and wages tend be weak and
unconvincing. New thinking is required to develop useful insights into
the character and implications of our increasingly globally integrated
national economies. Perhaps the most pressing need is for new kinds
of data to be collected, data that shed light on the position of domestic
firms, establishments and workers in GVCs. As a partial solution to this
data gap, we advocate the collection of establishment-level economic
data according to a standardized set of generic business functions. We
share with Lall the desire to move beyond given industry and product
classifications, and to create broad analytical frameworks and data
collection tools to examine aspects of global integration that cut across
specific industries and countries. The GVC framework, the business
function scheme, and Lall’s technological classification of exports are
all attempts to create intellectual tools and data classification schemes
of exactly this sort.
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The co-evolution of international
business connections and domestic
technological capabilities: lessons
from the Japanese catch-up experience
An essay in memory of Sanjaya Lall
John Cantwell and Yanli Zhang*
We undertake an examination of the technological catch-up experiences
of the leading Japanese industrial firms in the twentieth century, based
on both qualitative and quantitative historical evidence. We argue
that the international business connections of Japanese firms had a
strong influence on the industrial composition of the catch-up of their
technological capabilities, and that in turn that catch-up has led to a
change in the nature and form of their international business connections.
We speculate on some similarities and differences with the current catchup of firms in emerging market economies.
Key words: technological catch-up, technology transfer, international
business connections, business networks, Japan, China

1.

Introduction

During the course of the twentieth century, and especially between
the 1920s and the 1970s, the largest Japanese firms caught up economically
and technologically with their United States and European counterparts (e.g.
Minami, 1994). Their technological capabilities were initially basic and
highly imitative, grounded on the achievement of operational efficiency and
standard product design, but over time, they steadily became more complex
and sophisticated, and increasingly knowledge-intensive. In the course of this
transition, they increasingly relied on knowledge creation and absorption,
leading to the development of internal research and development (R&D)
capabilities. At the firm level, the leading Japanese companies went from
being aspiring emulators of Western models of organization and technology
to being world-class companies in their own right. At the industry level, there
* John Cantwell is Professor of International Business at the Rutgers Business School,
Newark, New Jersey. Contact tel.: 973-353-5050; email: cantwell@business.rutgers.edu. Yanli
Zhang is Assistant Professor at Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey. Contact tel.:
973-655-7863; email: zhangy@mail.montclair.edu. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
generous help of Mr. Kyohei Hirano in providing data on the technology licensing and R&D
spending of Japanese firms in the postwar period. We are very happy to dedicate this paper to
the memory of Sanjaya Lall, who has strongly influenced our work. For John Cantwell, Sanjaya
remains a continual source of inspiration and a dear friend, with whom I shared many wonderful
moments, in Oxford, in Reading, in Italy, and at several other locations at various times.

was industrial upgrading, in the sense of a structural shift towards
industries whose products were more science-based or characterized
by more complex engineering methods and design capabilities (Ozawa,
2000, 2005). Such structural change tends to become more difficult as
a country or a national group of firms moves up to higher rungs on the
ladder of economic development (Lall, 2001).
The technological learning of firms has been a central part of every
catch-up story, although this micro aspect has often been neglected in the
macro-institutional and policy environment studies that have dominated
the catch-up literature (e.g. Gerschenkron, 1962; Fagerberg and Godinho,
2005). While these studies provide valuable discussions of the role of
the institutional changes that have facilitated catch-up at the national
level (such as in the banking or education systems), they typically have
little to say about the variations across firms and industries with regard
to the firm-specific factors associated with capability-building over
time. Unlike the neoclassical view of catch-up as the accumulation of
physical and human capital, the evolutionary perspective frames catchup as a process of gaining access to and mastery of the technologies used
by the leading countries of the era (Nelson and Pack, 1999). Firms are
repositories of knowledge/technology (Kogut and Zander, 1993), and
the competitive advantage of firms in a country is the foundation of
national competitiveness.
We know that firms co-evolve with their institutional environment
(Murmann, 2003; North, 1990), be it in the domestic or international
context. In the catch-up experience of developing countries, the
importance of international business connections for a country’s
development has been observed repeatedly (Dunning and Narula, 1996).
In Japan, international business connections played a critical role in
the catch-up of its firms, although the forms of these connections have
changed over time (Ozawa, 1997). The propensity of Japanese society
and firms for adopting and adapting foreign practices has long been
noted, and their approaches to catch-up emphasized imitation by the
leading firms of the more advanced western countries ever since the late
nineteenth century.1
Therefore, largely in accordance with the approach of Sanjaya
Lall (Lall, 1992, 2000), the central research question addressed in this
paper is somewhat different from the usual aggregate-level perspectives
offered by most economic development theories. We focus on the
changing relationship between international business connections
1
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and the technology development paths of the largest Japanese firms,
especially in terms of their changing industrial structure, allowing for
the specific context provided by the institutional environment in Japan.
In this paper, we argue that the evolution of the innovative
capabilities of the largest Japanese firms was strongly influenced by
their earlier international business connections. The industries in which
international business connections were most significant and most
effective were also those in which the subsequent catch-up of indigenous
capabilities were strongest – an effect that seems to have persisted in
a path-dependent fashion long after the relevant international business
connections were discontinued or loosened. Moreover, we contend
that there was also an effect in the reverse direction: as Japanese firms
caught up technologically, the nature and form of their international
business connections shifted over time. This was partly because there
was a change in the forms of international business connections sought
or required by large Japanese firms at different stages of development,
and partly because of changes in the relevant policy or support regime
provided by the Government.
More specifically, there was a shift from a strong form of
dependency in the interwar period on close affiliations or interactions
with foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Japan to the arm’s-length
cross-border licensing of foreign technology in the post-war period, while
all the time being accompanied by vigorous autonomous in-house R&D
efforts. However, while these looser international business connections
of cross-border licensing were sufficient in the early post-war period
to build world-class electrical equipment and motor vehicle industries,
they also led Japanese industry to become locked into a particular path
of locally driven development. Therefore, in more recent times, as world
leaders themselves in an environment of greater international knowledge
connectedness, Japanese firms have begun to shift back towards closer
forms of international business connections again. They have come to
recognize the desirability of building international innovation systems
involving cross-border networks (which may be, to some extent, at the
expense of the traditional domestic business groups), and hence require
a rise in both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI).
We claim further that studying the experience of firms in Japan
may offer some lessons for firms in other countries as well, once we
take account of the specificities of different historical periods. Bearing
in mind the different context for catch-up today compared to that of
50 years ago, we consider some aspects that firms in emerging market
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economies today may be able to learn from Japanese firms, as well as
those they may now need to do differently.
In the following sections, we examine Japanese firms’technological
catch-up and post-catch-up experience, beginning from the interwar and
post-war periods. In doing so, our goal differs from the predominant
approach in business research, in that we are trying to draw analytical
inferences from historical experience to help establish a framework for
examining the co-evolution of international business connections and
indigenous corporate technological capabilities, rather than imposing or
testing some given prior theory. The main contribution of our paper is in
our interpretation of the evidence and in making analytical connections
between various trends (notably between the paths of international
business connection and domestic firms’ capability-building) that are
consistent with the historical evidence. Based on archival evidence, and
on historical data on technology licensing and corporate patenting, we
note how the technological catch-up experience of Japanese firms relates
to their changing international business connections over time. Then, in
some concluding thoughts, we consider the extent to which one might
legitimately extrapolate from these historical lessons, and in doing so,
we speculate on some similarities and differences with the contemporary
experience of catching up in other emerging market economies, most
notably those in East Asia.
The paper is structured chronologically, to follow the relevant
sequence of catch-up processes that we are interpreting. In the next
section, we review the role and composition of the international business
connections of Japanese firms in the interwar period. These international
business connections played an extremely important role in the early
technological catch-up experience of Japanese firms, which benefited
a great deal from close relationships with foreign firms, which resulted
in knowledge spillovers and technology transfer. In the third section,
we consider the catch-up process of the post-war period. Japanese firms
initially borrowed and imitated foreign technologies acquired through
international licensing. At the same time, they engaged in their own R&D
to modify and recombine the technologies learned, and thereby gradually
built their own more advanced capabilities. We show that the industrial
composition of catch-up reflected the pattern of international business
connections from the interwar years, as well as the then contemporary
composition of technology licensing. In the fourth section, we examine
the shift back towards closer international business connections through
(outward as well as inward) FDI in more recent years, as Japanese firms
themselves have become world leaders and need to keep at the cutting
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edge of technology development worldwide. In the final section, we
discuss some observed similarities and differences in the catch-up of
firms in emerging market economies today, and reflect on how these
relate to the contemporary global economic environment.

2.

Interwar knowledge transfer and spillovers from
FDI

In this section, we focus on the first stage during the modern
Japanese catch-up process – the interwar period – and illustrate the
critical importance of inward FDI in the earlier phase of the technological
catch-up of Japanese firms. The main inferences we draw in this
section are as follows. First, when local capabilities are still at an early
stage of development, relatively close forms of international business
connections (which may include local participation through FDI) seem
more desirable. Second, in industries in which such close connections
can be established with innovative foreign firms, local capability
development can gain a substantial and lasting momentum.
After the Meiji Restoration of 1867, Japan made a determined
effort to catch up with the western countries. The Government put
special emphasis on education, entrepreneurship, and learning the
technologies and organizational systems of western countries. Hired
foreigners (Oyatoi Gaikokujin) played an important role in transmitting
scientific knowledge, mainly from the United States and Europe.
Through this continuous process, Japanese firms had accumulated
considerable technological capabilities by the beginning of the twentieth
century, which formed the foundation for their ability to absorb the new
technologies from western countries during the country’s industrial
revolution.
It is well known that during the interwar period, many leading
transnational corporations (TNCs) expanded their business in Japan. The
existence of foreign affiliates or joint ventures served as a fertile learning
ground for the acquisition of technical, managerial and organizational
knowledge in the host country (Chandler and Hikino, 1997; Lockwood,
1954). Being the key pioneers of modern technologies, these TNCs
were used as a model for the technological learning of Japanese firms.
It was a critical period, in which Japanese firms built the foundation
and capability needed for modern industries, and this capability enabled
Japanese firms to catch up quickly later, despite having to overcome the
devastation of the Second World War.
Many of the major Japanese companies today and their respective
industries benefited significantly from their interwar relationships with
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western companies. Japanese companies used the more mature industrial
technologies of their western partners as a model for their technological
learning and catch-up. Many alliances and joint ventures were formed
in the interwar period, mostly at the request of large Japanese enterprise
groups known as zaibatsu (the pre-Second World War predecessor of the
current keiretsu), as they were well aware that they were lagging behind
the West in their technologies and felt the urgency to catch up with
the advanced technologies and rapid rate of innovation in the Western
countries (Fujita, 1989). The size and power of the zaibatsu, the span over
different industries, and the breadth of technological capabilities within
zaibatsu groups allowed zaibatsu firms to better absorb a diversified set
of technologies from foreign partners, and brought about the process of
catching up over a broad front of technologies and products.
Thus, FDI in Japan during this period proved highly significant
in terms of its qualitative transformational effect, even though the total
value of inward FDI in Japan during the interwar period was small
(Dunning, 1983; Udagawa, 1989). Table 1 shows the state of the foreignaffiliated manufacturing companies operating in Japan surveyed by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1931. This table is illustrative
of the influence of inward FDI during the interwar period upon the
subsequent technology development paths of Japanese firms. According
to this survey, there were 88 foreign or jointly-owned companies
operating in Japan. We can see that the more competitive industries
found in Japan today generally had more linkages with foreign-owned
firms during the interwar period, especially in the case of firms in the
machinery and electrical apparatus industries. Corporate technology
development is a path-dependent and firm-specific process (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Cantwell and Fai, 1999), and the initial
conditions under which technology is developed are often critical for
the subsequent accumulation of capabilities. The evidence portrayed
in this table suggests that the foundation of what became the strongest
indigenous Japanese industries can be traced back to the linkages built
up with large western companies in the interwar period, and their success
at that time in utilizing these linkages effectively to learn and master the
then modern technologies in the process of catch-up.
In the remainder of this section, we turn to more detailed evidence
on two industries to showcase the significant role of international
business connections in the technology development of Japanese
firms. The focus here is on the motor vehicles and electrical equipment
industries, in both of which Japanese firms have grown to positions of
significant competitiveness in the post-war world economy.
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Table 1. Foreign-affiliated companies in Japan (manufacturing),
by product and type of ownership (as of January 1931)
I. Foreign corporations (sales offices): 29 companies
By country of origin
United States

By product
15

Machinery

18

United Kingdom

5

Electrical apparatus

3

Germany

5

Food

3

Switzerland

2

Movies

2

Czechoslovakia

1

Art

1

Luxembourg

1

Petroleum

1

Silk yarn

1

II. Corporations under Japanese law
A. Fully owned and operated by foreigners: 13 companies
By country of origin

By product
6

Electric apparatus, machinery,
automobiles, and food

2 in each

United Kingdom

5

Records, rubber products, petroleum,
machinery, and photographic paper

1 in each

Germany

2

United States

B. Mostly owned and operated by foreigners: 10 companies
By country of origin

By product

United States

6

Records

United Kingdom

2

Machinery

Germany

2

Automobiles and rubber products

5
3
1 in each

C. Jointly owned by foreigners and Japanese, operated by Japanese: 36 Companies
By country of origin

By product

United States

9

Electric apparatus

8

United Kingdom

9

Cotton yarn

6

Germany

8

Rayon

3

China

2

Steel

3

Switzerland

1

Wool products

2

France

1

Machinery, gas, glass, ice, celluloid,
matches

Unidentified

6

Unidentified

1 in each
6

Source: Udagawa (1989).

At the turn of the twentieth century, amid such rapid technical
advances in electrical machinery, Japanese companies found that the gap
in technology was too wide for them to bridge by themselves. Because
this was considered such an important and fast-developing industry,
most of the major electric machinery manufacturers in Japan (most of
them zaibatsu companies) established affiliation with leading western
companies in the interwar period to learn cutting-edge technologies. In
the heavy electrical equipment industry, for example, the four dominant
companies, which were all zaibatsu affiliates, all became associated
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(with the exception of Hitachi) with foreign heavy electrical machinery
manufacturers. Shibaura Engineering, an affiliate of the Mitsui zaibatsu,
formed a link with General Electric. Mitsubishi Electric, an affiliate
of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, formed an affiliation with Westinghouse
Electric in 1923 and offered Westinghouse 10 per cent of its stocks. The
Fuji Electric Co. was established in 1923 as a joint venture of Furukawa
Electric Industry, a company of the Furukawa zaibatsu, and Siemens
(Udagawa, 1989).
A particularly prominent example in the heavy electrical equipment
industry was the tie-up between two of the major Japanese companies –
Tokyo Electric and Shibaura Engineering – and General Electric, one of the
world’s most technologically advanced and diversified firms at that time
(and today). General Electric formed an equity joint venture with Tokyo
Electric in 1905 and Shibaura Engineering (Mitsui affiliated) in 1909, at
the request of the Japanese zaibatsu.2 General Electric received equity
– Tokyo Electric allotted 51 per cent of the stock to General Electric at
the start of the joint venture and Shibaura Engineering transferred 24.75
per cent of the stock to General Electric – for the technical assistance it
provided and also royalties for the sale of equipment. These associations
with General Electric allowed Tokyo Electric and Shibaura Engineering
to rapidly raise their technological levels and to diversify into related
technological fields. The joint ventures allowed Japanese electrical
equipment companies to receive technological know-how and guidance,
and also to buy plant and equipment. New production methods such
as the integrated production system of large United States companies
(vertical integration) were adopted, and the frequent dispatching of
personnel to the home base of the tie-up partner was critical to the
success of technological learning (Chokki, 1989; Fujita, 1989).
As the result of the technological assistance from General
Electric, Tokyo Electric’s light bulb production technology was rapidly
modernized. All the necessary plant and equipment was ordered from
General Electric. The output increased two-fold and the cost reduction
was large. The capacity to produce carbon filaments and metal caps was
boosted with the installation of production machinery with an output
capacity of 10,000 carbon filaments per day and a set of metal-capfabricating machinery. Furthermore, light bulbs produced by Tokyo
Electric were marketed after 1906 under the Edison trademark, and the
brand impact strengthened their acceptability in the national market
(Chokki, 1989). At the time of the joint venture with General Electric,
2
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Shibaura Engineering was the sole domestic maker of heavy electrical
machinery, but its production was limited to generators of less than 100
kW, far below the level of western makers (Chokki 1989; Fujita, 1989).
When the tie-up between Shibaura Engineering and General Electric
formally started in 1909, General Electric provided technical designs
and supplied necessary raw materials and parts, but sent only one or
two directors. General Electric received a royalty of 1 per cent of sales
(Fujita, 1989). Many key personnel dealing with design and production
in Shibaura Engineering were sent to General Electric in April 1910 to
study their technology and visit their factories. Shibaura Engineering
continued to send trainees to General Electric, and occasionally
dispatched employees to observe work and learn technologies at General
Electric. As a result of the connection with General Electric, Shibaura
acquired the ability to manufacture large generators, transformers and
induction motors. Subsequently, its productivity, profits and dividends
rose. Furthermore, this facilitated its entry into the manufacture of fans
and household appliances as well as radio communications equipment,
thereby establishing the foundation for developing into a general
electrical equipment manufacturer (Chokki, 1989).
As an illustration of General Electric’s technical support to
Shibaura Engineering, General Electric helped Shibaura Engineering
set up from scratch the new Tsurumi plant for electric locomotives, for
which General Electric provided total support in all aspects from building
the plant to technology provision and factory management (Chokki,
1989). Many materials from that time in the General Electric archive in
Schenectady (which we, the authors of this paper, have examined for this
purpose) attest to the significant help from General Electric to Japanese
firms and Japan’s massive modernization and electrification process.
Among them, we can find a warm personal letter from the president of
Shibaura Engineering to General Electric to thank it for its help in the
building of the Tsurumi plant after the 1923 Kanto Earthquake, pictures
of General Electric engineers working on the plant site as wll as in the
factories helping set up activities in the new plant. Articles from the
General Electric magazine (GE Digest) in the interwar period described
the relationships between General Electric and Shibaura Engineering
and Tokyo Electric, and how General Electric helped bring a broad
array of products that were new to Japan, including larger generators,
transformers and induction motors, household appliances and radio
communication, and motors for electric trains and the Tokyo subway
system.
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The motor vehicle industry was another new industry that emerged
in Japan during the interwar period under the aegis of American influence
(Wilkins, 1989). The indigenous motor vehicle industry in Japan started
from an entirely foreign-owned sector in the 1930s, when companies
such as Toyota and Nissan, both small start-up companies at that time,
decided to enter. Nissan bought the vehicle design and technology from
Graham-Paige (the 14th largest auto maker in the United States), and
acquired technological assistance from Graham-Paige and its suppliers.
Graham sold machinery, arranged for Nissan employees to study at its
plant, and also built a prototype for Nissan. Nissan signed contracts with
several of Graham’s suppliers in the United States and had them send
casting machinery to Japan, set it up, and teach Nissan engineers how
to operate it. Nissan also initially hired American engineers to direct all
Nissan’s operations and set up the production. These head engineers not
only taught the Japanese how to operate the equipment properly, but also
applied modern techniques for process control and standardization to
improve Nissan’s machine processing (Wilkins, 1989).
Unlike Nissan, Toyota developed its own vehicle from the very
beginning, by studying and reverse engineering the American vehicle
models, since Toyoda Automatic Loom (predecessor of Toyota) had
already accumulated engineering capabilities needed in automobile
production. Toyota engineers disassembled and studied American cars,
and the first car they built was a hybrid, with a Chrysler body, a Chevrolet
engine, and Chevrolet and Ford parts. Toyota also sent its employees to
visit foreign factories. For example, in January 1934, Toyoda Automatic
Loom’s specialist on engine casting visited Ford, General Motors,
Chrysler, Packard, Graham-Paige and others to study factory design,
parts manufacturing, and materials, and came back with machine tools
(Cusumano, 1985).
In spite of the different approaches that Nissan and Toyota took,
they both initially relied heavily on United States manufacturers, sending
employees to the United States to study factory design and operation,
vehicle assembly and parts manufacturing, and to obtain machine tools
and materials. Furthermore, the take-off and development of these two
companies owed much to the presence and efforts of Ford and GM
in Japan for setting up the infrastructure and training employees and
suppliers (Ozawa, 1997).
In the 1920s, Ford and General Motors established assembly
plants in Japan in response to the large demand for trucks by the Japanese
army. Attracted by the demand in Japan, Ford established Nippon Ford
(Ford Japan) in 1925, and later constructed a larger factory in Yokohama
46
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to assemble cars and trucks. In 1926, General Motors, impressed by
Ford’s profits in Japan, followed suit and opened its large plant in Osaka
in 1927 and started assembling vehicles in Japan. Besides cars, Ford
and General Motors also produced many trucks for military use, as well
as three-wheeled vehicles. Although no joint ventures were formed in
this industry, the demonstration effect (Dunning, 1958) from the local
presence of United States car companies in Japan was enormous. There
are principally four ways in which United States companies contributed
to the start-up and development of the Japanese motor vehicle industry.
First, as discussed above, the emerging Japanese car manufacturers
used American cars as their models. In spite of the different approaches
that Nissan and Toyota took, they both benefited a great deal from
sending personnel to United States car companies. At that time, United
States companies such as Ford and GM were not afraid to transfer their
technology to Japanese manufacturers; they had no fears about nurturing
future competitors because of their own strength and confidence
(Wilkins, 1989). At one point, around 1935, Ford was even prepared
to transfer technology for the highest value-added components – the
transmission mechanism and the engine – to Toyota in order to form a
joint venture to allow it go into manufacturing, although it failed to do
so due to government and army opposition (Mathews, 1996).
Second, Ford and GM trained and developed automobile parts
suppliers, which were critical to establishing a local motor vehicle
industry. As Ford and General Motors began assembly operations, they
began to buy parts locally in line with their worldwide practice. One of
Ford’s early suppliers was Nissan, and Nissan acknowledged that its
major motive for becoming a supplier to Ford was to learn (Cusumano,
1985). Local suppliers trained by Ford and General Motors became
a critical factor for Japanese local companies in their attempt to start
an indigenous motor vehicle industry. In the mid-1930s, when Toyota
and Nissan decided to manufacture motor vehicles, there were already
a group of capable local suppliers. Subsequently, these suppliers were
urged to defect from Ford and GM, and sell to Japanese companies
(Wilkins, 1989).
Third, Ford and GM set up a dealer network in Japan and adapted
it to the Japanese market. Their networks were later utilized, imitated
and taken over by Japanese car companies. The dealership system is
an American innovation that contributed greatly to the development
of the motor vehicle industry. Before Ford and GM began operations
in Japan, there were no sales agents dealing in such durable consumer
goods as automobiles. Ford and GM therefore both developed their own
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dealer organizations in Japan. By about 1930, Ford and GM each had
between 70 and 80 franchised dealers, and had set up qualifications
and regulations for their dealers. In that sense, the automobile industry
in Japan had from its outset an extremely modern and rational sales
organization (Udagawa, 1981).
Fourth, American companies trained Japanese personnel for
assembly operation, purchasing and sales, who later contributed to the
local industry’s development. In the case of Ford, it started with mainly
foreign personnel. Over time, Ford hired more Japanese employees. By
1932, Ford had 381 Japanese employees and GM had 719 (Mason, 1987).
Many of them later worked for Japanese motor vehicle companies, taking
the skills and knowledge they had learned with them. The personnel
linkage effects in this industry were formidable. For example, Kamiya
Shotaro, the highest-ranking Japanese staff member at GM, joined
Toyota in 1935 as sales manager. Together with the knowledge of a
good sales network, he brought with him Hinode Motors, a leading GM
dealer and two of his principal subordinates in the sales and publicity
department, and he also went about convincing Ford and GM dealers to
join the Toyota organization (Cusumano, 1985). Technological progress
played an important role in Japan’s economic growth. As estimated by
Minami (1992), 65 per cent of the growth of per capita production in
mining and manufacturing in the period 1908–1938 is accounted for
by the residual factors, i.e. mainly technological progress. The main
sources of this technological progress were both developing indigenous
technology and learning from foreign technology (Odagiri and Goto,
1996).

3.

Post-war technology licensing and structural
upgrading

However, like the situation in the other industries, the dominant
position of American companies in the Japanese market in the late 1920s
generated opposition from the army and the Government. Later, they
began to make conditions increasingly difficult for the United Statesowned companies. Realizing that Japanese firms had, by then, built up
their own basic capabilities, the Government started to limit foreign
businesses in Japan. In the case of the electrical equipment industry and
motor vehicle industries, as local capability accumulation progressed, the
desired form of international business connections became one of looser
and less direct relationships, but those industries and firms that had once
enjoyed close international business connections continued to benefit
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from the strong initial momentum that they had gained, collaborating
with foreign firms for a considerable time to come.
In the case of General Electric, towards the later part of the
interwar period, the growth in domestic Japanese firms, together with
nationalism and militarism, resulted in General Electric’s involvement
in Japan being sharply reduced (Chokki, 1989). In the early 1930s, the
Board of Directors of Tokyo Electric expressed a desire to reduce the
“foreign” influence. The company decreased its capital stock, gradually
reacquiring General Electric’s holdings, which were cut from 57.0 per
cent in 1931 to 32.5 per cent in 1936. In July 1939, Tokyo Electric and
Shibaura Engineering merged to form Tokyo Shibaura (or Toshiba).
At first, General Electric’s share was 32.8 per cent, with the secondlargest shareholder being the Mitsui zaibatsu at 14.8 per cent. But not
long afterwards, General Electric’s share in the company was halved
(Wilkins, 1982).
In the case of the motor vehicle industry, by the 1930s, the
Government had passed legislation which allowed only Japanese
companies to manufacture locally. The most important pre-war
legislation, passed in 1936, restricted imports and assembly of vehicles
by foreign companies in Japan. Ford and GM tried to bypass Government
regulation by forming joint ventures with Toyota or Nissan, but failed
to do so due to Government and army opposition (Wilkins and Hill,
1964). The result was that whereas Japan Ford, Japan General Motors
and other foreign companies had accounted for more than 95 per cent of
new vehicle registrations between 1926 and 1935, the production share
of Nissan, Toyota, and Isuzu rose to nearly 57 per cent by 1938 and
to 100 per cent in 1938, when Japan Ford and Japan General Motors
ceased operating and Japanese motor vehicle companies had practically
taken over the market, supplier network, and employees of Ford and
GM in Japan (Cusumano, 1985).
We can see that the Government’s policies towards FDI, which
were initially encouraging but became restrictive later, played a central
role in the development of modern Japanese industries. The Government
and indigenous firms would take the lead in inviting foreign companies to
invest in Japan or to set up joint ventures, but would then limit or eliminate
their operations once local firms had learned the modern technologies
from foreign firms and achieved a certain level of capabilities. What
this suggests is that policy and firm capabilities co-evolved through the
different phases of catch-up, rather than one leading the other.
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Another example in this regard is the telephone industry. Having
become dissatisfied with the quality of telephone sets produced by
Japanese firms, the Ministry of Communications sent officials to the
United States and Europe and adopted some of the Western Electric
system (Mason, 1989). At the strong encouragement of the Government,
in 1899, Western Electric combined with the Japanese company Iwadare
Kunihiko to form the joint venture Nippon Electric Company Ltd.
(NEC). At its inception, the company’s capital was 200,000 yen, and the
initial Western Electric holding was 54 per cent of the shares (MorrisSuzuki, 1994).
However, in common with the fate of many other industries
with significant involvement of foreign companies, government
policy subsequently changed. In the late 1920s, the authorities began
to shift more of their procurement to Japanese-run manufacturers such
as Oki Electric and Toa Electric – which by then had become able
producers of many types of communications equipment. The Ministry
of Communications took this new policy direction one step further
and decided in 1930 that only telephone manufacturers whose capital
was primarily held by Japanese interests would qualify for privileged
consideration in domestic procurement (Mason, 1989).
Owing to the rising power of the military leading up to the Second
World War, TNCs were practically forced out of Japan in the 1930s.
After the Second World War, FDI in Japan was highly restricted for
many years, and Japanese firms relied on licensing in place of FDI
for technology transfer, which was possible because Japanese firms
had already built a foundation for modern industries from their earlier
direct involvement with foreign companies through joint ventures or the
presence of foreign TNCs in Japan. The leading Japanese industrial firms
had achieved a certain level of absorptive capacity, so that they could
rely on arm’s-length licensing to fulfil their technological requirements
in the post-war period.
The Government regulated technology importation, guided the
direction of technology imports, and approved technology licensing
agreements on a case-by-case basis. The Foreign Investment Law, enacted
in 1950, was to promote an inflow of foreign capital and technology. In
1950, there were only 27 technology purchase contracts with an effective
life of more than a year, but subsequently this number grew markedly to
reach 1,061 in 1969 (Ozawa, 1974). Technology imports contributed a
great deal to the post-war development of technological capabilities in
Japanese firms.
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R&D by indigenous firms in Japan was stimulated and accompanied
by licensed technologies. Thus, licensing and R&D together provided
the foundations for the performance of Japanese firms. The structure
of what became the most successful post-war Japanese industries and
their leading companies was built on the technological foundations laid
in the interwar period with the assistance of foreign firms. The pattern
of technological specialization was then augmented through inward
technology licensing, which was reinforced and further enhanced by
firms’ own increasing R&D efforts. In particular, we can clearly see
a pattern of path-dependency with steady industrial upgrading in the
technological endeavours of Japanese firms from the 1920s through to
the 1980s.
After the Second World War, the zaibatsu groups were broken
up by the Occupation Authorities. However, owing to the long-standing
institutional tradition, a new form of inter-firm networking, the keiretsu,
soon emerged in place of the original zaibatsu. The keiretsu differed
from the pre-war zaibatsu in that companies were now more loosely
connected. No holding company was allowed, and they did not have
the kind of monopoly power that the pre-war zaibatsu had once enjoyed
(Bieda, 1970).
Table 2 shows the number of technology introduction contracts
over the period 1950–1997. From this table emerge the dual themes of
path-dependency (from the international business connections of the
interwar period) and industrial upgrading of technology development
(drawing upon international business connections through licensing in
the post-war years). This table shows that three industries – chemicals,
machinery (which includes general machinery, transportation equipment
and precision machinery), and electrical machinery – consistently
accounted for around 60–80 per cent of the technology introduction
contracts during the post-war years. The industry classification here is
a broad one, partly due to data constraints, but it is convenient for our
purposes since it also reflects the primary technological categories. The
predominance of these industries in technology licensing owed much to
the post-war industrial policy of the Government, especially in the early
years, which prioritized the chemical and heavy (machinery and transport)
industries. But more importantly, it also shows the path-dependency and
the self-reinforcing tendency of technology development. As each of
these industries had built up a significant prior technical base during
the interwar years, they were more readily able to absorb foreign
technology. Thereafter, we see a fast and steady growth of technology
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imports in these industries, which happened to the greatest extent in the
electrical machinery industry, enabling it to surpass the other industries
and become the leader in foreign technology introduction from 1982.
Table 2. The average number of foreign technology introduction
in major Japanese industries
(Number of contracts)
Fiscal year

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Manufacturing (A)

76

188

252

235

213

184

310

254

242

Chemicals

32

61

71

59

81

69

134

101

Machinery

27

51

80

40

29

46

50

40

Electrical machine

378

588

601

757 1,137

75

111

173

143

155

231

45

104

138

172

260

429

6

20

32

61

33

20

20

34

19

38

113

75

100

167

Subtotal (B)

65

132

183

160

143

135

204

175

139

253

424

390

515

827

Ratio (B/A)

86

70

73

68

67

73

66

69

57

67

72

65

68

73

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1,041

958 1,153 1,295 1,744 1,629 1,768 2,007 2,403 2,450 2,093 1,836 1,893 1,914 2,139 2,116 2,142

233

195

247

292

362

264

361

390

358

354

335

234

212

232

255

265

298

343

376

439

399

582

638

547

655

746

768

618

561

675

570

723

666

709

106

126

102

146

256

225

229

257

349

367

249

304

297

404

377

416

414

682

697

788

837 1,200 1,127 1,137 1,302 1,453 1,489 1,202 1,099 1,184 1,206 1,355 1,347 1,421

66

73

68

65

69

69

64

65

61

61

57

60

63

63

63

64

66

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
2,076 2,229 2,212 2,378 2,436 2,361 2,709 2,834 2,898 3,211 3,175 3,224 3,029 3,161 3,901 3,145 2,685
228

201

208

190

258

215

221

246

240

218

214

226

175

180

176

170

126

600

595

535

526

530

479

452

506

451

441

428

388

344

354

351

330

312

448

633

696

817

900

934 1,274 1,341 1,604 1,972 1,988 2,132 2,023 2,092 2,105 1,996 1,735

1,276 1,429 1,439 1,533 1,688 1,628 1,947 2,093 2,295 2,631 2,630 2,746 2,542 2,626 2,632 2,496 2,173
62

64

65

65

69

69

72

74

79

82

83

85

84

83

68

79

81

Source: Data kindly made available by Kyohei Hirano at Kobe University, compiled from
Kagakugijyutsucho [Agency of Science and Technology] (each year), Gaikoku Gijyutsu
Donyu Nenji Hokoku [Annual Report on Foreign Technology Introduction], Kagakugijyutsucho
Kagakugijyutsuseisaku Kenkyuijyo [Science and Technology Policy Research Institute] (each
year), Gaikoku Gijyutsu Donyu no Gaiyo [Summary on Foreign Technology Introduction].

With the introduction of foreign technologies, the R&D
expenditures of Japanese firms also started to increase in the late
1950s. Japanese firms did not simply imitate foreign technologies.
The technology imports of Japanese firms were complemented by
their own vigorous efforts in R&D. Japanese firms invested heavily in
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R&D, which proved crucial in developing the knowledge to support
the steady building of the organizational capabilities needed to absorb
foreign technologies; to learn how they could best apply them in the
specific Japanese context; to modify and recombine technologies; and to
innovate around them and improve upon them. Table 3 shows the R&D
expenditures of the three major sectors of manufacturing (corresponding
to the sectors in table 2) from 1959 to 1998. In line with the findings
of table 2, table 3 also exhibits the themes of path-dependency and
industrial upgrading. Again, the three industries – chemicals, machinery,
and electrical machinery – consistently accounted for around 70–80 per
cent of total corporate R&D expenditures in manufacturing, with the
Table 3. R&D expenditures in major Japanese industries
(In millions of yen)
Fiscal Year

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

Manufacturing (A)

858 1,121 1,430 1,614 1,881 2,234 2,320 2,688 3,505 4,646 5,780 7,609

Chemicals

234

270

368

420

524

657

627

691

913 1,108 1,373 1,751

Machinery

156

249

280

297

363

472

523

616

817 1,116 1,371 1,863

Electrical machinery

212

281

390

434

504

507

515

652

858 1,258 1,693 2,278

Subtotal (B)

602

800 1,038 1,151 1,391 1,636 1,665 1,959 2,588 3,482 4,437 5,892

Ratio (B/A)

70.2

71.4

1974

1975

1971

1972

1973

72.6
1976

71.3
1977

74.0

73.2

1978

71.8

1979

72.9

1980

73.8
1981

74.9
1982

76.8
1983

77.4
1984

8,107 9,532 11,935 14,594 15,365 17,274 19,231 20,987 24,471 28,956 33,742 37,555 42,572 47,765
1,937 1,992 2,382 3,042 3,221 3,519 3,860 4,042 4,898 5,583 6,174 6,875 7,745 8,528
2,088 2,594 3,329 4,231 4,409 4,684 5,862 6,339 7,085 8,287 9,963 10,871 11,850 13,131
2,292 2,767 3,415 3,974 4,005 4,917 5,013 5,805 6,942 8,172 10,062 11,764 14,162 16,345
6,317 7,353 9,126 11,247 11,635 13,120 14,735 16,186 18,925 22,042 26,199 29,510 33,757 38,004
77.9

77.1

76.5

77.1

75.7

76.0

76.6

77.1

77.3

76.1

77.6

78.6

79.3

79.6

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

55,436 57,396 61,012 67,546 77,062 86,603 91,954 89,711 84,546 83,655 87,744 92,632 98,164 98,071
9,364

9,836 10,959 11,902 13,139 14,168 15,477 16,047 15,614 15,488 15,549 15,933 16,093 16,309

15,201 15,681 15,926 17,762 20,697 24,822 24,971 24,778 22,797 22,502 24,215 26,112 28,703 29,174
19,382 19,800 21,635 24,516 28,081 31,463 33,828 32,205 30,198 30,648 32,736 34,936 37,194 37,128
43,947 45,317 48,520 54,180 61,917 70,453 74,276 73,030 68,609 68,638 72,500 76,981 81,990 82,611
79.3

79.0

79.5

80.2

80.3

81.4

80.8

81.4

81.1

82.0

82.6

83.1

83.5

84.2

Source: Data kindly made available by Kyohei Hirano at Kobe University, compiled from
Kagakugijyutsucho [Agency of Science and Technology] (each year), Gaikoku Gijyutsu
Donyu Nenji Hokoku [Annual Report on Foreign Technology Introduction], Kagakugijyutsucho
Kagakugijyutsuseisaku Kenkyuijyo [Science and Technology Policy Research Institute] (each
year), Gaikoku Gijyutsu Donyu no Gaiyo [Summary on Foreign Technology Introduction].
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electrical machinery industry showing the fastest rate of upgrading,
allowing it to surpass the chemical and machinery industries in R&D
from the 1980s onward.
In the 1960s, Japanese firms began to produce their own original
technology derived from internal learning processes (Ozawa, 1974).
With technology imports and firm R&D, the corporate patenting of
Japanese firms began to take off from the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Our examination of United States patents granted to Japanese firms
shows that corporate patenting was not significant until the late 1960s.
For example, we looked into the number of patents of the Toyota Group
(including the Toyota Motor Company and its key affiliated suppliers
such as Aisin Seiki, Nippon Denso) from the 1920s to the 1960s, as
shown in table 4. We see that Toyota had no or very few patents before
the 1960s; this number began to grow in the mid-1960s, but starting
from 1969, the number of patents almost doubled each year, from 14 in
1968 to 204 in 1972, over a four-year period.
Thus, table 5 shows the patenting activities of Japanese firms since
1969. It indicates the annual average of Japanese patents granted by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) based on four- or
five-year intervals from 1969 to 1995. Due to the different sources of the
data, the industry classifications in tables 5 and 6 are more detailed than
in tables 2 and 3. The machinery industry in tables 2 and 3 is aggregated
to include general machinery, transportation equipment and precision
machinery. In table 5 we see that the six major Japanese industries listed
here accounted for a substantial proportion of innovative activity, around
Table 4. Number of United States patents by the Toyota Group
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s
Year

Number of United States patents
Year
by the Toyota Group

Number of United States patents
by the Toyota Group

1920–1956

0

1965

1957

0

1966

11
8

1958

0

1967

15

1959

0

1968

14

1960

0

1969

35

1961

1

1970

58

1962

3

1971

125

1963

3

1972

204

1964

3

…

…

Source: 		Information compiled by the authors from the United States Index of Patents, and the United
States Patent Gazette, 1920–1972, both published by the USPTO (United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
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90 per cent of the total patents in manufacturing by Japanese firms, with
four industries – namely electrical machinery, transport, chemicals and
instruments – being particularly intensive in their patenting efforts. We
can also see that the electrical machinery industry stands out in that it had
the highest number of patents consistently throughout the period 1969–
1995. The strong foundation in electrical machinery manufacturing that
Japanese firms built in the interwar period helped them catch on to the
fast technological growth in this area and contributed a great deal to the
technological prowess of Japan (Cantwell, 1992; Mowery and Teece,
1992). In addition, the transport and instruments industries also showed
high patent number growth, and they had caught up with chemicals and
joined the rank of top Japanese performers in patenting by the 1990s.
The pattern of patenting shown here in different industries
helps to further illustrate the dual themes of path-dependency and
upgrading in technology development. On the one hand, we see the
theme of continuity, in that the industries that have the most patents
tend to be those that had earlier built up a foundation of capabilities in
the interwar period and had also benefited from technology licensing
in the early post-war period. On the other hand, we also see the theme
of technology evolution and upgrading, as Japanese firms have been
continuously innovating to broaden the industrial base they laid earlier.
This is particularly reflected in the rapidly rising number of corporate
patents in each of the industries, but most prominently in the electrical
machinery, transport and instrument industries, probably due to the
importance of technological progress in these industries in the post-war
Table 5. Number of patents in major Japanese industries
(average number of United States patents granted per year)
1969–72

1973–77

1978–82

1983–86

1987–90

1991–95

2,000

3,656

4,650

7,792

11,948

14,242

Chemicals

435

734

757

1,023

1,569

1,704

Metals

115

222

235

398

550

754

32

100

162

230

276

291

Electrical machinery

814

1,253

1,648

3,190

5,322

7,251

Transport

231

569

830

1,511

2,104

1,706

Instruments

153

361

588

932

1,462

1,824

Subtotal (B)

1,780

3,239

4,219

7,284

11,281

13,530

Ratio (B/A)

0.89

0.89

0.91

0.93

0.94

0.95

Manufacturing (A)

Non-electrical machinery

Source: United States patent database compiled by Professor John Cantwell, with the cooperation of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
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period, and because these engineering-based areas best represented the
comparative advantage in innovation of Japanese firms in developing
smaller, cheaper and more efficient products.
Table 6 reports the export performance of the major Japanese
industries from 1950 to 2000. From this table, we can see that total
Japanese exports have been growing rapidly ever since the 1950s.
This growth was especially marked during the high-growth period in
the 1960s and 1970s, with exports growing five- or six-fold during the
periods 1961–1971 and 1971–1980. At the same time, we can also see
that the six major industries listed here played an increasingly important
role in the export performance of the Japanese economy, with their
combined share in total exports rising from 36 per cent in 1951 to 76
per cent in 1971, and to over 85 per cent after 1980. This is consistent
with the pattern of technology acquisition of Japanese firms displayed
in table 5, and demonstrates the competitive performance that resulted
from their increasing innovative capabilities.
Thus, Japan’s post-war development can be represented as a
structural upgrading process which passed through several consecutive
stages of transformation, proceeding from simpler to more sophisticated
technologies (Ozawa, 2000). The data presented in the tables above
show the industrial upgrading of the Japanese economy, the process
of technological accumulation, and the growing importance of the
transportation and electrical machinery industries. Especially in the
electrical machinery industry, Japanese firms were able to capitalize
upon the dynamic nature of this industry and its central position in the
Table 6. Export performance of major Japanese industries
(Millions of United States dollars)
Industry
Chemicals
Metals

1951

1961

1971

1980

1990

2000

52

205

1,698

7,050

15,399

33,906
26,452

312

621

4,576

21,334

19,562

Non-electrical machinery

61

313

2,448

16,876

45,526

78,769

Electrical machinery

15

337

2,874

24,263

85,242

149,279

Transport equipment

30

455

5,269

34,370

71,827

100,428

Instruments

13

106

1,464

6,479

15,119

38,667

Subtotal (B)

483

2,037

18,329

110,372

252,675

427,501

1,355

4,236

24,019

129,248

286,965

479,247

0.36

0.48

0.76

0.85

0.88

0.89

Total exports (A)
Ratio (B/A)

Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years from 1951 to 2000, published by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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current technological paradigm (Freeman and Louçã, 2001), and used it
as an engine of growth and a source of inter-industry spillovers.

4.

Back to FDI and knowledge sourcing through
closer international business ties in the post
catch-up era

After being defeated and left with a devastated economy, Japan had
successfully caught up with western countries within only a generation.
Japanese industrial firms became highly competitive in the world, with
about one in six of the world’s largest firms coming from Japan. The
successful catch-up of Japan has been attributed, to a large extent, to
its achievement in the area of technology, as we have seen the growth
in the number of United States patents by Japanese firms (table 5).
Japanese patenting in the United States increased by more than 650 per
cent during the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, far greater
than any other industrial economy (Mowery and Teece, 1992). By the
late 1980s, Japanese firms had become the acknowledged technology
leaders in many advanced industries.
The primary contention we set out to establish in this section is that
as the technological capabilities of firms become more advanced and as the
environment for innovation becomes more globally interconnected, firms
must rely increasingly on closer cross-border relationships for knowledge
exchange that include FDI, and international inter-firm networks. With
Japanese firms becoming technological leaders themselves, technology
imports via licensing have become increasingly inadequate to keep them
at the cutting edge of technological development. At the same time, in
an increasingly globalized and knowledge-based economy in which
technologies have become more complex, interrelated and locationally
dispersed and differentiated with local pockets of expertise, firms are
finding it necessary to tap into capabilities residing elsewhere to keep
pace with the fast-developing technologies (Cantwell, 1989; Cantwell
and Mudambi, 2005; Dunning, 1996a; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997).
The technology strategies of Japanese firms post-catch-up began to
shift again to place more emphasis on outward FDI and overseas R&D
investment.
The growing success and technological competitiveness of
Japanese industries gave rise to a growth in outward FDI from the 1970s
onwards. Table 7 shows the outward FDI stock of the major Japanese
industries from the 1970s to the 2000s. As we can see, following the
growth of corporate innovation, outward FDI began to take off by the
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

57

late 1970s, and the growth of FDI stock was particularly rapid in the
1980s. Industry-wise, we see that again, electrical machinery took over
the leading position in the total stock of outward FDI from the 1980s
onwards.
Table 7. Stock of outward FDI in major Japanese industries
(Millions of United States dollars)
1984

1990

1995

2000

2004

Chemicals

1960 1965 1970

1,369 2,626 3,849

1977

1980

10,940

18,784

37,568

73,767

Metals

1,051 2,619 4,805

74,081

10,308

18,783

37,566

Non-electrical machinery

513

894 1,619

7,932

10,958

21,916

43,319

Electrical machinery

843 1,579 3,234

20,360

26,016

52,032

103,221

538

10,880

15,143

30,286

60,034

Transport
Total

979 2,746

529 1,394 4,339 21,223 36,497 71,431 310,808 445,692

889,990 1,754,418

Source: IRM Directory of Statistics of International Investment and Production, Dunning and Cantwell,
London, Macmillan, 1987; World Investment Directory, UNCTAD, 1992; and JETRO.

Realizing the importance of global technology sourcing, Japanese
firms began investing intensively in R&D sites abroad. Japanese R&D
investments overseas have grown rapidly since the 1980s (e.g. Berry,
2006; Granstrand, 1999; Kogut and Chang, 1991; Iwasa and Odagiri,
2004; Pearce and Papanastassiou, 1996; Penner-Hahn and Shaver,
2005). According to Florida and Kenney (1994), as of 1990, Japanese
corporations operated 174 stand-alone R&D laboratories in the United
States alone and spent $1.2 billion on United States-based R&D, up
from $307 million in 1987. Granstrand (1999) found that foreign R&D
expenditures in selected leading Japanese corporations grew very fast,
at a 48 per cent annual growth rate, over four times as fast as the annual
growth of their total R&D expenditures (11 per cent), raising their
foreign share of R&D expenditures from 1.58 per cent in 1987 to 5 per
cent in 1991.
Empirical studies on overseas R&D by Japanese firms have found
that knowledge sourcing is one major motivation for overseas R&D,
particularly in the United States and Europe (Florida and Kenney, 1994;
Granstrand, 1999). The R&D sites of Japanese firms abroad usually serve
either or both of two purposes: to engage in product adaptation and to tap
into the local science and technology base (Papanastassiou and Pearce,
1994). While demand considerations (i.e. to support local production
and markets) are still important, creating access to foreign science
and technology was the strongest driving force behind the increase in

58

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

internationalization of Japanese R&D across sectors (Granstrand, 1999;
Florida and Kenney, 1994; Freeman, 1987).
Similarly, Florida and Kenny (1994) found from their
comprehensive data on Japanese R&D labs in the United States that
although a large share of Japanese overseas R&D facilities are product
development facilities that customize products for the local host
country market and provide technical support to manufacturing, a
smaller but significant number of Japanese overseas R&D investments
are scientifically oriented basic research facilities, located near major
research centres and universities. Their objective is to secure access to new
sources of scientific and technical talent, and to harness the knowledge
and ideas embedded in regionally based centres of innovation. It is
these types of overseas R&D facilities that have engaged in active and
effective knowledge sourcing (Belderbos, 2003; Todo and Shimizutani,
2005). They have tended to be heavily concentrated in technologically
advanced industries such as electronics and automobiles, and many of
them are located in regional innovation clusters, such as Silicon Valley
in electronics and the Detroit area in automotive technology (Freeman,
1987; Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004).
However, despite the vigorous R&D investments abroad,
innovation originating from overseas has played a minor role for
Japanese firms (e.g. Belderbos, 2001; Patel, 1995; Cantwell and Zhang,
2006). Table 8 examines the share of United States patents of the largest
Japanese-owned firms attributable to overseas research in the context
of the world’s largest firms from other countries of origin. Overall,
the share of foreign-located R&D by Japanese-owned firms in the
most recent period is only 1.08%, compared with the world average of
11.24%. Japan’s low degree of internationalization has been unusual in
comparison with the other industrialized economies, which Japan had
caught up with long ago.
This unusually low degree of internationalization of innovation
of Japanese-owned companies can be largely attributed to the particular
institutional characteristics of Japan, most notably the Japanese system
of innovation. It seems more difficult for Japanese firms to integrate
R&D abroad with their core innovation networks at home because of
the closely-knit R&D organization of these firms. Westney (1994) found
that the Japanese system of innovation often involves the development
of a domestic R&D network that runs even more extensively than
usual (for large companies), beyond the boundaries of individual firms.
Therefore, as Japanese-owned companies have expanded their networks
across international borders, they have found that integrating offshore
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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R&D centres and foreign partners into these networks is more difficult
than they had anticipated, partly because of the already complex system
of innovation at home, and partly because they often need to involve the
same set of domestic partners abroad.
The institutional environment also explains why Japan is such a
minor recipient of inward FDI compared with other large economies.
Japan’s FDI outward stock in 2001 was about 6 times higher than its
inward stock, and this gap has only been decreasing slightly since the
mid-1990s (UNCTAD, 2006). In the period 1988–1990, only 1.4 per
cent of the total FDI flows from the United States and EC countries went
to Japan (Pearce and Papanastassiou, 1996, p. 6), and sales of foreignowned firms in Japan around 1993 accounted for only 1 per cent or so
its GNP, compared with 5 per cent or so in other advanced host countries
such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
(Yoshitomi and Graham, 1996). The main reason is that inward FDI into
Japan was severely restricted during the post-war years, and this policy
has only been relaxed since the 1990s, associated with an increasing
Table 8. The share of United States patents of the world’s largest firms
attributable to research in foreign locations, organized by the nationality
of the parent firms, 1969–1995
(Percentage)
Country
United States

1969-72

1973-77

1978-82

1983-86

1987-90

1991-95

4.91

5.88

6.41

7.54

7.91

8.63

Germany

12.77

11.05

12.07

14.47

17.05

20.72

United Kingdom

32.27

33.41

32.95

37.76

39.95

43.01

Italy

13.39

16.03

13.85

12.59

11.14

16.47

France

8.16

7.74

7.17

9.19

18.17

33.18

Japan

2.63

1.88

1.22

1.26

0.93

1.08

Netherlands

63.07

57.32

55.60

61.78

59.52

62.79

Belgium

50.00

54.32

56.27

71.21

59.04

67.25

Switzerland

44.36

43.63

43.78

41.59

42.99

52.47

Sweden

17.82

19.90

26.20

28.94

30.60

42.42

Canada

41.19

39.30

39.49

35.82

40.12

43.96

Total, of all countries

10.03

10.67

10.55

11.02

11.24

11.24

For Reference: Comparison of Japanese-owned patents from research in foreign locations with the equivalent
from both home and foreign locations
Japan (patents from foreign locations)
Japan (total patents from both home
and foreign locations)

210

343

284

392

442

771

7998

18278

23249

31169

47793

71212

Source: United States patent database compiled by Professor John Cantwell, with the cooperation of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
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realization that international business may be needed as a catalyst for
the institutional changes required to help address the problems that had
by then arisen in the economy (Ozawa, 2003). Apart from government
restrictions, the low level of inward FDI can also be attributed to other
specificities of the institutional environment in Japan, such as the
industrial structure, the keiretsu influence and the wider pervasiveness
of local inter-firm networks (Dunning, 1996b).
Table 9 presents the share of research activity undertaken by nonJapanese firms in Japan, i.e. the inward penetration of foreign-owned
firms to undertake R&D in Japan. It shows the inward penetration
from foreign-owned firms is generally very low in Japan, especially in
those industries in which Japan is strong, such as electrical equipment,
motor vehicles, and professional and scientific instruments, with
shares standing at only 1.13%, 1.78%, and 0.67% respectively in the
period 1991–1995. The exceptions are industries in which Japan has
traditionally been weak, and Japanese policy is more encouraging in
bringing in foreign firms to boost innovation in these industries, e.g. the
pharmaceutical-biotech industry.
Table 9. The share of United States patents of the largest non-Japaneseowned firms attributable to research in Japan, as a proportion of the
number due to research in Japan by all Japanese and non-Japanese large
firms, organized by the industrial group of the parent firms, 1969-1995
(Percentage)
Sector
Food

1969-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991-95
6.84

3.80

8.51

2.55

5.74

3.75

Chemicals

5.56

6.92

5.30

4.01

3.64

6.38

Pharmaceuticals

6.80

11.75

13.70

15.07

19.40

24.94

Metals

3.81

2.82

1.84

2.21

2.77

1.68

Mechanical Engineering

7.41

8.97

5.77

4.97

5.93

2.30

Electrical equipment

3.63

2.16

1.23

0.99

1.29

1.13

11.80

24.85

13.27

17.95

11.15

17.41

Office equipment
Motor vehicles

0.46

0.19

0.74

3.04

3.35

1.78

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Other transport equipment

2.70

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Textiles

1.65

1.70

1.51

1.46

0.33

0.79

Rubber products

8.20

1.21

0.00

0.37

1.86

1.36

Non-metallic mineral products

1.56

0.55

0.23

1.46

1.42

0.95

Coal and petroleum products

39.62

13.87

34.57

10.81

15.78

17.00

Aircraft

Professional and scientific instruments

0.33

0.06

0.10

0.30

0.43

0.67

Other manufacturing

5.79

10.16

3.16

4.95

14.50

91.32

Total

4.57

4.29

2.99

3.19

3.04

3.85

Source: United States patent database compiled by Professor John Cantwell, with the cooperation of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
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5.

Concluding remarks

Before concluding, we are reminded that in describing and
theorizing about what happened in the past, we need to appreciate that
history is always to some extent unique, made up of a number of complex
and contingent factors. While there are certain lessons that might be
drawn from past events, we need to resist the temptation to over-theorize
or prescribe recommendations for the future using past evidence. We
need to be aware that specific historical periods and national business
contexts have elements of distinctiveness. With this caveat in mind, we
may draw the following inferences from the illustrative examples we
have considered in this paper:
(a) International business connections are extremely important
for firms in countries catching up and learning new technologies. We have
seen how, in the interwar period, Japanese firms and the Government of
Japan lured foreign firms to invest in the country, so that these foreignowned firms could help train indigenous firms through joint venture or
supplier or other local contractual relationships, as well as through the
knowledge spillovers they generate. We have also seen how the nature
of Japanese firms’ international business connections shifted from being
close in the interwar period (involving a foreign presence in Japan),
becoming looser in the early post-war period (through arm’s- length
cross-border technology imports via licensing), and then reverting to
being close again once capabilities had caught up (through outward and
inward FDI, incorporating R&D).
A critical difference between the earlier catch-up of Japanese
firms and firms in a late-industrializing country today is that countries
such as Japan and the Republic of Korea caught up in a broad range of
industries and technologies, while countries catching up more recently,
especially East Asian countries, tend to be part of global supply chains.
Modularization and fragmentation of the value chain and the consequent
specialization of firms in certain segments of the value chain have made
developing countries a critical part of a global production process.
Hence, an inherent international connectedness of production activities
is central to the catch-up efforts of today’s emerging economies, in
contrast to the experience of Japan and the Republic of Korea.
(b) A further general pattern is that international business
connections are significantly more important during the very earliest
stages of a successful development experience. This applies both to
developing countries today and Japan historically. Firms first develop
basic capabilities through local initiatives that may, especially in more
established or mature industries, incorporate imitation and adaptation of
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products and technology transfer from foreign companies (Athreye and
Cantwell, 2007). The further progression of such capabilities depends
upon intensive in-house firm-specific learning efforts that are not easy
or automatic but rely on deliberately undertaken and costly strategies
for capability upgrading (Lall, 2001), which ultimately may lead R&D
efforts to more advanced and sophisticated capabilities. Modifying
and re-combining technologies learned through interactions with firms
based in the established industrialized countries usually relies in the first
instance on relatively close forms of international business connections.
One example is the Japanese motor vehicle industry, which in the early
stages might not have invented many “new to the world” products, since
most of the technologies and prototypes came during the interwar period
with the help of foreign firms. Yet this indigenous industry did make
some original adaptations and set in train a process of internal learning
that led eventually to more fundamental capabilities, and it was soon
able to innovate to improve the production process and efficiency of
factory operations.
(c) As Japanese firms caught up with those in western countries in
technological capabilities, arm’s-length cross-border technology imports
via licensing became increasingly insufficient, and Japanese firms tried
to forge more direct and closer international business connections via
outward and inward FDI and R&D. Many Japanese scholars and officials
themselves have come to appreciate this and are calling for Japan to be
more open and to allow international connections to facilitate innovative
regeneration (Ozawa, 2003; Best, 2000). Former Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe appointed Mr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, a medical professor, as special
innovation advisor to head the Government’s Innovation 25 initiative.
Realizing that “Japan must join the world before it can lead it”, the
initiative set out to reform dramatically Japan’s rigid structures of
scientific education, funding and decision-making, and also to open up
to international interaction, in order to boost technology and innovation
in the country. Professor Kurokawa has been retained as the science
advisor by the current Prime Minister (at the time of writing) Yasuo
Fukuda, and many of the recommendations coming from Innovation 25
are being gradually implemented (Red Herring, 2007).
In closing, we may note that institutional reform in Asia has
increased international business connections in many economies.
However, Lall (2001) commented on how different forms of international
business associations have prevailed across Asian countries that
have been successfully catching up in technological capabilities. In
other words, there is more than one potentially viable model for an
effective relationship between international business connections and
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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local capability-building. Singapore, in which FDI has made a highly
dynamic contribution to local technological development, has been at
the opposite extreme to Japan or the Republic of Korea in this respect.
Which model is best suited depends upon the national political and
institutional context, and on the extent to which foreign-owned firms
can legitimately become embedded within domestic business networks,
and hence become regarded as an integral part of the national business
or innovation system. What we have stressed here is that, when viewed
in a longer-term perspective, what is regarded as the appropriate model
for the relationship between international business connections and
technological capability development in indigenous firms tends to
evolve over time, as the context or setting for international business
connections shifts. The experience of Japan in this respect has helped us
to explain the circumstances under which we observe different models
of international business connections, and why and how indeed each of
these may have its place.
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EU enlargement and consequences for
FDI assisted industrial development
An essay in memory of Sanjaya Lall
Rajneesh Narula and Christian Bellak*
Many of the new member states as well as candidate and accession
countries of the EU are confident that membership will result in
substantially increased inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in
manufacturing. This paper discusses the policy issues and challenges
that cohesion and accession countries face, applying lessons that by
now have become mainstream in the parallel discussion of FDI-assisted
development in the developing economies. We argue that globalization
has attenuated the benefits that accrue from EU membership for
latecomers, and that they must now compete for FDI not just with other
European countries but also with non-EU emerging economies. We posit
that they should not base their industrial development strategy on mere
passive reliance on FDI flows without considering how to concatenate
their industrial development and the nature of the TNC activities they
attract.
Key words: FDI, EU, transnational corporations, absorptive capacity,
globalization, development, enlargement
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1.

Introduction

Policymakers in most European countries consider inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) as an indispensable part of their industrial development
strategy. Many of the less economically developed, more “peripheral”
economies of the EU-15, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (referred
to here as the ‘cohesion’ countries) followed this approach, and, partly as a
result of their success, these policies have been pursued much more explicitly
by the new member states (NMS) and those wishing to join, a large number of
both groups being located in central and eastern Europe (CEE) (referred to in
this paper either as the accession countries or CEE countries, irrespective of
* Rajneesh Narula (corresponding author) is at Henley Business School, University of
Reading. Contact e-mail: r.narula@henley.reading.ac.uk; fax: +44 (0)118 975 0236. Christian
Bellak is at Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria. Contact e-mail: bellak@wu.ac.
at.

their membership status). Although this paper focuses on the accession
countries as a group, we acknowledge that this classification subsumes
important differences between several subgroups which are themselves
made up of heterogeneous countries. Important subgroups include the
12 new member states that joined in 2004, the two new members that
joined in 2008, namely Bulgaria and Romania, and other candidate
countries such as Croatia or Turkey. However, our aim is to discuss
the broader aspects of the role of FDI in industrial development, the
principles of which, in our estimation, are broadly similar and relevant
to all countries, rather than particular aspects and policy implications
for individual countries. This paper will discuss the costs, benefits,
opportunities and limitations of an FDI-based industrial development
strategy in these countries.
The literature on FDI-assisted development is one which has
evolved much more thoroughly in the context of developing countries
and to which Sanjaya Lall was a seminal contributor for much of his
career.1 Many (but not all) of the challenges that face the peripheral
economies of Europe in pursuing an FDI-based industrial policy
have increasingly much in common with those that many developing
countries have faced in the past, although cross-fertilization between the
two strands of literature has been sparse.
We will attempt to raise some of the most important of these
issues that derive from Sanjaya’s work over the years,2 while at the same
time framing these within the context and particular challenges that
derive from EU integration. We will focus on discussing the policy issues
and challenges that accession and cohesion countries face, applying
lessons that by now have become mainstream in the parallel discussion
of FDI-assisted development in the developing world. Our attention will
primarily be on FDI in the manufacturing sector, despite the fact that a
large share of FDI in the accession countries is carried out by and in the
services sector of the countries in question. However, despite its smaller
share, it has considerably greater economic and political significance for
at least two reasons. First, the manufacturing sector tends to be regarded
as more significant in terms of its potential to promote economic
1

See contributions to Narula and Lall (2006) for a review of the literature.
We have not attempted to thoroughly reference each and every idea to specific
contributions of Sanjaya Lall – given his prolific output over the years, the richness of
his contributions and the seminal nature of his much of his work; this would make the
paper unduly long. His contributions have played such an important part in this field that
it has become almost impossible to distinguish his contributions from the contributions
of those whom he has influenced.
2
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growth through spillovers and externalities. Second, a substantial part
of the demand for services is derived from manufacturing activities (i.e.
producer-related services such as banking, consulting, R&D, design).
This paper discusses the policy options of cohesion, accession
and candidate countries for FDI-assisted development strategies in light
of the ongoing enlargement process of the European Union.

2.

Some stylized facts about FDI-assisted
development strategies

Although inward FDI is not the only option available to promote
economic catching-up, it may be the most efficient option (Dunning and
Narula, 2004). FDI, however, is not a sine qua non for development.
There are at least four main preconditions that need to be satisfied:
1. The FDI being attracted must generate significant spillovers.
2. The domestic sector needs to develop the capacity to absorb these
spillovers.
3. The FDI being attracted should be complementary to domestic
industry, rather than substitutive.
4. A regulatory and institutional environment must be developed in
order to facilitate the integration of the foreign affiliates into the
domestic economy.
These conditions tend to make FDI more sticky and sustainable
in particular locations. It is true that the determinants of economic
development are similar to the determinants of FDI, but this does not
mean that there is a simple cause and effect between them. Particular
types of FDI tend to be attracted to countries with certain levels of
economic development and appropriate economic structures. But simply
to “pump” a country full of FDI will not catapult it to a higher stage of
development. In other words: there are no automatic gains from FDI
(see e.g. Mencinger, 2003). For instance, FDI may not compensate for
the low ratio of domestic savings in the host countries; nor do we know
whether inward FDI will generate sufficient externalities.
We highlight two points about the significance and nature of the
positive externalities of FDI. First, even if FDI were attracted through
large subsidies, it is unlikely to become embedded or provide significant
externalities and spillovers to the host economy without the appropriate
domestic absorptive capacity (Criscuolo and Narula, 2008). From
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a developmental perspective, externalities only matter if they can be
captured by other economic actors in the host economy. For externalities
to be optimally utilized, there needs to be an appropriate match between
the nature of potential externalities and the absorptive capacities of
domestic firms. It is ironic that the countries that receive the kind of FDI
that has the highest potential benefits vis-à-vis industrial development
are those that already have a highly developed domestic absorptive
capacity. In other words, domestic capacity – whether in the form of
knowledge infrastructure or an efficient domestic industrial sector –
remains a primary and crucial determinant of high-competence foreign
affiliates (Radosevic, 1999; UNCTAD, 2005; Barnes and Lorentzen,
2006). One of the most important lessons from Lall’s work has been
his emphasis on the failure by governments to promote their domestic
sector when focusing on attracting TNCs as the primary aspect of their
industrial development strategy. If no viable domestic sector exists, then
by definition, spillovers from FDI are largely irrelevant.3 Even where a
domestic sector does exist, this does not mean that TNCs will necessarily
establish links with them – in a perfectly liberalized world where market
failures are minimized, TNCs have the capacity to bypass domestic
firms completely. They can do so by either importing all their inputs, or
by encouraging their captive suppliers from abroad to relocate.
Figure 1. Determinants of the competence, scope and scale of a foreign
affiliate
Parent MNE level influences
Internationalization strategy
Role of subsidiary in global
TNC portfolio
Motivation of investment
Parent-level partnerships/
supply chain agreements
Parent-home country
agreements/political
obligations

Subsidiary history/
sunk costs

Host country influences
Market size/accessibility
to market
Regulatory policy
Industrial policy
Trade barriers
o Tariff
o Non-tariff
Presence of suppliers
Presence of competitors
Political stability

Subsidiary scope
Subsidiary scale
Subsidiary competence

Source: Authors.
3

Empirical evidence for the CEE countries is provided by Konings (2001) and
Nicolini and Resmini (2006).
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Second, not all FDI is equal in the nature of the benefits it provides
(Lall and Narula, 2006). The quality of the spillovers that derive from
an investment are associated with the scope and competence level of the
subsidiary, and these are co-determined by a variety of factors (see figure
1). These include TNC internal factors such as their internationalization
strategy, the role of the new location in their global portfolio of subsidiaries,
and the motivation of their investment, in addition to the available
location-specific resources which can be used for that purpose (Benito
et al., 2003). High competence levels require complementary assets that
are non-generic in nature and are often associated with agglomeration
effects, clusters, and the presence of highly specialized skills (Lall and
Pietrobelli, 2002). In other words, firms are constrained in their choice of
location of high-competence subsidiaries by local resource availability.
For instance, R&D activities tend to be concentrated in few locations,
because the appropriate specialized resources are associated with only
a few locations. The embeddedness of firms is often a function of the
duration of the TNCs’ presence, since firms tend to build incrementally.
TNCs most often rely on location advantages that already exist in the host
economy, and deepening of embeddedness generally occurs in response
to improvements to the domestic technological capacity. However,
while the scope of activities undertaken by a subsidiary can be modified
more or less instantly, developing competence levels takes time. TNC
investments in high value-added activities (often associated with high
competence levels) have the tendency to be “sticky”. Blomstrom and
Kokko (1997) suggest that some of the host country characteristics that
may influence the extent of linkages – and thereby in the longer term the
extent of spillovers – are market size, local content regulations and the
size and technological capability of local firms. They argue that there is
a propensity for linkages to increase over time, as the skill level of local
entrepreneurs grows, new suppliers emerge and local content increases.
In other words, government incentives and subsidies are rarely
pivotal in determining the scope and competence of TNCs (which
normally imply greater potential for greater technological spillovers).
TNCs do not make their proprietary assets available at the whims of
governments. Instead, they tailor their investment decisions to existing
market needs, and the relative quality of location advantages, but
especially the skills, capabilities and infrastructure in which the domestic
economy has a comparative advantage. It is also clear that the kind of FDI
activity a country might attract (or wish to attract) is different at different
stages of its industrial development (Dunning and Narula, 1996, 2004;
Boudier-Bensebaa, 2008). The motive of the investment is crucial in
determining the extent to which linkages and externalities develop. The
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motive of an investment helps to determine (in conjunction with the
host-country-specific factors) the kind of TNC affiliate and therefore
the potential for spillovers. It is generally acknowledged that there are
four main motives for foreign investment: 1) to seek natural resources;
2) to seek new markets; 3) to restructure existing foreign production
through rationalization; and 4) to seek strategically related created
assets. These, in turn, can be broadly divided into two types. The first
three represent motives which are primarily asset-exploiting in nature:
that is, the investing company’s primary purpose is to generate economic
rent through the use of its existing firm-specific assets. The last is a
case of asset-augmenting activity, whereby the firm wishes to acquire
additional assets that protect or augment their existing created assets in
some way. In general, developing countries are unlikely to attract much
asset-augmenting FDI, but tend to receive FDI that is primarily resourceseeking, market-seeking or efficiency-seeking. Empirical evidence (e.g.
Bellak et al., 2009a) shows that in the CEE countries, besides market
size, the level of infrastructure plays a crucial role for attracting FDI,
while unit labour costs are comparatively less important.
Figure 2. Different types of subsidiaries, and their relationship to

scope and competence levels

Level of
competence
High

Strategic centre

Highly
specialized unit,
e.g. R&D centre
Multi-activity unit,
e.g. manufacturing
and sales subsidiary

Low

Single-activity unit,
e.g. sales subsidiary

Few
value activities

Miniature
replica

Scope of
activities
Many
value activities

Source: Benito et al. (2003).

The point here is that not all affiliates provide the same opportunity
for spillovers. A sales office or an assembly unit may have a high turnover,
or employ a large number of staff, but the technological spillovers will
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be relatively fewer than, say, those from a manufacturing facility (figure
2). Likewise, resource-seeking activities can be capital- intensive, but
also provide fewer possibilities for spillovers than say, a market-seeking
type of FDI. Prior to economic liberalization and EU integration, TNCs
responded to investment opportunities primarily by establishing truncated
miniature replicas of their facilities at home, although the extent to
which they were truncated varied considerably between countries. The
extent of truncation was determined by a number of factors, but by far
the most important determinant of truncation – and thereby the scope
of activities and competence level of the subsidiary – were associated
with market size, and the capacity and capability of domestic industry
(Dunning and Narula, 2004). There is thus a hierarchy of the quality of
FDI activity in Europe which reflects the stage of industrial development.
At the “bottom” are countries that are at an early stage of transition
(and furthest away from convergence with the EU norm), with a very
limited domestic sector and with low domestic demand. Such countries
have been host to the most truncated subsidiaries, often single-activity
subsidiaries, primarily in sales and marketing, and in natural resource
extraction. The most advanced economies with domestic technological
capacity (such as the core EU members) have hosted the least truncated
subsidiaries, often with R&D departments. Cohesion countries (with
the exception of Greece) have been in the middle.
Miniature replicas are increasingly a concept of the past, particularly
within the EU. Rationalization of activities within the single market
has, in many cases, led to a downgrading of activities from truncated
replica to single-activity affiliates. TNCs have taken advantage of the
EU single market to rationalize production capacity in fewer locations
to exploit economies of scale at the plant level, especially where local
consumption patterns are not radically different to justify local capacity
and where transportation costs are not prohibitive (i.e. there is a proximity
– concentration trade-off). This has meant that some miniature replicas
have been downgraded to sales and marketing affiliates, which can be
expected to have fewer opportunities for spillovers.
It is an open question to what extent the accession countries
will be able to benefit from an increase in the quality of FDI that they
receive due to EU membership. Although there will be some investment
in new affiliates resulting in new (greenfield) subsidiaries that did not
exist previously, there will also be a downgrading of subsidiaries (as
discussed above). TNCs may divest their operations in response to
better location advantages elsewhere in the EU (as Spain and Portugal
are experiencing as their low-cost advantages are eroded), or reduce
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the intensity of operations by lowering the level of competence and/or
scope of their subsidiary, and shifting from truncated replicas to singleactivity affiliates. There may also be a redistribution effect. That is to
say, sectors that were dominated by domestic capital are transferred to
foreign ownership, particularly where domestic capitalists have failed
to improve their competitive advantages to compete effectively with
foreign firms. Indeed, in many of the CEE countries, the share of foreign
ownership in total capital stock is already typically much higher than in
older EU member states, although with considerable variation across
sectors.

3.

Overestimating the effect of EU membership on
FDI inflows?

Membership of the EU has two important implications with
regard to FDI. First, it allows countries that have small domestic markets
to expand their de facto market size. Firms located in the EU have
access to the entire EU. However, as the number of countries in the EU
increases, this advantage is currently shared by 27 member countries
(and in the future, possibly by the three candidate countries as of 2008 –
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey) and
even more if one includes countries that have preferential access to the
single market through various lesser forms of trade agreement. Thus, this
advantage has considerably less value to the accession countries than it
had for the cohesion countries, and this is exacerbated by the fact that
domestic firms in many of the CEE countries have little experience in
dealing with competition in a market economy which further attenuates
the benefits that derive from the competition effect.
Second, membership suggests political, economic and legal
stability. Although the absence of efficient institutions can retard the
efficient accumulation and transfer of knowledge (e.g. Rodrik, 1999;
Rodrik et al., 2004; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Asiedu, 2006), EU accession
countries are not competing with the least developed countries for FDI.
Indeed, it is a requirement for membership that candidate countries
demonstrate convergence and overlap of formal and informal institutions.
This acts as a location advantage vis-à-vis non-member countries with
poorly developed institutions (e.g. some countries in Latin America,
or the Russian Federation) but not necessarily so compared to nonmembers who are stable (for instance, some East Asian countries), or
indeed relative to other long-standing EU members. Again, the greater
the number of countries that are members, the less stability counts as a
unique advantage to potential investors. For example, Fabry and Zeghni
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(2006) find that FDI in 11 former communist countries is sensitive to
specific and local institutional arrangements.
As such, EU membership per se does not necessarily lead to an
increase in the quality or the quantity of FDI that a country receives, and
this is best illustrated by the case of Greece. In 1980, inward FDI stock
per capita was $470 (all figures in current prices) compared with $315
and $137 for Portugal and Spain respectively. By 2007, FDI stock per
capita in Greece had grown to only $4,740, compared with $10,750 and
$12,138 for Portugal and Spain respectively.
To take just one example from the NMS for comparison, Hungary’s
FDI per capita in 2007 was already more than double that of Greece
($9,711). A substantial part of these flows took place before Hungary
became an EU member in 2004. In this respect it is important to highlight
that while EU membership may help promote FDI, we argue that the
positive effects of EU membership for FDI are decreasingly important,
partly because these advantages are less significant as the number of EU
members increases. Furthermore, globalization and the growth of supranational agreements (particularly those associated with the WTO) mean
that several of these benefits are not as unique as they once were. Firms
from outside the EU are no longer “forced” into EU-based production,
since tariff and non-tariff barriers are fewer. It is worth remembering
that a large part of the inward FDI flows from outside the EU prior to
1992 was spurred by the fear of “Fortress Europe”. These fears have
largely proven to be unfounded. Finally, the growth of peripheral trade
and investment agreements with non-EU members also may impact on
the effects of EU membership.
The point here is that the benefits that accrued from EU membership
to the countries that joined earlier are substantially attenuated for later
entrants to the EU because of globalization. First, because global
financial, political and economic liberalization, which forms a large part
of the globalization process, has “levelled the playing field” in lowering
the risk associated with trade and investment in most parts of the world
(Narula, 2003). With growing technological convergence, increasing
homogeneity of consumption patterns and improved communication and
transportation facilities, these factors have reduced the costs associated
with supplying EU markets from East Asia or the Americas.
As such, many of the new entrants to the EU are faced with
increased competition for FDI not just from other European countries
but also from other parts of the world, most notably Asia. The total flows
of FDI are not fixed, and thus, in principle, countries need not compete
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for FDI. Therefore, FDI need not be a zero-sum game. Nonetheless,
particularly when host countries are at a similar level of development,
substitution effects may occur, and hence they de facto compete for a
limited amount of FDI.
The empirical evidence on the effects of EU membership and the
shift from the cohesion countries to the NMS by and large confirms our
skeptical view of FDI flows to the cohesion and accession countries.
Ex ante studies on the effects of EU membership on the shift of FDI,
not unexpectedly, have found a wide range of effects. These studies are
mainly simulations based on theoretical models: As early as the mid1990s, Lankes and Venables (1996), Baldwin et al. (1997), Brenton
and DiMauro (1999), Pfaffermayr et al. (2001) and Galego et al. (2004)
examined various aspects of the shift of FDI from the periphery to the
CEE countries. Other papers (e.g. Gorg and Greenaway, 2002) examined
the FDI potential of the CEE countries upon accession. Altomonte
and Guagliano (2003) go beyond the cohesion countries and examine
the potential of the CEE countries compared to the Mediterranean
region, which can be considered as a competitor location. Clausing
and Dorobantu (2005) found significant effects of key European Union
announcements regarding the accession process. Garmel et al. (2008),
in a growth model, predict that three quarters of capital in the NMS will
ultimately be acquired by investors from the “core” member states in the
long run. Ex post studies have generally found some, but no dramatic
shift of FDI.4
This increased competition for FDI challenges both the cohesion
countries and the CEE countries. Many (but not all) of these countries
have sought to compete globally on the basis of two primary location
advantages: low labour costs and EU membership. As we have discussed
above, EU membership is not as much of an advantage in a liberalized,
stable and shrinking world where distance does not form as much of
a barrier to trade and investment as it once did. For similar reasons,
the cost advantage of these countries has also been dissipated in many
cases, particularly where productivity gains in China and other Asian
economies have grown (Kalotay, 2004) partly as a result of their superior
technological infrastructure. Spain and Portugal have experienced some
displacement of FDI or lost sequential FDI because they have not been
able to develop location advantages in knowledge- and capital-intensive
activities to compensate for the rising labour costs that have eroded their
industrial base in low-value-adding activities, a development that also
4

(2006).
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has been observed in CEE countries, where already some production
activities have been shifted “further east”.

4.

FDI and the cohesion countries: policy
implications

In the light of the empirical evidence discussed in the previous
section, in the case of Ireland, Portugal and Spain, we expect to see
some level of displacement to the new members in industries where:
1. low-cost labour remains the primary reason for location and
where the TNC subsidiary has not expanded its original low
value-adding activities towards knowledge-intensive areas in
which the domestic economy has a competitive advantage;
2. the TNC subsidiary is not embedded through important linkages
to other firms in the host economy;5
3. the sunk costs of an FDI in the host economy are low;
4. productivity gains have overcome disadvantages associated with
rising labour costs; and
5. skill levels are not particularly high and thus employees are easy
to substitute,6 since in these cases (tacit) know-how hardly limits
the slicing of the value-chain.
In other words, the most obvious long-term solution for cohesion
countries is to improve their location advantages in other areas, towards
more science-based technological sectors. Ireland has succeeded in doing
so with its focus on the ICT sectors (Barry, 2004), although Portugal
and Spain have so far failed to make significant moves towards more
science-based sectors. Beyond the fact that science-based sectors and
knowledge-intensive activities fit the current comparative advantage of
these countries much better, they are also less footloose. This is partly
because these sectors tend to rely on location-specific and locationbound assets that are less easily substitutable.
Disinvestments in the cohesion countries are, of course, not
happening suddenly, because although they do rely on cheap factor
5

In contrast, when the TNC subsidiary is located close to an important customer or
supplier, and proximity is important (e.g. because of just-in-time delivery), it is unlikely
that the firm will relocate.
6
The EU KLEMS database, at http://www.euklems.net/index.html, has detailed
accounts for high-, medium- and low-skilled by industry for a large range of countries
and for long time periods.
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inputs, they are also capital-intensive. They are also less footloose,
partly because they are in industries in which these host countries are
firmly established locations within the major TNCs’ global production
networks. In each of these locations the TNC affiliates are well embedded
in the local economy, and the specialized infrastructure to support this
sector is well developed.
It is not immediately obvious that when TNCs begin to disinvest
from the cohesion countries, thus will automatically result in increased
investments in the accession countries in the same industries. In the
automobile industry, for instance, the efficiency of a new greenfield
plant tends to require a relatively large minimum efficiency scale. TNCs
are therefore reluctant to start out in greenfield sites, which is a further
deterrent to setting up new investments in the CEE countries. Except
where strong domestic sectors and specialized knowledge-based clusters
exist – whether public or private – the CEE countries are unlikely to
receive major inflows of FDI that are intended to supply the EU as a
single market.
The lesson here for most peripheral countries is very much the
same as one that development policy experts (see e.g. Rodrik, 1999;
Lall, 1997b, 2004; Haque, 2007) have been arguing for the developing
countries: dependence on static and generic location advantages –
whether drawing from the development of institutions, infrastructure,
stability, or low-cost labour – is necessarily short-term and short-sighted.
The last two decades of increasing liberalization, falling transportation
and communication costs, and investment in knowledge-based activities
in East Asia has meant that the peripheral EU countries are no longer
as attractive (although it should be noted that the lack of strong IPR
enforcement in some Asian countries does provide a small window of
opportunity). It is axiomatic that as industrial development takes place,
the comparative advantage of these countries needs to shift away from
low value-adding activities to higher value-adding activities, which are
necessarily science-based.
It is only in those sectors where “specialized” location advantages
associated with higher value-adding exist that host countries can
benefit significantly from TNC activity in the long run. This requires
a considerable amount of government interaction and investment into
tangible and intangible infrastructure. As countries reach a threshold level
of technological capabilities, governments need to provide more active
support through macro-organizational policies. This implies developing
and fostering specific industries and technological trajectories, such that
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the location advantages they offer are less “generic” and more specific,
highly immobile, and such that they encourage mobile investments to be
locked into these assets. Many of the CEE countries have the basis for
creating such science-based location advantages. For instance, Poland
has strengths in certain natural and life sciences, as does Hungary in
electro-mechanical sectors. The Czech Republic has opted to focus
on the automotive industry, given the existence of large automotive
plants, while Slovakia has attracted a number of greenfield automotive
plants. Of course, adapting to such challenges is not costless, for three
reasons. First, countries need considerable resources to invest in such
vertical industrial policy actions. Second, they require considerable
political will and discipline, because other industries will necessarily
need to be “wound down”. Third, fostering new sectors requires major
institutional change. Innovation systems and firms designed, developed
and ingrained within central-planning models and their associated
institutional arrangements do not function effectively in a market
economy (Narula and Jormanainen, 2008). Such radical systemic
change requires resources and an effective period of transition, given
the inertia associated with formal and informal institutions.
There are two points of caution that need to be raised here. First,
in pursuing such a strategy, the peripheral EU countries face competition
not just from Asia, but also from the “core” economies of the EU, which
have systematically developed strengths in technology-intensive sectors
over decades, and can often out-compete weaker, peripheral economies
in terms of resources, incentives and opportunities. Nonetheless, there
are several niches and gaps in their technological competences that can
be effectively exploited by the peripheral economies.
Second, such a strategy requires systematic long-term investment,
both in terms of building the appropriate public infrastructure, and in
promoting domestic capacity in supplier and related activities. Many
of the CEE countries have a well-trained and skilled work force, but
the availability of a large stock of suitably qualified workers does not
in itself result in efficient absorption of knowledge, or in its efficient
use in industrial development, especially if the level of relevant
infrastructure is much lower (Bellak et al. 2009a). Efficient absorption
of knowledge requires the presence of institutions and economic actors,
and the efficient use of markets and hierarchies, be they intra-firm, intraindustry or intra-country. This knowledge is not costless, and must be
accumulated over time. Important externalities arise which impinge
on the ease of diffusion and efficiency of absorption and utilization of
external knowledge (Criscuolo and Narula, 2008).
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Industrial policy where certain industries are selected for rapid
growth by focused investments through intensive development of
created assets can and do accelerate economic development. The
examples of both the more advanced industrializing countries (such as
the Asian NIEs) and emerging economies such as Brazil and Malaysia
illustrate this. Attracting specialized FDI to a particular sector can
alter the sequence of industrial upgrading (Williamson and Hu, 1994),
because specialized FDI may help improve the created assets associated
within a sector (say, consumer electronics production). Created assets in
this sector may have significant knowledge-flow externalities in another
(say micro-electronics design), which in turn may represent significant
input to another sector (say, software development). But this assumes
the presence of a virtuous circle and the development of appropriate
clusters.
Specifically, for the CEE countries, it is argued that both
proactive and reactive policies are needed to achieve sustainability of
FDI. Proactive policies are geared to attract FDI and therefore affect the
sustainability via sectoral targeting. Reactive policies aim to make FDI
more sustainable through three distinct policy channels, namely through
strengthening comparative advantage, enabling firms to benefit from
economies of scale, and supporting agglomeration forces. In this respect,
emphasis should be put on providing specific bundles of location factors
as public goods for closely defined value-added activities of the TNC
(Bellak and Leibrecht 2007, p. 234).
There is empirical evidence that a clear gap exists between “old”
and “new” member states’ policies to attract additional FDI (Bellak
et al., 2009b). The older member states gained most by focusing on
infrastructure and R&D policies. “New” member states’ policies
have tended to focus on reducing the share of low-skilled workers (for
example by encouraging firms to restructure production and increase
capital intensity) and through a reduction of labour costs via a decrease
in non-wage labour costs. The fact that different policy areas are relevant
in the two groups of countries opens the possibility for focused policy
approaches geared to the needs of individual sectors.
FDI-assisted growth requires the capacity to be a “strategic
follower” (Ramos, 2000). This requires a systematic understanding of
what technological capabilities need to be developed or enhanced; it
also requires seeking to actively coordinate potential users with sources
of the appropriate technologies. Asian governments that have pursued
such a strategy successively have actively sought to identify, acquire
and transfer technologies, with government agencies acting as market82
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makers. Left to their own means, firms have a tendency to be risk-averse,
and to avoid the financial and technological risk of upgrading their
technological assets as long as these continue to provide a reasonable
rate of return. This short-term myopia is not unique to firms of any
given nationality. Many governments recognize this problem, and seek
to overcome or at least reduce the perceived risk levels by providing
subsidized loans and other incentives to domestic firms that restructure
their existing operations by adopting new technologies in the products
and processes that promoted international best practice.
The economies with the most successful technological upgrading
– the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and, to a lesser
extent, Brazil – allocated subsidies in what Amsden and Hikino (2000)
and Amsden (2001) call a “reciprocal control mechanism”. That is,
incentives and subsidies, whether to upgrade technologically, promote
local content, expand exports or reduce import-dependence were subject
to performance standards that were actively monitored, and in Amsden’s
(2001) words, were “redistributive in nature and results-oriented” and
acted to prevent government failure.
To be sure, upgrading of the technological capabilities of domestic
firms can no longer be pursued in quite the same way in a globalized
world. International competition is a given, and there can be no return
to the infant industry model (except for few particular industries).
While a number of CEE countries have had considerable investment
in R&D, a majority of the formal R&D efforts were conducted by
state-owned enterprises and the non-firm sector. While the role of the
state must necessarily continue to be that of a significant investor in
innovation, these policies need to be orchestrated with the private firm
sector, whether domestic or foreign. Given that the CEE countries prior
to their EU membership have to accept the acquis communautaire,
discrimination of domestic and foreign firms is no longer possible as
stated in the competition policy regulations of the EU.
Market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in
developing and promoting a proactive industrial policy (Lall, 1996, 1997a,
1997b, 2003). Firms necessarily take a shorter-term, profit maximizing
view because they are largely risk-averse. TNCs and unrestrained
flows of inward FDI may well lead to an increase in productivity and
exports, but they do not necessarily result in increased competitiveness
of the domestic sector or increased industrial capacity, which ultimately
determine economic growth in the long run. FDI per se does not provide
growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial sector exists which
has the necessary technological capacity to profit from the externalities
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from TNC activity. Yet, as there are only very few domestic firms left
in some industries in the CEE countries, this possibility of growth may
be limited. This is also well illustrated by the inability of many Asian
countries which have relied on a passive FDI-dependent strategy to
upgrade their industrial development. It should be remembered that
unrestrained FDI inflows often result in “crowding out” of the domestic
sector. FDI and domestic capabilities and a domestic sector need to be
concatenated and properly phased if positive results are to be achieved.
The lesson here is not that the role of governments should be substituted
by the market, but that markets and governments can co exist.
The lessons of developing countries cannot of course be applied
without some modification to understanding the impact of FDI on the
development strategies of the NMS and the cohesion countries. As we
have emphasized here, there are additional layers of complexity that
derive from “deep” integration within such a powerful economic and
political bloc. However, these are – by and large – positive, in the sense
that “insider” status within the EU provides a considerable boost to the
location advantages of these countries, even if they are less significant
than in previous rounds of EU expansion. The biggest challenge is that
of institutional restructuring, and the move – especially for the CEE
countries – away from national champions and state ownership of key
sectors, and state-defined priorities, which has been achieved in the CEE
economies to different degrees, partly as a result of specific funds made
available to these countries by the European Commission. On the other
hand, these countries are also limited in their competition for FDI by
EU policies, particularly those associated with regulation, competition
and state aid.

5.

Specific challenges for the accession countries

Many of the new and accession member states have yet to confront
the difficulty in embedding inward FDI into domestic economic and
innovation systems. One of the challenges in creating embeddedness
is associated with matching the industrial structure and comparative
advantage of the region7 with the kinds of FDI that are being attracted.
As highlighted in the previous sections, benefits from FDI are maximized
when the kinds of investment projects being attracted are matched with
the potential clusters of domestic competitiveness that the TNCs may be
able to tap into.
7

Again, it should be noted that we do not aim at addressing issues of particular
countries, but rather try to provide a sketch of the broader aspects.
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In the case of the accession countries, many have well-developed
components of science and technology systems. Some are even endowed
with considerable capacity in high value-adding activities such as R&D,
software development and design. This has been used as a basis to
attract and embed highly specialized high-competence TNC facilities.8
Nonetheless, one of the considerable disadvantages these countries face
is the challenge of dismantling centrally planned innovation systems that
are driven primarily by planners and bureaucrats rather than by demand
conditions and the specific needs of firms. Such restructuring has to deal
with considerable inertia in the institutional arrangements (Narula and
Jormanainen, 2008), which is often difficult to overcome.
Foreign affiliates interact with knowledge organizations such
as local universities and public research institutes, which undertake
basic or applied research, produce R&D manpower and provide
technical services to firms (UNCTAD, 2005). Foreign affiliates may
cooperate with these institutions, e.g. by providing financial support
and conducting joint research projects. Such collaboration can also
help R&D by other enterprises, by raising the research capabilities of
knowledge institutions, bringing them into contact with industrial work
and promoting spin-offs. At the same time, however, TNCs may also
be locked into existing supplier relationships, partnerships and R&D
networks in other locations, and may be reluctant to seek to establish
new associations with as yet unproven local suppliers and universities.
Indeed, as TNCs increasingly seek to rationalize their activities, decisions
about local linkages are not always made at the subsidiary level, but at
the headquarters level, by comparing the various options available to the
TNC globally. Thus, governments need to create incentives for the TNC
to consider local partners, and not expect these to happen “naturally”. In
circumstances where domestic firms are not present, linkages between
foreign affiliates may represent the sole available mode of industrial
upgrading and capability development in the CEE countries. As long as
industrial and technological upgrading happens and spills over to other
firms, it does not matter who the beneficiary is, as long as it serves to
further embed the TNC affiliate in the host country.
Often, there may not be domestic firms and organizations that
properly match the potential needs of the TNC, and this also requires
government intervention. At one level, projects need to be led by
government investment, through establishing science and technology
incubators for small groups of industry-facing researchers who help
bridge the research undertaken in public institutes to the commercial
8

Kokko and Kravtsova (2007) provide case studies on these aspects.
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needs of TNC affiliates. It is important that the focus of these incubators
be on the collaboration with TNC affiliates, and the provision of the
infrastructure and environment to foster competitive R&D. At another
level, it may also be necessary to create (and encourage the creation of)
new, more nimble and entrepreneurial smaller firms, and not attempt
to force a “fit” between the older, large and formerly state-owned
enterprises whose competences do not properly match the needs of the
TNC affiliates. In the case of the accession countries, there has been
a historical trend to focus on large firms, and the absence of special
treatment for start-up firms and SMEs means that bureaucratic red tape
prevents the establishment of such a policy.
The challenges that the accession countries face vis-à-vis
developing countries are plainly easier in many ways, because
membership does provide them with important location advantages.
They have access to a much larger and more affluent market;
valuable resources are made available by the EU to improve their
basic infrastructure; they are obliged to converge their institutional
arrangements with EU standards; they are protected by EU regulation
and laws; and they have the political and economic clout of the EU in
the areas of competition policy, trade policy, and so forth. However,
they are also in the “home region” of some of the world’s largest TNCs,
and thus face greater and immediate competition, and cannot afford to
be passive.

References
Altomonte, Carlo and Claudia Guagliano (2003). “Comparative study of FDI in Central
and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean”, Economic Systems 27, pp. 223–246.
Amsden, Alice (2001). The Rise of the ‘The Rest’, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amsden, Alice and Takashi Hikino (2000). “The Bark is Worse than the Bite: New WTO
Law and Late Industrialization”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, 570, pp. 104-114.
Asiedu, Elisabeth (2006). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of natural
resources, market size, government policy, institutions and political instability,
World Economy, 29/1: 63-77
Baldwin, Robert, Joseph F. François and Richard Portes (1997). “The Costs and Benefits
of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe”, Economic
Policy, 12(24), pp. 125–176.
Barnes, Justin and Jochen Lorentzen (2006). “Learning, Upgrading, and Innovation in
the South African Automotive Industry” in Rajneesh Narula and Sanjaya Lall (eds.)
Understanding FDI-assisted development, Routledge, London, pp. 19-52.

86

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

Barry, Frank (2004). “Prospects for Ireland in an Enlarged EU”, The World Economy,
27, pp. 829-852.
Bellak, Christian and Markus Leibrecht (2007). “How to make FDI in Central and
Eastern European countries sustainable?”, in K. Liebscher, J. Christl, P. Mooslechner
and D. Ritzberger-Grünwald eds., European Economic Integration: The Changing
Landscape of FDI in Europe, Edward Elgar: London, pp. 226-236.
Bellak, Christian, Joze Damijan and Markus Leibrecht (2009a). “Infrastructure
endowment and corporate income taxes as determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment in Central and Eastern European Countries” The World Economy, 32(2),
pp. 267-290.
Bellak, Christian, Markus Leibrecht and Robert Stehrer (2009b). “The role of public
policy in closing Foreign Direct Investment gaps: An empirical analysis”, Empirica,
Special Issue on FDI Policies, (jointly edited with Yvonne Wolfmayr-Schnitzer).
Benito, Gabriel, Birgitte Grogaard and Rajneesh Narula (2003). “Environmental
Influences on MNE Subsidiary Roles: Economic Integration and the Nordic
countries”, Journal of International Business Studies, 34, pp.443-456.
Blomstroem, Magnus and Ari Kokko (1997). “How Foreign Investment Affects Host
Countries”, Policy Research Working Paper, Washington: The World Bank.
Boudier-Bensebaa, Fabienne (2008). “FDI-assisted development in the light of the
investment development path paradigm: evidence from Central and Eastern
European Countries”, Transnational Corporations, 17(1), pp. 37-67.
Brenton, Paul and Francesco DiMauro (1999). “The Potential Magnitude and Impact of
FDI Flows to CEECs”, Journal of Economic Integration, 14(1), pp. 59–74.
Buch, Claudia M., Robert M. Kokta and Daniel Piazolo (2003). Foreign direct investment
in Europe: Is there redirection from the South to the East? “Journal of Comparative
Economics”, 31, pp. 94–109.
Clausing, Kimberly A. and Cosmina L. Dorobantu (2005). “Re-entering Europe:
Does European Union candidacy boost foreign direct investment?” Economics of
Transition, 13(1), pp. 77–103.
Criscuolo, P. and Narula, R. (2008). A novel approach to national technological
accumulation and absorptive capacity: Aggregating Cohen and Levinthal, The
European Journal of Development Research, 20/1: 56-73.
Dunning, John H. and Rajneesh Narula (1996). Foreign Direct Investment and
Governments: Catalysts for Economic Restructuring, London: Routledge
Dunning, John H. and Rajneesh Narula (2004). Multinational and Industrial
Competitiveness: A New Agenda, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Fabry, Nathalie and Sylvain Zeghni (2006) “How former communist countries of Europe
may attract inward foreign direct investment? A matter of institutions”, Communist
and Post-Communist Studies, 39, pp. 201-219.

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

87

Galego, Aurora, Carlos Vieira and Isabel Vieira (2004) “The CEEC as FDI Attractors: A
Menace to the EU Periphery?”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 40(5), pp.
74–91.
Garmel, Kateryna, Lilia Maliar and Serguei Maliar (2008) “EU eastern enlargement
and foreign investment: Implications from a neoclassical growth model”, Journal of
Comparative Economics, 36, pp. 307–325.
Goerg, Holger and David Greenaway (2002). “Is there a potential for increases in FDI
for Central and Eastern European countries following EU accession?” in Herrmann,
Heinz and Robert E. Lipsey eds., Foreign Direct Investment in the Real and
Financial Sector of Industrial Countries, Springer, Berlin, pp. 165-183.
Haque, Irfan (2007) Rethinking Industrial Policy, G-24 Discussion paper series, No.
183, UNCTAD, Geneva
Jensen, Camilla (2006). “Institutional Contexts and FDI Trends in European Emerging
Economies” in Klaus Meyer and Saul Estrin (eds.), Acquisition Strategies in
Emerging Economies, Palgrave, pp. 11-26.
Kalotay, Kalman (2004). “The European flying geese: new patterns for an old continent?”
Research in international business and finance, 18, pp. 27-49
Kalotay, Kalman (2006). “The Impact of EU Enlargement on FDI Flows”, International
Finance Review, 6, pp. 473-499.
Kokko, Ari and Victoria Kravtsova (2007). “The determinants of innovative capability
building: a case of four transition economies” Stockholm School of Economics
Working Paper 224.
Konings, J. (2001). “The effects of foreign direct investment on domestic firms: Evidence
from firm-level panel data in emerging economies”, Economics of Transition, 9, pp.
619–634.
Lall, Sanjaya (1996). Learning from the Asian Tigers, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Lall, Sanjaya (1997a). “East Asia”, in John H. Dunning ed., Governments, globalization
and international business, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 407-30.
Lall, Sanjaya. (1997b). “Policies for industrial competitiveness in developing countries:
Learning from Asia”, Report prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat, Oxford.
Lall, Sanjaya (2003). “Foreign direct investment, technology development and
competitiveness: Issues and evidence”, in Sanjaya Lall and Shujiro Urata eds.,
Competitiveness, FDI and technological activity in East Asia, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 12-56.
Lall, Sanjaya (2004). “Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy
in Building Industrial Competitiveness,” Working Papers qehwps111, Queen
Elizabeth House, University of Oxford
Lall, Sanjaya and Carlo Pietrobelli (2002). Failing to Compete. Technology Development
and Technology Systems in Africa, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.

88

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

Lall, Sanjaya and Rajneesh Narula (2006). “FDI and its Role in Economic Development:
Do We Need a New Agenda?” in Rajneesh Narula and Sanjaya Lall eds.,
Understanding FDI-assisted development, London: Routledge, pp. 1-18
Lankes, H. Peter and Anthony J. Venables (1996). “Foreign direct investment in
economic transition: the changing pattern of investments”, Economics of Transition,
4(2), pp. 331-347.
Mencinger, Joze (2003). “Does Foreign Direct Investment Always Enhance Economic
Growth?” Kyklos, Vol. 56(4), pp. 493–510.
Meyer, Klaus and C. Jensen (2003). “Foreign Investor Strategies in view of EU
Enlargement” in Heinz-Jürgen Stuting, Wolfgang Dorow, Frank Classes and Susanne
Blazejewski, eds., Change Management in Transformation Economies: Integrating
Strategy, Structure and Culture, London: Palgrave, pp. 291-308.
Meyer, Klaus E. and Peng, Mike W. (2005). ‘Probing Theoretically into Central and
Eastern Europe: Transactions, resources, and institutions’, Journal of International
Business Studies 36: 600-621.
Narula, Rajneesh (2003). Globalization and Technology, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Narula, Rajneesh and Irina Jormanainen (2008) “When a good science base is not
enough to create competitive industries: Lock-in and inertia in Russian systems of
innovation” MERIT-UNU Working Papers 2008-059
Narula, Rajneesh and Sanjaya Lall (2006) Understanding FDI-assisted development,
Routledge: London
Nicolini, Marcella and Laura Resmini (2006). “The Impact of MNEs on Domestic Firms
in CEECS: A Micro-Econometric Approach”, ERSA conference papers, No. 411.
Pfaffermayr, Michael, Fritz Breuss and Peter Egger (2001). “The Impact of Agenda
2000’s Structural Policy Reform on FDI in the EU”, Journal of Policy Modeling,
23(7), pp. 811-824.
Ramos, Joseph (2000). “Policy Directions for the New Economic Model in Latin
America”, World Development, 28, pp. 1703-1717.
Rodrik, Dani (1996). Understanding Economic Policy Reform, Journal of Economic
Literature, 34: 9-41
Rodrik, Dani (1999). The new global economy and developing countries: making
openness work, Policy Essay no. 24, Overseas Development Council, Johns Hopkins
University Press, Washington, DC.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi (2004). Institutions Rule: The
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,
Journal of Economic Growth, 9: 131-165.
UNCTAD (2005). World Investment Report 2005, United Nations: New York and
Geneva.
Williamson, Peter and Quionghua Hu (1994). Managing the Global Frontier, London:
Pitman Publishing.

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

89

90

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

The United Nations and transnational
corporations: a review and a
perspective*
Theodore H. Moran1**
The UN and Transnational Corporations:
From Code of Conduct to Global Compact
Tagi Sagafi-Nejad, in collaboration with John H. Dunning
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008),
312 pages
1.

Introduction

The volume, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code
of Conduct to Global Compact, by Tagi Sagafi-Nejad (in collaboration with
John H. Dunning), originates in an extraordinarily important endeavour – the
creation of an intellectual history of the role of the United Nations in helping
to shape global governance in the second half of the twentieth century and
the beginning of the current millennium. The work of the United Nations
can be divided into two broad categories: promoting economic and social
development, and enhancing regional and international security. Within the
former sphere, this book presents the record of the United Nations Commission
on Transnational Corporations, the United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations (UNCTC), and the ultimate shift of TNC-related activities within
the United Nations system from New York to United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva.
This study celebrates – but, as I shall argue below, significantly
understates! – the importance of these TNC-related endeavours at the United
Nations, and the individuals who led them, staffed them and advised them,
in shaping our understanding of the relationship between foreign direct
investment (FDI) and broad-based sustainable development.
*
The author would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Edward M. “Monty”
Graham, tireless participant in the debates chronicled here.
** Theodore H. Moran is Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International Business and
Finance at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and Non-Resident Senior
Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics. The author would like to thank John M.
Kline, Gerald T. West, and other anonymous readers for their comments on earlier drafts of this
article. The faults that remain are entirely my own.

2.

The early period (1972–1992): an era of
misdirection?

The entry of the United Nations into exploration of what this
volume calls the TNC problématique came in the midst of severe
turbulence. In 1972, Jack Anderson, an investigative reporter in the
United States, asserted that the International Telephone and Telegraph
Company (ITT) had plotted with the United States Central Intelligence
Agency in 1970 to block the election of Salvador Allende – who had
threatened to nationalize ITT’s 60 per cent share of the national phone
company – in Chile. These allegations prompted the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to establish the Subcommittee
on Multinational Corporations, which held highly publicized hearings
critical of TNCs in the developing world under Senator Frank Church
from 1973 to 1976. On another front, critics accused the Swiss giant
Nestlé of dressing its sales personnel to look like doctors and nurses
to discourage breastfeeding of babies and to substitute what the sales
people claimed to be medically superior baby formula. At the United
Nations, Philippe de Seynes, United Nations Under-Secretary-General,
crafted a resolution in 1972 calling for the formation of a Group of
Eminent Persons “to study the impact of multinational corporations on
economic development and international relations” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008,
p. 52). The goal was to create a “focal point” within the United Nations
to develop the “institutions needed for a new international economic
order”. The Group’s hearings and report led to the establishment of the
United Nations Commission on TNCs and the UNCTC in New York in
1974. The UNCTC’s terms of reference included providing information,
analyzing policy, and offering advisory services, technical assistance
and capacity-building.
The Group of Eminent Persons launched many important and
controversial initiatives, such as urging TNCs to refuse to comply with
apartheid in South Africa, and to threaten divestment if the apartheid
system was not abolished. A central recommendation of the Group,
however, and “almost certainly the most significant and contentious
policy issue at the UNCTC” was work on drafting a code on TNCs, a
task that “took center stage” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 108). The Group
of 77 developing countries, supported by the socialist bloc, demanded a
legally binding international instrument of rules to govern the activities
of TNCs. The representatives of the developed market economies
insisted on a voluntary code of principles. The debate represented a clash
between those who believed in government-directed development and
those who preferred the primacy of the market mechanism. To simplify
92
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the terms of the conflict, the former tended to see TNC–host relations
as a zero-sum struggle, in which developing countries lacked bargaining
power. The latter tended to view foreign investment as yielding positivesum gains for all participants.
For almost two decades, from 1975 to 1992, the UNCTC struggled
over the code. Three important executive directors presided over the
UNCTC during this period, Klaus Sahlgren, Sidney Dell and Peter
Hansen. The perspectives on the code quoted in this volume represent
a spectrum of often fiercely held views. Oswaldo Sunkel, a prominent
Latin American intellectual, warned that TNCs possessed “sufficient
power and influence to try to set the rules of the game” (Sagafi-Nejad,
2008, p. 75). Jose Campillo Sians, an undersecretary in the Government
of Mexico, declared. “If we have lost any foreign investment as a result
of our policies, it has been well lost” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 74). Edith
Penrose, Professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies at
the University of London, argued that creating an agency that simply
gathered and analyzed data about TNCs would be “the most effective
type of action that an international organization could take” (SagafiNejad, 2008, p. 72). G. A. Waagner, president of the Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company, asserted that “multinational enterprises have been
major contributors to the development process… and engines of growth”
(Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 67). For 73 pages – the longest single component
of the volume – the book presents a mausoleum of charges and countercharges about TNC behaviour (pro and con) from this period, easily
remembered by those emeriti who witnessed the interaction as if they
were exchanged yesterday.
By 1992, the volume concludes that the efforts to fashion a
code framework for TNC activities “failed”; the negotiations “came
to naught” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 122). In his report to the General
Assembly, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared that “no
consensus was possible”, and thereby “the final nail was driven into the
code’s coffin”.
What emerged from two decades of struggle, concludes the volume,
was “the promotion of FDI through incentives and the Washington
Consensus. Jeanne Kirkpatrick and like-minded conservatives must
have felt exonerated by the swing” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 124).
But should this 20–year inability to negotiate a code to govern
the behaviour of TNCs be labelled as failure? Did this outcome in 1992,
on the eve of the United Nations moving TNC-related operations to
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Geneva, simply represent a victory for one ideological point of view
over another?
From today’s vantage point, it is difficult to recall how little
was understood about the dynamics of FDI when this United Nations
initiative was launched – let alone the most appropriate policy responses
to capture benefits and avoid damage – and how slowly evidence and
reliable analysis built up over the early era from 1972 to 1992.
The period from 1950 to 1970 had seen the beginnings of an
explosive growth in the magnitude and importance of FDI. Accumulating
raw data on FDI that was anywhere near reliable, complete and
comparable became one of the early significant accomplishments of
the United Nations. The number of foreign affiliates of United Statesbased TNCs alone – “transnational corporations” was the term of art
preferred by UN agencies, rather than “multinational corporations” or
“multinational enterprises” – grew from approximately 7,400 in 1950
to 23,000 in 1966, with the rate of expansion averaging nearly 10 per
cent. Worldwide FDI flows equalled some $3 billion in 1960 – when a
billion dollars still represented a considerable sum – almost tripling to
$8.5 billion by 1970.
But what motivates FDI? What hinders FDI? What is the impact
of FDI on the welfare and growth of developing countries? These were
subjects of perplexity and confusion. The international economics
community in developed and developing countries alike was trained to
think in terms of trade analysis. The movement of firms across borders
to set up operations was something of a puzzle, not because there were
no explanations, but because the most commonsense explanations
were clearly wrong. A common question-answer sequence was: What
motivates FDI? – FDI represents a movement of investment from a
region of capital abundance to a region of capital scarcity. But most FDI
was moving from one region of capital abundance (the United States) to
another region of capital abundance (Europe), and even more baffling
was the phenomenon of cross-investment among capital-abundant
regions (United States FDI into Germany, and vice versa). A second
question-answer sequence was: What motivates FDI?–FDI represents a
flow of business operations from a region of high wages to a region of
low wages. But most FDI was moving from one region of high wages
to other regions of high wages, with cross-investment among high-wage
areas again adding to the puzzle.
What was the attraction of FDI to be drawn to the developing
world? Transnational corporate investment in oil, copper, bauxite, or
94
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gold seemed straight fowardly determined by geology. TNC investment
in Latin American utility monopolies was not hard to fathom. TNC
investment in Asian or African rubber and banana plantations adhered
closely to comparative advantage in trade theory.
But what about the burgeoning FDI in manufacturing and
services? The answer to this question emerged from a small group
of insightful researchers, which included Stephen Hymer, Charles
Kindleberger and Raymond Vernon, and centrally featured John H.
Dunning, a collaborator in the production of this volume and a recurrent
participant in the evolution of United Nations dealings with TNCs.1
These breakthough intellectual figures, and their collaborators and
students, began to understand FDI flows as the awkwardly phrased but
analytically brilliant internalization of intangible assets. Functioning as
an alternative to exporting or licensing, FDI was a strategy to maintain
or extend a firm’s ability to extract oligopoly rents via controlling and
integrating operations across borders. Within this framework, there were
two parallel motivations for manufacturing (and service) FDI in the
developing world – the contemporary business school jargon is “marketseeking” FDI versus “efficiency-seeking” FDI. But these buzzwords
obscure the principal distinction. One motivation was for TNCs to
set up plants behind trade barriers in protected host country markets,
designed as cash cows to fund external TNC worldwide endeavours.
The alternative motivation was for TNCs to build plants fully integrated
into the firms’ global sourcing network, designed to help reinforce the
firms’ competitive position in international markets directly.
In the 1970s, there was legitimate ideological debate about which
of these two forms of TNC entry might best contribute to host country
development, without sufficient empirical evidence to settle the issue
one way or another. Perhaps a protected host country market could
be used to induce TNCs to accept weighty performance requirements
like domestic content, joint venture, and technology-sharing mandates,
creating the setting for the successful emergence of infant industries.
Perhaps export-oriented TNCs that typically insisted on whole or majority
ownership, and freedom from domestic content requirements, would
limit their activities to screw driver operations of little benefit to the
host economy. In fact, over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, empirical
reality turned out to be the opposite. TNCs operating in protected host
markets regulated by performance requirements built sub-scale plants
and used technology well behind the industry frontier, often assembling
1

One of the best surveys of the emergence of the theory of FDI remains Dunning
(1993).
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knocked-down “kits” of previous-generation products. TNCs oriented
toward external global markets built full-scale plants with cutting-edge
technology, and in their own self-interest – under some conditions –
created supplier-networks of component producers that stretched deep
into the host economy.2
The use of TNCs for infant industry development in India – or the
use of TNCs for informatics sector development in Brazil and Mexico –
did not bring industry-frontier practices into the host economy or create
internationally competitive national champions, as policy advocates
had wished. Instead, the dynamics of industrial success in South-East
Asia and the creation of auto plant poles in Brazil and Mexico became a
“contract-manufacturing” or original-equipment-manufacturing (OEM)
phenomenon associated with outward-looking TNC operations. Even
the Korean electronics industry – often considered an “alternative
model” – grew up through OEM contracts to United States, Japanese
and European TNCs, only very gradually moving up a learning curve
from OEM guidance to Original Design Manufacturing to (in a few
cases) Own Brand Manufacture.3
It took painstaking investigation – often using firm-level microdata, industry case studies, and cost-benefit analyses of specific FDI
projects – to figure out the impact of TNC operations in a way that
could be used to inform host-country policy. Evidence about backward
linkages from manufacturing FDI was initially worrisome but – in local
business-friendly settings, with access to indigenous skilled labour,
engineers, managers, unimpeded imports and finance, as the World
Investment Report 2001 showed – became more promising as TNCs
settled into host economies. Evidence about counterproductive results
from simply imposing joint venture or technology transfer requirements
on FDI emerged gradually, but have been consistent with recent data
(e.g. from China).4 Confirmation that formation of infant industries via
FDI usually did not offer the scale economies and the dynamic learning
needed to launch competitive “adult” firms took time to accumulate.
From 1972 to 1992, unravelling how various forms of FDI might
affect development and what the most useful host policies might be was
a work in progress. Gradually it became clear that heavy-handed and
overly legalistic binding-code regulation was probably not a suitable or
even desirable approach for developin-country authorities. But neither
2

For what these conditions were, see the discussion of the World Investment
Report 2001.
3
Hobday (1995, 2000).
4
Long (2005).
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was the “laissez-faire, hands-off, and just let international markets work”
approach. As discussed in more detail later, there were subtle market
failures (and poor policy design) that prevented TNCs from contributing
as much as they might, and from generating positive externalities as
they operated. There were market failures (and poor policy design) that
allowed TNC investment to distort development and leave a legacy
of negative externalities as they went. There was a crying need for
standards to ensure good governance and sustainable operations on the
part of TNCs, a form of international public good that the market would
not supply on its own.
After Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali dismantled the
UNCTC (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 131) and gave the staff the option
of remaining in New York or moving to continue their work on
TNCs in Geneva, the field was not merely ceded to a simple-minded
characterization of the Washington Consensus – that TNC investment
is good, and the more the better! Quite to the contrary, the work of the
United Nations after the shift of TNC affairs to UNCTAD in Geneva
did much (along with other research endeavours and advisory initiatives
elsewhere) to ensure a much more complex and practical treatment of
the challenges of harnessing investment by TNCs to development.

3.

The later period (1992–2008): helping to guide a
paradigm shift

In retrospect, it has become clear that FDI comes in at least three –
or four – distinct forms: FDI in extractive industries, FDI in utilities, FDI
in manufacturing, and (perhaps separately) FDI in services. Each type
of FDI poses specific and singular policy challenges that determine how
extensively TNC operations can potentially contribute to host-country
development, or – conversely – detract from host-country welfare,
slow host-country growth, and undermine host-country governance and
stewardship of the environment.5 Athwart all categories are important
cross-cutting policy themes: investment promotion; technology transfer
and the generation of backward linkages; transparency and anticorruption; competition policy; environmental policy and enforcement;
and capacity-building for civil servants, parliamentarians and civil
society.
While not generally sponsoring original policy research,
UNCTAD kept in close touch with the evidence on the ground about
5

For an effort to separate out the evidence and address the policy challenges for
each of these categories of FDI, see Moran (2009).
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the impact of FDI in each category, and the reality of the policy space of
host governments for each type of FDI (arranging meetings of experts,
offering courses, and providing advice to host officials and negotiators).
Along the way, UNCTAD became a major contributor – in some respects,
the most important contributor around the world – in assembling basic
statistics on TNC investment flows and stocks, and gradually upgrading
the accuracy and comparability of the TNC investment data base. At
the same time, however, UNCTAD did not fall into the trap of running
regressions of undifferentiated FDI flows on host-country growth,
productivity (total factor productivity or labour productivity), or other
development indicators that hadsnared analytic assessment elsewhere.6
Instead, UNCTAD research summaries and policy discussions showed
sensitivity to the distinctive features of each major kind of FDI.
Throughout the period 1993–2008 (the TNC unit did not arrive in
Geneva until 1993), UNCTAD provided on-the-ground policy analysis
and capacity-building services throughout the developing world. Many
individuals contributed, but the key figure in guiding the evolution of the
Division and building its stature was Karl P. Sauvant, who had joined
the United Nations in 1973 (shortly prior to the establishment of the
UNCTC) and became acting Officer-in-Charge and later Director of the
Investment Division until his retirement in 2005.
Perhaps the clearest record of the contribution to empirical
analysis and policy debate during the UNCTAD years emerges from the
annual World Investment Report (WIR). This history volume provides
6

In Moran (2009), I go so far as to argue – and show – that the work of researchers
who run regressions using data that mix FDI in the extractive sector with FDI in utilities,
with FDI in manufacturing, with FDI in services to produce a single measure of “the
impact” of FDI on the host economy simply has to be, well, discarded and redone. It
is analytically absurd to jumble evidence from FDI in Nigeria’s oil industry (where
the outcome varies as a function of policies related to the resource curse and Dutch
disease), with FDI in Argentine utilities (where the outcome varies as a function of
polices related to foreign currency obligations/local revenues mismatch), with FDI in
Malaysian electronics (where the outcome varies as a function of policies related to
backward linkages and vertical spillovers), with FDI in Singaporean services (where the
outcome varies as a function of policies related to competition policy) and find a single
“contribution” that some generic FDI brings to some generic host economy. This critique
touches even the most distinguished investigators, such as V. N. Balasubramanyam,
M. Salisu, and David Sapsford; E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio and J. W. Lee; Maria
Carkovic and Ross Levine; Bruce Blonigan and Miao Grace Wang. Attempts to model
FDI flows as a single phenomenon, with a common motivation and dynamic, then tested
with undifferentiated FDI data, is likewise misdirected. This includes the basic writings
of superstars that include Elhanan Helpman, James Markusen, David Carr, Keith
Maskus, Tony Venables and Rob Feenstra, all of whom appear to be characterizing TNC
activities solely as engaging in multi-plant manufacturing FDI.
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a useful once-over review of each of the UNCTAD WIRs, but does not
go far enough in highlighting the conceptual breakthroughs or policy
audacity that occasionally emerge. In addition, the UNCTAD effort
devoted to the straightforward dissemination of the WIRs around the
world, accompanied by appropriate elaboration of themes and on-thespot publicity, constituted – and continues to provide – an important
public service, especially in developing-country capitals.
In the WIR 2007 on TNC investment in extractive industries, for
example – this WIR appeared too late for full treatment in the volume
– there is sophisticated and nuanced discussion of the resource curse
and Dutch disease phenomena, repeated stress on the necessity for
transparency about revenue flows to prevent corruption, and appropriate
emphasis on the need to strengthen environmental enforcement
capabilities rather than mere enactment of environmental laws.
There is honest assessment that prospects for the spread of backward
linkages, or the building of extractive industry “clusters”, are limited in
comparison to FDI in manufacturing. There is frank acknowledgement
that TNC investors from non-OECD states must join in exercising good
governance standards: “the ‘new players’, whether State-owned or
not, should derive long-term operational benefits from complying with
basic human rights standards as part of wider policies for responsible
investment. Attention to human rights compliance may be needed
to defend themselves against accusations of complicity with various
abuses” (WIR 2007, p. 178). Finally, WIR 2007 marches up close to
the daring recommendation that TNC investment be delayed or denied
when host countries are manifestly ill-ruled: “When mineral deposits
are found in weakly governed or authoritarian states, foreign companies
need to decide whether to invest there or not, since they may end up –
directly or indirectly, or even unwittingly – supporting or strengthening
the existing order” (WIR 2007, p. 184).
WIR 2008 on TNC investment in infrastructure also appeared after
this history was drafted. FDI in infrastructure raises issues that overlap with
TNC involvement in extractive industries as relate to transparency and
anti-corruption. WIR 2008 provides a carefully documented assessment
of pros and cons of privatization, especially TNC-led privatization, with
regard to provision of services and implications for universal access
(treating electricity, telecommunications, transport, water and sanitation
separately). The document offers cutting-edge criticisms of relying on
dispute settlement provisions in international investment agreements,
especially bilateral investment treaties (BITs) for settling disputes with
multinational investors, in light of the consequent reduction in the
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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host government’s regulatory flexibility. The text draws attention to
instances where the TNC “does not carry out due diligence in assessing
the feasibility of the project, or is negligent in the implementation of the
investments but then blames the commercial loss on government action”
(WIR 2008, p. 168). WIR 2008 lays the groundwork for forthcoming
investigation of dispute settlement mechanisms that seek an amicable
solution via mediation and conciliation in contrast to contemporary
arbitration (WIR 2008, p. 169).
As far back as 1993 – with treatment of TNCs and integrated
international production systems – many WIRs focused on issues
surrounding FDI in manufacturing and assembly. WIR 1994 on
employment and the workplace, for example, acknowledged that TNCs’
use of capital-deepening and labour-saving technologies might appear
to limit the number of TNC-generated jobs. But WIR 1994 introduced
widespread evidence that TNCs paid more than their domestic
counterparts, and tended to create qualitatively better employment, both
in terms of working conditions and human resource development.
WIR 1994 was published too early to record data that were
beginning to emerge from the UNCTAD TNC database itself – namely,
that far from being primarily a lowest-skilled, lowest-wage phenomenon,
the flow of TNC manufacturing investment to medium-skilled activities
such as electronics and electrical products, transportation equipment,
industrial machinery, chemicals, rubber, and plastic products is nearly
ten times larger each year than to investments in garments, footwear,
toys and the like – and the differential is speeding up over time.7 While
complete evidence is not available, ILO survey data indicate that TNCs
with these higher-skilled plants pay their workers two to three times
as much for production-line jobs, and perhaps ten times as much for
technical and supervisory positions than in plants devoted to lowerskilled labour-intensive operations.
WIR 1996, appearing shortly after the ratification of the Uruguay
Round and the establishment of WTO, emphasized the complementarity
between trade liberalization and the ability to realize the full potential
from FDI in manufacturing. After all, TNCs accounted for two thirds
of world trade, about half of which was between affiliates of the same
parent. Already in 1996, there was abundant evidence that higher levels
of trade and more rapid rates of growth go together, but there was
also spirited debate about the direction of causation (do higher levels
of trade cause more rapid rates of growth, or do more rapid rates of
7
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growth lead to higher levels of trade?) Research subsequent to 1996
provides the important new finding that when trade liberalization and
FDI liberalization go together, there is a causal link to higher rates of
host-country economic growth.8 WIR 1998, published after the onset of
the Asian financial crisis, noted that FDI proved to be more stable and
less subject to the swings in financial markets than other types of private
capital flows.
Of particular importance is WIR 2001 on TNCs and backward
linkages. Developing-country host authorities need to recognize, WIR
2001 argued, that vibrant backward linkages depend upon a supportive
business-friendly environment for local firms no less than for TNCs;
that indigenous companies need a setting with contract enforcement,
regulatory reliability, and access to imported inputs, capital, and
dependable services no less than foreign investors, in order to become
participants in deep multi-tiered supplier networks.
Conscientiously drawing on empirical studies from World
Development, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of
Development Studies, Transnational Corporations, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics and Cambridge Journal of Economics, and
the international political economy series published by Princeton,
Stanford, Cornell, Cambridge, and Oxford University Press, WIR 2001
catalogued the growing array of micro-level evidence of TNCs providing
production assistance, recommendations on machinery purchases, and
advance payments to indigenous firms to help them become competitive
suppliers. WIR 2001 provided detailed investigation of TNC talent-scout
and vendor-development programmes in Singapore and Malaysia (and
Wales), as host authorities sought to expand local TNC supplier chains.
These indigenous suppliers did not remain captive producers, but used
the expertise acquired from foreign TNCs to become independent market
players. In some cases, TNCs introduced local suppliers in a given host
country to sister affiliates in other countries in the region, whereupon
the suppliers began to operate in international markets on their own.
In short, these were backward linkages that included externalities from
FDI conferred upon the host economy – productivity externalities and
export externalities – rigorously defined.
As noted earlier, UNCTAD did not generally aspire to undertake
independent research on the relationship between FDI and development,
but nonetheless remained in closer touch with reality on the ground than
other organizations and individuals who did. To illustrate the contrast,
8
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a reader of the principal publications of the United States economic
community – including some of the leading academic investigators
such as Robert Lipsey, Dani Rodrik or Gordon Hanson, for example
– would have found near-unanimous affirmation well into the twentyfirst century that “an abundance of evidence that FDI generates positive
spillovers does not exist” (Hanson, 2005, p. 178). The common referents
for this conclusion were two ill-designed econometric studies that
looked at FDI in the heavily protected import-substitution regimes in
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and pre-1995 Morocco and failed
to find substantial benefits from FDI in these highly distorted markets.9
These studies did not separate export-oriented FDI from FDI oriented
towards protected domestic markets, did not control for wholly-owned
versus minority-owned FDI, did not distinguish FDI required to meet
domestic content requirements from FDI free to source from wherever
the TNC wished. Without such controls, it is impossible to arrive at
reasonable conclusions about the impact of FDI on host economies
throughout the world. Yet these two econometric studies led the
economic academic community to generalize that FDI around the globe
fails to generate positive spillovers, provide externalities or offer any
distinctive contribution to development.
The findings from these analyses of FDI in heavily regulated
import-substitution regimes continue to be ritually repeated in the
foremost economics journals long after the generalizability of the
original studies has been discredited. This is analogous to finding that
contemporary submissions to The Astrophysical Journal begin by
showing deference to the geocentric arguments of Ptolemy.
A new “second generation” of econometric research is now
beginning to provide the basis for judging when, how, and why horizontal
and vertical total factor productivity externalities, export externalities,
and labour market externalities do accompany FDI, or do not – alternative
outcomes where, as noted in WIR 2001, the openness, competitiveness,
and business-friendly setting for indigenous as well as foreign firms
is crucial.10 More recent research highlights the importance of access
to finance as a key determinant of successful indigenous supply-chain
formation (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009).
9

For detailed dissection of these two studies, see Moran (2008).
This “second generation” of econometric research includes (for horizontal and
vertical TFP externalities) Garrick Blalock and Paul J. Gertler, Beata Smarzyska Javorcik,
Sourafel Girma and Yundan Gong; (for export externalities) Brian Aitken, Gordon H.
Hanson and Ann E. Harrison, Deborah Swenson; (for labour market externalities) Robert
Lipsey and Fredrik Sjoholm, Alexander Hijsen.
10
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As a kind of ideological carry over from the earlier period
1972–1992, UNCTAD publications on TNCs were perpetually in
conflict about the merits of imposing performance requirements on
manufacturing TNCs. Over time, the push of those who favoured the
use of domestic content and joint-venture mandates to force TNCs to
build the host-country industrial base and compel technology transfer
to indigenous firms performed an unintended service by insisting on
periodic assessments of the use of TRIMS (Trade Related Investment
Measures). The WTO negotiations specified that TRIMS in the form
of domestic content and trade-balancing requirements be phased out,
but advocates of performance requirements fought for extension of their
use.
UNCTAD studies on TNCs noted that export performance
requirements had been useful in Mexico and Thailand because they
had induced the major auto TNCs to build full-scale world-class
export plants. Export performance requirements that merely used
trade-rents from TNC operations in protected markets to subsidize
external shipments from sub-scale host plants, in contrast, did not lead
to internationally competitive results. Domestic content requirements
and technology-sharing requirements repeatedly showed themselves to
be counterproductive, detracting from the competitive performance of
the firms subjected to them. The legacy of UNCTAD surveys of the
use of TRIMS – the most recent in 2007, covering Argentina, Ethiopia,
Pakistan, the Philippines and Viet Nam – has been to affirm, and reaffirm,
how meagre is the evidence that imposing performance requirements on
TNCs can be a useful policy tool to promote development.11
WIR 2004, subtitled “The Shift Toward Services”, noted that the
share of services in the national product of most countries has risen
rapidly, to reach 72 per cent of developed, 52 per cent of developing and
57% of former socialist-bloc countries in 2001. Services FDI has grown
more rapidly than FDI in other sectors, quadrupling between 1990 and
2002 from an estimated $950 billion to over $4 trillion (based on 61
countries accounting for over four fifths of the world’s stock of FDI,
extrapolated to the world), with communications, finance, electricity,
gas, water, tourism, trade, and business activities being the largest
concentrations of FDI for developing economies.
WIR 2004 acknowledged that services provide crucial inputs
into products that compete in domestic and international markets. The
text appropriately notes that “services” includes diverse industries,
11

UNCTAD (2007a).

Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

103

some of which have natural monopoly characteristics, and need careful
regulatory attention. The policy analysis, however, reflects something
of a schizophrenic oscillation between appreciation of increased
competition from service FDI and wariness of “crowding out” less
efficient indigenous service providers.12 WIR 2004 appeared too early to
pick up more recent econometric research showing that liberalization of
service sectors – including increased access for service FDI – has a strong
independent effect on the productivity of domestic manufacturing firms.13
In India, for example, most explanations for the post-1991 expansion of
the country’s manufacturing sector focus on the liberalization of imports
of goods and on industrial de-licensing. But the evidence indicates that
banking, telecommunications and transport reforms all had significant
positive effects on manufacturing productivity too – a one-standarddeviation in the index of services liberalization resulted in a productivity
increase of 6 per cent for domestic Indian firms and 7.5 per cent for
TNCs operating within India.14
WIR 2006, subtitled “FDI from Developing and Transition
Economies: Implications for Development”, pointed out that the stock of
outward FDI from developing and transition countries in 2005 reached
$1.4 trillion, up from $335 billion ten years earlier. The sources of such
FDI moreover multiplied, to include such countries as Argentina, Chile,
India, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the Russian
Federation and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, alongside China,
Singapore, Brazil and Mexico. The study celebrated potential advantages
that TNCs from developing states might bring as part of South–South
investment, including technology, marketing, and product design
especially suited to less affluent economies. Survey materials showed
that many developing countries were actively soliciting FDI from
developing and transition economies, most especially African states
looking for investors from China. WIR 2006 noted the importance of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) for such TNCs, and identified some
– including Cemex (Mexico) and Petrobras (Brazil) – that were among
the leaders in their respective industries in adopting CSR principles. The
text acknowledged that “some TNCs are based in home countries that
lack a civil society that can freely voice its opinion….The practices of
TNCs in such situations are not subjected to the same level of public
scrutiny that has raised the level of awareness of CSR issues elsewhere
…. A significant number of large TNCs from developing and transition
12

For an iconoclastic reappraisal of evidence surrounding FDI and the crowdingin/crowding-out debate, see Moran (2009).
13
Arnold, Javorcik, and Matoo (2008).
14
Arnold et al. (2009).
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economies are state-owned and active in extractive industries….which
raises potential issues related to corporate governance and transparency”
(WIR 2006, p. 233). The text refrained, however, from showing the rather
sharp edge that was to appear in WIR 2007 about TNCs from developing
and transition economies undermining industry-accepted governance
standards and even being complicit in various abuses.
At the end of the day, the empirical conclusions and analytic
results that emerge from the UNCTAD TNC legacy are a far cry from
simple “promotion of FDI though incentives and the Washington
Consensus”. The paradigm shift that the United Nations system helped
foster – along with the efforts of many other researchers and institutions
– showed clearly that each of the principal categories of FDI (FDI in
extractive industries, FDI in infrastructure, FDI in manufacturing, and
FDI in services) can be a force for improvement in host country welfare,
productivity, growth, and sustainable development within carefully
designed policy constraints, or a force for damage and harm when those
policy constraints are mis-designed or absent.

4.

The future

Looking to the future, what is the most vital and effective role the
United Nationsmight be able to play in enhancing the contributions of
TNCs to development while avoiding harmful or negative impacts?
From beginning to end, this volume exudes a fascination with
ever-higher High Level Meetings, with ever more eminent Eminent
Persons, to endorse ever more towering Charters and Principles. The
culminating endeavour treated in the text is the United Nations Global
Compact, an initiative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, first proposed
at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999. The goal, as enunciated
in the volume, is to promote “responsible” global capitalism; that is, to
promote the idea, through an ongoing process of dialogue and discourse,
that TNCs “can do well by doing good” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 195).
The Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support, and
promote a set of ten principles relating to human rights, labour, the
environment, and anti-corruption. This lofty undertaking should not be
dismissed out of hand. There is clearly a role for the United Nations
in standard-setting on international corporate governance as a muchneeded public good. By 2008, over 4,700 businesses in 120 countries
around the world had signed up to the principles. The volume endorses
proposals that the Global Compact office undertake increasingly
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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intensive reporting on what exactly signatories are – or are not – doing
to comply with the terms of the ompact (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 212).
This volume is forthright in acknowledging some of the drawbacks
of working within the United Nations apparatus: “There is little doubt
that there is duplication, redundancy, and waste within the United
Nations system. (...) Dignitaries gather, make declarations, and leave
chronic problems unresolved” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 213).
Looking to the future, this volume provides acknowledgement and
well-deserved praise for the expansion of CSR codes and endeavours
over the past 40 years. One of the principal recommendations is that:
“the United Nations should rededicate itself to creating a special focal
point on TNCs within the United Nations (like the UNCTC in New
York) to interface with TNCs about their relations with home and host
countries on matters of good corporate citizenship and their impact on
the developmental process” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, p. 215).
All well and good, but such an undertaking should not divert
attention from the fundamental finding that pervades the United Nations’
TNC analysis: the real transformational contributions that TNCs can
make to broad-based sustainable development come when extractive
investors, infrastructure investors, manufacturing and service investors
operate their main line activities within well-designed host-country
policy frameworks – generating revenues in a transparent fashion,
providing reliable power and transport, creating backward linkages and
vibrant supplier networks, diversifying exports and moving into middleskilled and higher-skilled endeavours; not – merely – when they build
clinics, giving grants to regional micro-finance institutions, providing
an audio-visual record of “the intangible cultural heritage” of a tribe
or people, or supporting local charities (valuable as these may be). The
principal input – good or bad – that TNCs can provide to host countries
comes from their core operations, not from their philanthropy. The
magnitude of the latter, moreover, cannot be allowed to substitute for the
meagreness of the former. The endorsement of CSR themes throughout
this volume should not obscure the contribution that UNCTAD TNC
analysis and policy support has provided – and can continue to provide
– to ensure these mainline activities are appropriately structured and
allowed to expand with vigour.
It is important to reiterate that there is a vital role for public
actors to play in ensuring positive TNC contributions to development.
This volume may be right in showing some weary scepticism toward
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the never-ending United Nations TNC debates over more than decades;
it quotes Rubens Ricupero, a former UNCTAD Secretary General,
as saying “a typical creature of the 1960s, UNCTAD…gave impetus
to a project with which it became indissolubly linked: the dynamic
movement towards the creation of a New International Economic Order,
in capital letters as the phrase was written then….Today, all this sounds
unbelievable and absurd” (Sagafi-Nejad, 2008, pp. 124–125). But the
“swing of the pendulum”, to use the volume’s analogy, has not settled at
what the text sometimes morosely characterizes as a Jeanne Kirkpatrick/
Ronald Reagan end point, today.
It is not necessary to invoke Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Ronald Reagan
to observe that the strongest force to reduce poverty, improve infant
mortality and raise broad living standards is to improve the productivity
and growth of developing-country economies, or that the key to achieving
this is to provide conditions for a vibrant and competitive private sector
(domestic and international). To achieve progress here, the record of
United Nations TNC analysis – like analysis from other sources –
demonstrates clearly that left on their own, international markets do not
necessarily produce optimal outcomes for broad-based improvement
in living standards. To be sure, poor countries should improve their
business climate – undertake micro, macro and institutional reform
– but while the mantra of “reform, reform”, in the words of Ricardo
Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, may be a necessary condition for success,
it is not a sufficient condition.15
The contribution of TNCs to sustainable development, in
particular, is beset with multiple market failures that require public sector
institutional action to correct. There are information asymmetries – TNCs
are not all-knowing; the search for investment opportunities is costly;
and would-be hosts have to capture the attention and interest of potential
investors. There are coordination externalities – infrastructure services,
vocational training, healthy workers have to be meshed with the needs of
investors in catalytic fashion. There are problems with making credible
commitments – contract enforcement and regulatory stability have to
be strengthened. There are appropriability problems and first-mover
disadvantages – pioneer investors in novel or chaotic situations may
need special incentives or guarantees. There are international standards
that have to be set, and enforced, as a worldwide public good.
Here United Nations TNC activities – like the World Bank
Group (International Finance Corporation, Investment Climate
15

Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
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Advisory Service, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), regional
development banks, OECD, bilateral aid donors – can be crucial. My
hope, therefore, is that the work the United Nations has done in offering
host country policy diagnostics regarding TNC investment, and providing
on-the-ground capacity-building, will not be lost in the pursuit of more
soaring CSR-related aspirations.
The question as to how the United Nations can position its TNCrelated undertakings will require some creative thinking, parallel to
alternative approaches being debated within the World Bank Group,
within regional development banks, and within leading aid donor
institutions (public and private).
There is a growing appreciation, for example, that even the most
insightful analytic studies of policy toward TNCs – by IFC, OECD, or
the United Nations – that are conducted in drive-by fashion, and then
handed over with an impressive-looking cover to host authorities have
very limited usefulness.
The emerging alternative view is that what is needed is more
sustained external help with creating a mesh – a web, an arrangement – of
policy recommendations and advocacy structures. Once host authorities
set their goals and request assistance, the international community
needs to provide not just customized policy prescriptions, but also a
sustained on-the-ground external presence, surrounded by carefully
identified indigenous policy champions, with external supporting
financial assistance on call. Under imprimatur of the highest levels of
host leadership, this places external supporters in the tricky position
of not simply offering policy advice but helping shape the political
economy of the reform process. In most cases, UNCTAD or other United
Nations agencies would probably not be the leader – that role would
more likely fall to the World Bank and regional lending agencies – but
United Nations participants could be integral players and legitimators.
UNCTAD’s current initiative to investigate best practices in a given FDI
arena, combine the results with ongoing Investment Policy Reviews,
and join forces with OECD and other institutions to serve developingcountry needs might be a step in the right direction.16
Along one dimension, UNCTAD TNC operatives as organized
in the Division on Investment and Enterprise (DIAE) could help in
developing a rapid-reaction capacity, to respond to opportunities and
crises:
16
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– A promising new government comes to power in a country (think
Liberia in 2005) that needs a prompt overhaul of mining legislation,
expert assistance in renegotiating treatment of transfer pricing in FDI
contracts, capacity-building of civil servants, parliamentarians, and
civil society on monitoring tax and environmental issues.
– A country just opening up to trade and investment practically for the
first time (think Mongolia in 2004) needs a multilateral on-the-ground
presence to help with TNC policy design and advocacy.
– A country (think Morocco in 2006) completes preferential trade
arrangements with Europe and the United States, needs customized
advice and assistance to improve investment promotion and vocational
training programmes to upgrade its export processing zones and
industrial parks from low-skilled to higher-skilled TNC activities
with expanding linkages into the local economy.17
– States and provinces are undergoing rapid economic growth linked
to TNC-led globalization (think China, India), necessitating external
advice and assistance to deal with concomitant negative externalities
in the form of internal migration and environmental pollution.18
– Post-conflict economies need special packages of capital, guarantees
and insurance to attract investment (and reverse flight capital), to
restore services, and to rebuild basic economic activities.19
The examples could go on.
Along another dimension, UNCTAD’s DIAE could help in
pursuing ongoing vital multilateral initiatives:
– UNCTAD has played the role of midwife in the creation of the
World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA),
whose membership reached a total of 220 members by early 2009
(some countries have multiple subnational member agencies). Yet
a large majority of these IPAs do not have adequate professional
staffing, or up-to-date websites with current information about
appropriate ministries and officials, or active links to existing foreign
17

In fact, UNCTAD’s IPRs have looked at the issue of EPZs’ upgrading and
linkages for a number of countries. The IPR of Kenya has an entire section on the
diversification of FDI in EPZs (UNCTAD, 2005). The IPR of the Dominican Republic
also looks at the issue, focusing on the institutional structure of investment promotion
(UNCTAD, 2007b). The forthcoming IPR of El Salvador looks at the issue of EPZs from
a regulatory and tax perspective (including compliance with WTO rules).
18
Environmental regulations is an issue that we analyse in all IPRs.
19
IPRs have looked at the potential contribution of FDI in several post-conflict
countries, including Burundi and Sierra Leone (forthcoming).
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and indigenous businesses. Working with the World Bank’s Doing
Business Reform Unit, and other donors and NGOs, UNCTAD could
help assist on-the-ground efforts to upgrade these agencies and spread
best practices in investment promotion.20
– There is broad recognition that the competition in offering incentives,
tax giveaways and subsidies to TNC investors among alternative
sites in developed and developing countries needs to be capped and
brought under regional or international control. Surely there is a role
for UNCTAD’s DIAE, as well as other United Nations agencies, in
helping to launch a multilateral initiative here.
– The discovery of loopholes in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
(and in corresponding national legislation, including the United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) requires new interpretative
statements that exclude gifts and beneficial partnerships awarded
to family members and associates of host country leaders.21 While
the prime actor here must be the OECD, there is a legitimating and
implementing role for UNCTAD’s DIAE and for other United Nations
agencies (along with a revised Global Compact).22
– UNCTAD TNC publications have led the way in recognizing the
growing importance of TNC investors that originate in developing
countries. UNCTAD’s DIAE could help lead multilateral efforts to
ensure these new TNCs adopt best practices in corporate governance
and on-the-ground performance.
– United Nations agencies have played a key role in helping developing
countries with the design of environmental policies and adoption of
green technologies. UNCTAD’s DIAE office would be a central
player in helping with capacity-building for enforcement vis-à-vis
TNC operations.
– United Nations agencies could also play a role with regard to the
renewed interest in finding multilateral solutions to investment
regulations. (See the G20 “Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh
Summit”, as well as the outcomes of the 2009 L’Aquila G8 Summit,
the “G8 Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a
20

This effort would be a follow-on to UNCTAD’s publications, Investment
Advisory Series A and B.
21
Center for Global Development (2007).
22
The well-publicized anti-bribery cases brought against Siemens in 2008–2009
illustrate that old-fashioned corrupt techniques are also still alive in securing international
business contracts.
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Sustainable Future” and the “Concluding Report of the Heiligendamm
Process”.)
The list could easily be expanded.
Across the broad realm of issues relating to TNC operations around
the world, it is clear that there is much critical, essential, and exciting
work still to be done. Herein the UN will continue to be (as it has been
in the past) a valuable – in many ways, indispensable – player in helping
to analyze, advise and support the potential for TNCs to contribute to
broad-based sustainable development.
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RESEARCH NOTE
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2009:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

KEY MESSAGES
FDI Trends, Policies and Prospects
Global FDI flows have been severely affected worldwide by the
economic and financial crisis. Inflows are expected to fall from $1.7 trillion in
2008 to below $1.2 trillion in 2009, with a slow recovery in 2010 (to a level
up to $1.4 trillion), and then gaining momentum in 2011 (approaching $1.8
trillion).
The crisis has changed the FDI landscape: investments to developing
and transition economies have surged, increasing their share in global FDI
flows to 43 per cent in 2008. This was partly due to a concurrent large decline
in FDI flows to developed countries (29 per cent). In Africa, inflows rose to
a record level, with the fastest increase in West Africa (a 63 per cent rise over
2007); inflows to South, East and South-East Asia witnessed a 17 per cent
expansion to hit a new high; FDI to West Asia continued to rise for the sixth
consecutive year; inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean rose by 13 per
cent; and the expansion of FDI inflows to South-East Europe and the CIS rose
for the eighth year running. However, in 2009, FDI flows to all regions will
suffer a decline.
The agriculture and extractive industries have weathered the crisis
relatively well, compared with business-cycle-sensitive industries such as
metal manufacturing. In addition, there is a better outlook for FDI in industries
such as agribusiness, many services and pharmaceuticals.
With regard to the mode of investment, greenfield investments were
initially more resilient to the crisis in 2008, but were hit badly in 2009. On
the other hand, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been on
a continuous decline, but are likely to lead the future recovery. Divestments
were particularly significant during the crisis.
There was a marked downturn in FDI by private equity funds as access
to easy financing dried up. Endowed with sizeable assets, sovereign wealth
funds attained a record FDI high in 2008, though they too faced challenges
caused by falling export earnings in their home countries.
Overall policy trends during the crisis have so far been mostly favourable
to FDI, both nationally and internationally. However, in some countries a

more restrictive FDI approach has emerged. There is also growing
evidence of “covert” protectionism.

TNCs in Agricultural Production and Development
Foreign participation can play a significant role in agricultural
production in developing countries, which are in dire need of private
and public investment, thereby boosting productivity and supporting
economic development and modernization.
FDI flows in agricultural production tripled to $3 billion annually
between 1990 and 2007, driven by the food import needs of populous
emerging markets, growing demand for biofuel production, and land
and water shortages in some developing home countries. These flows
remain small compared to the overall size of world FDI, but in many
low-income countries agriculture accounts for a relatively large share of
FDI inflows; and the latter are therefore significant in capital formation
in the industry. Moreover, FDI in the entire agricultural value chain is
much higher, with food and beverages alone representing more than
$40 billion of annual flows.
Contract farming activities by TNCs are spread worldwide,
covering over 110 developing and transition economies, spanning a
wide range of commodities, and in some cases accounting for a high
share of output.
Developed-country TNCs are dominant in the upstream (suppliers)
and downstream (processors, retailers, traders) ends of the agribusiness
value chain. In agricultural production, FDI from the South (including
South–South flows) is equally significant as FDI from the North.
TNC participation in agriculture in the form of FDI and contract
farming may result in the transfer of technology, standards and skills, as
well as better access to credit and markets. All of these could improve the
productivity of the industry – including the farming of staple foods – and
the economy as a whole. Moreover, TNCs’ contribution to food security
is not just about food supply; it also includes enhanced food safety and
affordability. These depend on the right policies for host countries to
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of TNC participation.
Governments should formulate an integrated strategic policy and
regulatory framework for TNC activities in agricultural production. This
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should include vital policy areas such as infrastructure development,
competition, trade and trade facilitation, and R&D. It is equally
important to address social and environmental concerns regarding TNC
involvement.
Governments could also promote contract farming between TNCs
and local farmers in the direction of enhancing farmers’ predictable
income, productive capacities and benefits from global value chains.
To protect the interests of farmers, governments could develop model
contracts for them to use or consider when negotiating with TNCs.
To ensure food security in host countries as a result of exportoriented FDI in staple food production by “new investors”, home and
host countries could consider output-sharing arrangements.
In order to address the concern about “land grab”, the international
community should devise a set of core principles that deal with the need
for transparency in large-scale land acquisitions, respect for existing
land rights, the right to food, protection of indigenous peoples, and
social and environmental sustainability.
Public–private partnerships can be an effective tool for bringing
a “new green revolution” to Africa. One initiative in this regard is seed
and technology centres that adapt seeds and related farming technologies
to local needs and conditions, distribute them to local farmers, and build
long-term indigenous capacities.
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OVERVIEW
FDI TRENDS, POLICIES AND PROSPECTS
Amid a sharpening financial and economic crisis, global FDI
inflows fell from a historic high of $1,979 billion in 2007 to $1,697
billion in 2008, a decline of 14 per cent. The slide continued into 2009,
with added momentum: preliminary data for 96 countries suggest that
in the first quarter of 2009, inflows fell a further 44 per cent compared
with their level in the same period in 2008. A slow recovery is expected
in 2010, but should speed up in 2011. The crisis has also changed the
investment landscape, with developing and transition economies’ share
in global FDI flows surging to 43 per cent in 2008.
The decline posted globally in 2008 differed among the three major
economic groupings – developed countries, developing countries, and
the transition economies of South-East Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) – reflecting an initial differential impact
from the current crisis. In developed countries, where the financial crisis
originated, FDI inflows fell in 2008, whereas in developing countries and
the transition economies they continued to increase. This geographical
difference appears to have ended by late 2008 or early 2009, as initial
data point to a general decline across all economic groups (figure 1).
The 29 per cent decline in FDI inflows to developed countries in
2008 was mostly due to cross-border M&A sales that fell by 39 per cent
in value after a five-year boom ended in 2007. In Europe, cross-border
M&A deals plummeted by 56 per cent, and in Japan by 43 per cent.
Worldwide mega deals – those with a transaction value of more than $1
billion – have been particularly strongly affected by the crisis.
In the first half of 2008, developing countries weathered the global
financial crisis better than developed countries, as their financial systems
were less closely interlinked with the hard-hit banking systems of the
United States and Europe. Their economic growth remained robust,
supported by rising commodity prices. Their FDI inflows continued to
grow, but at a much slower pace than in previous years, posting a 17
per cent to $621 billion. By region, FDI inflows increased considerably
in Africa (27 per cent) and in Latin America and the Caribbean (13 per
cent), in 2008, continuing the upward trend of the preceding years for
both regions. However, in the second half of the year and into 2009,
the global economic downturn caught up with these countries as well,
adversely affecting FDI inflows. Inflows to South, East and South116
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Figure 1. FDI inflows, by quarter,
2007–2009
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Total for 96 countries accounting for 91 per cent of world
inflows in 2007–2008.
Total for 35 countries accounting for almost all of developed
countries’ inflows in 2007–2008.
Total for 49 countries accounting for 74 per cent of developing
countries’ inflows in 2007–2008.
Total for 12 countries accounting for 95 per cent of SouthEast Europe and the CIS (transition economies) inflows in
2007–2008.

East Asia witnessed a 17 per
cent expansion to hit a high of
$298 billion in 2008, followed
by a significant decline in
the first quarter of 2009. A
similar pattern prevailed in the
transition economies of SouthEast Europe and the CIS, with
inflows rising by 26 per cent to
$114 billion in 2008 (a record
high), but then plunging by 47
per cent year-on-year in the first
quarter of 2009.
Dramatic changes in FDI
patterns over the past year have
caused changes in the overall
rankings of the largest host
and home countries for FDI
flows. While the United States
maintained its position as the
largest host and home country
in 2008, many developing and
transition economies emerged
as large recipients and investors:
they accounted for 43 per
cent and 19 per cent of global
FDI inflows and outflows,
respectively, in 2008. A number
of European countries saw
their rankings slide in terms of
both FDI inflows and outflows.
The United Kingdom lost its
position as the largest source
and recipient country of FDI
among European countries.
Japan improved its outward
position (figure 2).

FDI flows increased to structurally weak economies in 2008,
including least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing
countries (LLDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS), by 29
per cent, 54 per cent and 32 per cent respectively. However, due to the
distinctive characteristics of these three groups of economies, including
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Figure 2. Global FDI flows, top 20 economies, 2007–2008 a
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their dependence on a narrower range of export commodities that
were hard hit by falling demand from developed countries, the current
crisis has exposed their vulnerabilities in attracting inward FDI. These
economies may, therefore, wish to consider promoting FDI in industries
which are less prone to cyclical fluctuations, such as agriculture-related
industries, particularly food and beverages, as part of a diversification
strategy.

Structural features of the decline in FDI
In late 2008 and the first few months of 2009, significant declines
were recorded in all three components of FDI inflows: equity investments,
other capital (mainly intra-company loans) and reinvested earnings.
Equity investments fell, along with cross-border M&As. Lower profits
by foreign affiliates drove down reinvested earnings, contributing to the
46 per cent drop in FDI outflows from developed countries in the first
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quarter of 2009. In some cases, the restructuring of parent companies
and their headquarters led to repayments of outstanding loans by foreign
affiliates and a reduction in net intra-company capital flows from TNCs
to their foreign affiliates. Critically, the proportionate decline in equity
investments today is larger than that registered during the previous
downturn.
Since mid-2008, divestments, including repatriated investments,
reverse intra-company loans, and repayments of debt to parent firms,
have exceeded gross FDI flows in a number of countries. For instance,
divestments amounted to $110 billion in the case of FDI outflows from
Germany, accounting for 40 per cent of its gross FDI flows in 2008. In
the first half of 2009, nearly one third of all cross-border M&A deals
involved the disposal of foreign firms to other firms (whether based in
a host, home or third country). This depressed FDI flows further. While
divestments are not uncommon (affecting between one quarter and four
fifths of all FDI projects), they became especially noticeable during the
crisis. Indeed, the motivations for divestment have been heightened
during this crisis as TNCs seek to cut operating costs, shed non-core
activities, and, in some cases, take part in industry-wide restructuring.
Greenfield investments (new investments and expansion of existing
facilities) were resilient overall in 2008, but have also succumbed to the
crisis since late 2008.
Available cross-border M&A data by sector indicate that
companies in a limited number of industries increased their FDI activities
in 2008. Industries exhibiting rising cross-border M&A sales (by value)
during the year included food, beverages and tobacco, buoyed by the
$52 billion purchase of Anheuser Busch (United States) by Stichting
Interbrew (Belgium); precision instruments; mining, quarrying and
petroleum; motor vehicles and other transportation equipment; business
services; other services; agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries;
coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel; and public administration and defence.
In general, the primary sector witnessed a growth of 17 per cent in the
value of M&A sales in 2008; whereas manufacturing and services –
which account for the largest proportion of world inward FDI stocks
– reported declines of 10 per cent and 54 per cent respectively.
The financial and economic crisis had varying impacts on the FDI
carried out by special funds, such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) or
private equity funds. Private equity funds were hit especially hard, as
the financial crisis struck at their lifeblood: easy capital, which shrank
as lenders became more risk-conscious. Cross-border M&As by these
funds fell to $291 billion in 2008, or by 38 per cent, from a peak of
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$470 billion in 2007. The main reason for the sharp decline was that
the financing of leveraged buyouts – which had contributed most to the
dynamic growth of cross-border M&As by these funds in previous years
– nearly dried up in the second half of 2008.
SWFs, on the other hand, recorded a rise in FDI in 2008, despite
a fall in commodity prices, the export earnings of which often provide
them with finance. Compared with 2007, the value of their cross-border
M&As – the predominant form of FDI by SWFs – was up by 16 per
cent in 2008 to $20 billion, a small amount in proportion to the size of
FDI and other assets under their management. This increase bucked the
downward trend in global FDI as a whole. However, during the course
of 2008, the sharp economic downturn in developed countries and the
worldwide slump in stock prices led to large losses in SWFs’ investments
(partly because of a high concentration of investments in financial and
business services industries), which depressed the pace of growth of their
cross-border M&A deals. Moreover, the large size of SWFs and their
perceived non-economic intentions have aroused concerns in a number
of countries. To counter this concern, in October 2008 a number of SWFs
agreed on a set of Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP)
– the so-called Santiago Principles. Prospects for further increases in
cross-border M&As by SWFs have deteriorated dramatically, judging
by data on M&As for the first half of 2009.

TNCs in international production
Today, there are some 82,000 TNCs worldwide, with 810,000
foreign affiliates. These companies play a major and growing role in the
world economy. For example, exports by foreign affiliates of TNCs are
estimated to account for about a third of total world exports of goods
and services, and the number of people employed by them worldwide
totalled about 77 million in 2008 – more than double the total labour
force of Germany. However, their international stature has not insulated
them from the worst global recession in a generation. The 4.8% reduction
in inward FDI stock worldwide was reflected in the decline in value of
gross product, sales and assets, as well as employment of TNCs’ foreign
affiliates in 2008, a marked contrast to huge double-digit growth rates in
2006 and 2007 (table 1).
UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPS) 2009–
2011 shows that TNCs’ FDI plans have been affected by the global
economic and financial crisis in the short term. In contrast to the previous
survey, when only 40 per cent of companies reported being affected by
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the crisis, in 2009 as many as 85 per cent of TNCs worldwide blamed the
global economic downturn for influencing cutbacks in their investment
plans; and 79 per cent blamed the financial crisis directly. Both of these
aspects, separately and combined, have diminished the propensity and
ability of TNCs to engage in FDI.
The economic and financial crisis has had a strong impact both
industry-wide and at the individual company level. This is reflected
in declining profits, increasing divestments and layoffs, and forced
restructuring. According to UNCTAD’s preliminary estimates, the rate
of internationalization of the largest TNCs slowed down markedly in
2008, while their overall profits fell by 27 per cent.
Even so, the 100 largest TNCs worldwide continue to represent
a sizable proportion of total international production by the universe of
TNCs. Over the three years from 2006 to 2008, these 100 companies
accounted for, on average, 9 per cent, 16 per cent and 11 per cent
respectively, of the estimated foreign assets, sales and employment of all
TNCs. And their combined value added accounted for roughly 4 per cent
of world GDP, a share that has remained relatively stable since 2000.
Table 1. Selected indicators of FDI and international production,
1982–2008
Item

Value at current prices
(billions of dollars)
1982

FDI inflows
FDI outflows
FDI inward stock
FDI outward stock
Income on inward FDI
Income on outward FDI
Cross-border M&As
Sales of foreign affiliates
Gross product of foreign
affiliates
Total assets of foreign
affiliates
Exports of foreign affiliates
Employment of foreign
affiliates (thousands)
Memorandum
GDP (in current prices)
Gross fixed capital formation
Royalties and licence fee
receipts
Exports of goods and nonfactor services

1990

2007

2008

58
207 1 979 1 697
27
239 2 147 1 858
790 1 942 15 660 14 909
579 1 786 16 227 16 206
44
74 1 182 1 171
46
120 1 252 1 273
..
112 1 031
673
2 530 6 026 31 764 30 311

Annual growth rate
(percentage)
1986– 1991– 1996–
1990 1995 2000 2005
2006 2007 2008
23.6
25.9
15.1
18.1
10.2
18.7
32.0
19.7

22.1
16.5
8.6
10.6
35.3
20.2
15.7
8.8

39.4
35.6
16.0
16.9
13.3
10.3
62.9
8.1

32.4
-5.4
4.6
5.1
32.8
28.4
91.1
5.4

50.1
58.9
23.4
22.2
23.3
18.4
38.1
18.9

6 020

17.4

6.8

6.9

12.9

21.6 20.1

-4.4

2 036 5 938 73 457 69 771

-5.0

623 1 477

6 295

35.4 -14.2
53.7 -13.5
26.2 -4.8
25.3 -0.1
21.9 -0.9
18.5 1.7
62.1 -34.7
23.6 -4.6

18.1

13.7

18.9

20.5

23.9 20.8

6 664

22.2

8.6

3.6

13.8

15.0 16.3 15.4

19 864 24 476 80 396 77 386

5.5

5.5

9.7

8.5

11 963 22 121 55 114 60 780

9.5

5.9

1.3

8.4

8.2 12.5 10.3

2 795 5 099 12 399 13 824

10.0

5.4

1.1

11.8

10.9 13.8 11.5

177

21.1

14.6

8.1

10.6

2 395 4 414 17 321 19 990

11.6

7.9

3.7

13.8

635 1 498

9

29

5 775

163

11.4 25.4

9.1 16.1

-3.7

8.6

15.0 16.3 15.4

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production
and Development, table I.6.
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In terms of the sectoral composition of the top 100 list for 2007,
the majority of the largest TNCs continued to be in manufacturing.
General Electric, Toyota Motor Corporation and Ford Motor Company
were among the biggest manufacturers. TNCs from the services
sector, however, have been steadily increasing their share among the
top 100. There were 26 companies on the 2008 list, as opposed to 14
in 1993, with Vodafone Group and Electricité de France among the
biggest. Primary sector TNCs — such as Royal Dutch/Shell Group,
British Petroleum Company, and ExxonMobil Corporation — ranked
high in the list, buoyed by swelling foreign assets. As for TNCs from
developing countries, 7 featured in the list, among them large diversified
companies such as Hutchison Whampoa and CITIC Group, as well
as important electronics manufacturers such as LG Corporation and
Samsung Electronics.
The operations of the 50 largest financial TNCs were more
geographically spread in 2008 than ever before; however it is not clear
what the ultimate consequences of the hiatus of late 2008 and early
2009 will be. With massive government interventions in banking and
financial services, some developed-country governments have become
the largest or sole shareholders in several of the biggest financial TNCs.
This dramatic change, together with the downfall of some of the largest
financial TNCs, will strongly reshape FDI in financial services in the
coming years.

FDI Prospects
Global FDI prospects are set to remain gloomy in 2009, with
inflows expected to fall below $1.2 trillion. However, recovery of these
flows is expected to begin slowly in 2010 to reach up to $1.4 trillion,
and will gather momentum in 2011 when the level could approach an
estimated $1.8 trillion – almost the same as in 2008.
In the short run, with the global recession extending into 2009 and
slow growth projected for 2010, as well as the drastic fall of corporate
profits, FDI is expected to be low. TNCs appear hesitant and bearish
about expanding their international operations.
This is confirmed by the results of the WIPS: a majority (58
per cent) of large TNCs reported their intentions to reduce their FDI
expenditures in 2009 from their 2008 levels, with nearly one third of them
(more than 30 per cent) even anticipating a large decrease. Considering
the 44 per cent fall in actual FDI inflows worldwide in the first quarter
of 2009, compared to the same period last year, 2009 could end with
much lower flows than in 2008.
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The medium-term prospects for FDI are more optimistic. TNCs
responding to WIPS expect a gradual recovery in their FDI expenditures
in 2010, gaining momentum in 2011; half of them even foresee their
FDI in 2011 exceeding the 2008 level.
The United States and Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and
China (the so-called BRIC countries) are likely to lead the future FDI
recovery, as indicated by the responses of large TNCs to WIPS. Industries
that are less sensitive to business cycles and operate in markets with
stable demand (such as agribusiness and many services), and those with
longer-term growth prospects (such as pharmaceuticals) are likely to
be the engine for the next FDI boom. Furthermore, in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis, when the global economy is on its way to
recovery, the exit of public/government funds from ailing industries will
possibly trigger a new wave of cross-border M&As.

Recent developments in investment policies at
national and international levels
In 2008 and the first half of 2009, despite concerns about
a possible rise in investment protectionism, the general trend in FDI
policies remained one of greater openness, including lowering barriers
to FDI and lowering corporate income taxes. UNCTAD’s annual Survey
of Changes to National Laws and Regulations related to FDI indicates
that during 2008, 110 new FDI-related measures were introduced, of
which 85 were more favourable to FDI (table 2). Compared to 2007, the
percentage of less favourable measures for FDI remained unchanged.
The trend of scrutinizing foreign investments for national security
reasons continued. Regulations to this end were adopted in some OECD
countries. They expanded the scope of compulsory notification rules
or enabled governments to block acquisitions of stakes in domestic
companies. There was also a continuing trend towards nationalization
of foreign-owned entities in extractive industries, particularly in parts
of Latin America.
The most recent survey of investment policy developments in the
42 countries of the G-20 conducted by the UNCTAD secretariat shows
that the overwhelming majority of policy measures specific and/or related
to investment taken by these countries in the period November 2008 to
June 2009 were non-restrictive towards foreign inward and domestic
outward investment. In fact, a substantial number of the policy changes
surveyed were in the direction of facilitating investment, including
outward investment. There were, however, also a few policy measures
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Table 2. National regulatory changes, 1992–2008
Annual average
Item
1992–1994 1995–1999 2002
Number of countries that introduced changes
49
66
72
Number of regulatory changes
95
132 246
More favourable
94
121 234
Less favourable
1
11
12

2003
82
242
218
24

2004
103
270
234
36

2005
92
203
162
41

2006
91
177
142
35

2007 2008
58
55
98 110
74
85
24
25

Source: 		UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production
and Development, table I.14.

that restricted private (including foreign) investment in certain highly
sensitive sectors, or introduced new criteria and tests for investments
that caused national security concerns.
During 2008, the network of international investment agreements
(IIAs) continued to expand: 59 new bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
were concluded, bringing the total number to 2,676. Also, the number of
double taxation treaties (DTT) increased by 75 to a cumulative total of
2,805, and the number of other international agreements with investment
provisions (mostly free trade agreements containing binding obligations
on the contracting parties with regard to investment liberalization and
protection) reached 273 by the end of 2008. In contrast, up to the end
of 2008, six BITs were terminated. In parallel with the expansion of the
IIA universe, the number of investor–state disputes has also continued
to increase, totalling 317 at the end of 2008.

Impact of the crisis on FDI-related policies
So far, the current financial and economic crisis has had no major
impact on FDI policies per se, since FDI is not the cause of this crisis.
However, some national policy measures of a more general scope
(national bailout programmes, economic stimulus packages) introduced
in response to the crisis are likely to have an impact on FDI flows
and TNC operations in an indirect manner. They may have a positive
effect on inward FDI, as they could help stabilize, if not improve, the
key economic determinants of FDI. On the other hand, concerns have
been expressed that country policy measures could result in investment
protectionism by favouring domestic over foreign investors, or by
introducing obstacles to outward investment in order to keep capital at
home.
There are also signs that some countries have begun to discriminate
against foreign investors and/or their products in a “hidden” way, using
gaps in international regulations. Examples of “covert” protectionism
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include favouring products with high “domestic” content in government
procurement (particularly huge public infrastructure projects), de facto
preventing banks from lending for foreign operations, invoking “national
security” exceptions that stretch the definition of national security, or
moving protectionist barriers to subnational levels that are outside the
scope of the application of international obligations (e.g. in matters of
procurement).
Looking to the future, a crucial question is which FDI policies
host countries will apply once the global economy begins to recover.
The expected exit of public funds from flagship industries is likely
to provide a boost to private investment, including FDI. This could
possibly trigger a new wave of economic nationalism to protect
“national champions” from foreign takeovers. IIAs have a role to play
in ensuring the predictability, stability and transparency of national
investment regimes. Policymakers should also consider strengthening
the investment promotion dimension of IIAs through effective and
operational provisions. Investment insurance and other home-country
measures that encourage outward investment are cases in point where
continued international cooperation can be useful.
All of these developments, as well as the impacts of the crisis on
FDI flows and TNC activities, have had different effects on the pattern
of FDI by region (table 3).

Regional trends
FDI inflows into Africa rose to $88 billion in 2008 – another
record level, despite the global financial and economic crisis. This
increased the FDI stock in the region to $511 billion. Cross-border
M&As, the value of which more than doubled in 2008, contributed to a
large part of the increased inflows, in spite of global liquidity constraints.
The booming global commodities market the previous year was a major
factor in attracting FDI to the region. The main FDI recipients included
many natural-resource producers that have been attracting large shares
of the region’s inflows in the past few years, but also some additional
commodity-rich countries.
In 2008, FDI inflows increased in all subregions of Africa, except
North Africa. While Southern Africa attracted almost one third of the
inflows, West African countries recorded the largest percentage increase
(63 per cent). Developed countries were the leading sources of FDI in
Africa, although their share in the region’s FDI stock has fallen over
time.
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63.9
32.6
3.5

1.0

19.9
4.1
15.8
565.2

7.3
1.2
6.1
730.5

73.2
25.8

361.3
279.8
259.4
6.3
53.1
22.0
184.0
20.9
45.8
117.3
116.9
11.3
72.7
53.5
8.2
24.7
0.4

2003

534.9
323.3
310.0
4.6
169.7
37.2
188.3
9.0
72.9
106.4
105.9
3.3
70.7
41.8
3.9
28.0
0.5

1995–2000
(Annual
average)

4.1

56.4
39.5

30.3
3.5
26.8
734.9

414.2
227.7
223.3
7.8
135.8
42.8
290.4
22.1
95.1
173.2
172.9
20.5
106.3
60.6
10.7
35.5
0.3

2007

972.8 1 358.6
631.7
899.6
590.3
842.3
- 6.5
22.5
237.1
271.2
110.4
165.3
433.8
529.3
57.1
69.2
93.3
127.5
283.4
332.7
282.1
331.4
67.6
77.6
131.8
150.4
72.7
83.5
27.8
34.0
55.0
69.5
1.3
1.3

2006

962.3
518.3
503.5
24.4
316.1
103.4
620.7
87.6
144.4
388.7
387.8
90.3
187.0
108.3
50.7
59.9
0.9

2008

3.2

63.0
33.8

3.7

66.6
29.7

4.6

68.7
26.8

6.7

56.7
36.6

30.9
54.5
90.9
114.4
4.8
9.9
12.8
10.9
26.1
44.7
78.1
103.5
973.3 1 461.1 1 978.8 1 697.4

613.1
506.1
498.4
2.8
104.8
- 0.6
329.3
38.2
77.1
214.0
213.8
43.6
116.2
72.4
14.4
39.6
0.2

2005

FDI inflows
2004

0.3

89.1
10.6

2.0
0.1
1.9
702.8

626.3
446.2
416.9
25.1
125.9
29.2
74.5
2.4
21.1
51.0
51.0
0.9
39.6
2.0
0.3
10.2
0.0

1995-2000
(Annual
average)

1.9

90.0
8.1

10.7
0.1
10.6
563.4

507.2
306.9
285.0
28.8
129.4
42.1
45.5
1.3
21.3
23.0
22.9
- 1.4
17.4
2.9
1.6
5.3
0.0

2003

1.5

85.5
13.0

14.1
0.4
13.8
929.6

795.1
411.5
377.3
31.0
294.9
57.7
120.4
2.1
28.0
90.4
90.3
8.1
62.9
5.5
2.3
17.0
0.1

2006

2007

2008

1.6

84.4
14.0

1.7

82.9
15.4

2.4

84.3
13.3

3.1

81.1
15.8

14.3
23.7
51.5
58.5
0.3
0.4
1.4
0.6
14.0
23.3
50.1
57.9
879.0 1 396.9 2 146.5 1 857.7

742.0 1 157.9 1 809.5 1 506.5
689.9
799.6 1 270.5
944.5
609.7
697.2 1 192.1
837.0
45.8
50.3
73.5
128.0
15.4
224.2
378.4
311.8
- 9.1
83.8
87.1
122.3
122.7
215.3
285.5
292.7
2.3
7.2
10.6
9.3
36.0
63.6
51.7
63.2
84.4
144.5
223.1
220.2
84.3
144.4
223.1
220.1
12.9
24.0
48.3
33.7
49.8
82.3
111.2
136.2
12.3
21.2
22.5
52.2
3.5
14.9
17.8
18.2
18.1
23.3
45.8
32.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1

2005

FDI outflows
2004

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, annex table B.1 and FDI database
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).

Developed economies
Developing economies
South-East Europe and CIS
(Transition economies)

Developed economies
Europe
European Union
Japan
United States
Other developed countries
Developing economies
Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
Asia and Oceania
Asia
West Asia
East Asia
China
South Asia
South-East Asia
Oceania
South-East Europe and CIS
(Transition economies)
South-East Europe
CIS
World
Memorandum: percentage share in
world FDI flows

Region/economy

Table 3. FDI flows, by region and selected countries, 1995–2008

A number of African countries adopted policy measures to make
the business environment in the region more conducive to FDI, although
the region’s overall investment climate still offers a mixed picture. For
example, some African governments established free economic zones
and new investment codes to attract FDI, and privatized utilities.
However, some countries also adopted less favourable regulations, such
as tax increases.
At the bilateral level, African countries have continued to adopt
investment-related measures. In 2008, 12 countries signed 13 BITs, and
6 signed 9 DTTs, raising the total number to 718 and 467 respectively.
As in the past, most of the BITs (8) and DTTs (4) concluded in 2008
were with developed countries. At the subregional and regional levels,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted
three acts relating to investment rules and the modalities for their
implementation, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and
the East African Community (EAC) concluded agreements with the
United States.
In 2009, there is likely to be a decline in FDI inflows into Africa
following five years of uninterrupted growth. The main reasons for
this are the slowdown in the global economy, lower global commodity
prices and a worsening of the financial crisis in many developed and
fast-growing developing economies. However, the optimistic prospects
for global commodity prices might have a positive effect on inflows
in the medium term. This prognosis is supported by the results of the
WIPS.
South, East and South-East Asia continued to register strong
growth in FDI inflows in 2008 (17 per cent), reaching a new high of
$300 billion. But the available data in early 2009 pointed to a significant
downturn, and cast doubts about FDI prospects in the short term.
At the subregional level, year-on-year FDI growth varied: 49
per cent in South Asia, 24 per cent in East Asia, and -14 per cent in
South-East Asia, with inflows amounting to $51 billion, $187 billion
and $60 billion respectively. Inflows into the major economies in the
region varied significantly as well: they surged in China, India and the
Republic of Korea; continued to grow in Hong Kong (China); dropped
slightly in Malaysia and Thailand; and fell sharply in Singapore and
Taiwan Province of China. China, with inflows reaching a historic high
($108 billion), became the third-largest FDI recipient in the world. India,
with inflows of $42 billion, ranked the thirteenth largest FDI recipient.
Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, the ability of these
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two largest emerging economies to attract FDI has reshaped the landscape
of global FDI flows. Inflows to the two are inevitably affected by the
crisis, but their medium- to long-term prospects remain promising. This
is confirmed by the WIPS: respondents to the survey ranked China and
India as first and third, respectively, among the most attractive locations
for FDI.
FDI inflows in services continued to gain momentum in South,
East and South-East Asia in 2008. This is reflected in the rising value
of cross-border M&A sales in the region’s services sector. This sector
accounted for the major share of FDI in some economies, although
investments in banking dropped as a result of the global financial crisis.
FDI to the services sector in China and India rose, particularly in such
services as infrastructure and the retail industries. In India, Wal-Mart
(United States) opened its first store in 2008, and plans to open 15 more
over the next few years.
Outward FDI from South, East and South-East Asia rose by 7 per
cent, to $186 billion in 2008, due mainly to large outflows from China.
India is becoming an important investor, though FDI outflows remained
almost at the same level as in 2007. China gained ground as an important
source of FDI: it ranked thirteenth in the world and third among all
developing and transition economies in 2008. FDI from China reached
$52 billion in 2008, up 132 per cent from 2007. In early 2009, outflows
from the country continued to rise. Indeed, significant exchange-rate
fluctuations and falling asset prices abroad as a result of the crisis have
created M&A opportunities for Chinese companies. In contrast, FDI
outflows from other major economies in the region generally slowed
down in early 2009, as the crisis has largely reduced the ability and
motivation of many TNCs from these economies to invest abroad.
Cross-border M&As undertaken by firms from South, East and
South-East Asia in developed countries continued to increase. In the
primary sector, in addition to oil companies, large mining and metal
companies from China and India have become increasingly aggressive
in acquiring overseas assets. For example, in cooperation with Alcoa
(United States), Chinalco (China) acquired a 12 per cent stake in Rio
Tinto plc (United Kingdom) for $14 billion in 2008. In manufacturing,
a recent case was the $2.3 billion acquisition of Jaguar Cars (United
Kingdom) by Tata Motors (India). In services, large deals included, for
example, investment by Temasek Holdings (Singapore) in Merrill Lynch
(United States).
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Changes in national policies and legislation favourable to FDI took
place in some countries, for instance by raising or abolishing FDI ceilings
or streamlining approved procedures. This has led to the further opening
up of markets in the region and a more enabling business environment
for foreign investors. A few other countries introduced new policies and
laws to protect sensitive industries. The region concluded 19 BITs and
13 DTTs in 2008, and continued to be the most active developing region,
with 10 new agreements other than BITs and DTTs signed. Singapore
concluded FTAs with the the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), China
and Peru, while China concluded agreements with New Zealand and
Peru. ASEAN countries concluded an FTA with Australia, Japan and
New Zealand; and Viet Nam concluded an FTA with Japan.
FDI inflows into West Asia increased in 2008 for the sixth
consecutive year. They rose by 16 per cent to reach $90 billion, largely
due to a significant growth of inflows to Saudi Arabia (57%, to $38
billion), especially to real estate, petrochemicals and oil refining. This
consolidated the country’s position as the region’s leading recipient. FDI
growth was uneven among the other countries of the region. For example,
it was negative in the second and third recipient countries: Turkey and
the United Arab Emirates. In Turkey, inflows fell to $18 billion, down by
17 per cent, after the exceptional level reached in 2007, when a number
of mega-cross border M&A deals took place in the financial industry. In
the United Arab Emirates, they decreased by 3 per cent, to $14 billion,
as Dubai’s tourism, real estate and banking industries were particularly
badly affected by the global economic and financial crisis.
Since the third quarter of 2008, the sharp fall in oil prices and
the steadily worsening outlook for the world economy have dampened
the optimism that had pervaded the region over the previous six years.
Development projects across the region are being hit hard by the
tightening global credit markets. The number of international banks
willing to lend to projects in GCC countries has shrunk sharply. As a
consequence, key oil and gas, industrial and infrastructure projects,
which had substantial FDI, have been delayed. This is likely to reduce
the level of FDI inflows in 2009.
Real estate, petrochemicals, refining, construction and trade were
the main drivers of FDI inflows in the two leading recipient countries
of the region: Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Together, they attracted 63 per
cent of total FDI inflows to the region in 2008. Inflows increased in real
estate by 120 per cent to $10.9 billion, in oil refining and petrochemicals
by 37 per cent to $12 billion, in construction by 104 per cent to $3.7
billion and in trade by 154 per cent to $2.9 billion.
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FDI outflows from West Asia declined by 30% in 2008, to $34
billion, largely due to the significant fall (of 45%) in the value of net
cross-border M&A purchases by West Asian TNCs. The sharpest
decreases occurred in Saudi Arabia (from $13 billion to $1 billion) and
in Qatar (from $5.3 billion to $2.4 billion). As a consequence of the large
losses suffered from the global crisis, outward investors have become
more risk-averse, and some have turned their spending to their own
crisis-hit economies. On the other hand, the fall in global equity markets
has offered new investment opportunities for government-controlled
entities. Some, such as SWFs of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, have already
begun to make small acquisitions that support their national economic
development objectives. This portends an increase in FDI outflows in
2009.
The trend towards a more liberal FDI-related policy continued
in 2008 in a number of countries. Examples include reductions in the
rate of tax levied on foreign companies, privatization of state-owned
enterprises, liberalization of the exchange rate regime, improved access
to financing by investors and investment facilitation. The region
concluded 15 new BITs, and 12 new DTTs in 2008. Furthermore, FTAs
with investment provisions were concluded between Turkey and Chile,
as well as between the GCC and Singapore.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, FDI inflows increased
in 2008 by 13 per cent to $144 billion, despite the global economic and
financial crisis. The growth was uneven among the subregions: it was up
by 29 per cent in South America – where 49 per cent of the $92 billion
worth of inflows targeted Brazil – and down by 6 per cent in Central
America and the Caribbean. This divergence was due to the differing
impact of the crisis on the economies of the two subregions: Central
America and the Caribbean were directly affected by the slowdown of
the United States economy, while South America – which relies more
on commodity export earnings – was affected later via the drop in
commodity prices.
Natural resource–related activities continued to be the main
attraction for FDI in South America, and they are increasingly becoming
a significant FDI target in Central America and the Caribbean. In
particular, FDI in the metal mining industry boomed in 2008: crossborder M&As targeting this industry reached $9 billion in net value – an
eightfold increase from the previous year. In contrast, the value of crossborder M&A sales in the oil and gas industry turned negative, indicating
divestments by foreign firms as well as nationalizations in this industry.
FDI to the manufacturing sector declined due to a sharp drop in flows
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to Central America and the Caribbean, where foreign-owned exportoriented manufacturing activities are closely tied to the United States
economic cycle. In South America, FDI inflows in manufacturing,
which are highly concentrated in natural resource–related activities and
more oriented to the internal market and to export destinations other
than the United States, were more or less stable.
FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean increased in
2008 by 22 per cent to $63 billion, due to soaring outflows from South
America (up by 131 per cent), which offset the 22 per cent decline
in outflows from Central America and the Caribbean. The strongest
increase was registered in Brazil (189 per cent), where outflows reached
$20 billion, while outflows from Mexico plummeted to $686 million
from the previous $8 billion. The value of net cross-border acquisitions
by Mexican firms was negative in 2008 (-$358 million), indicating that
sales of existing foreign affiliates of Mexican-based TNCs were higher
than the purchases of foreign firms by Mexican-based TNCs.
The shift towards a bigger role for the state in the economy
continued in a number of countries and extended to new activities.
This resulted in more nationalizations in the oil and gas industry. Some
countries took measures to strengthen national champions. Latin America
and the Caribbean concluded only 6 BITs and 8 DTTs in 2008. The
CARIFORUM States concluded the Economic Partnership Agreement
with the European Union (EU), thereby agreeing to the progressive,
reciprocal and asymmetric liberalization of investment.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, FDI inflows and outflows
are expected to decline in 2009, as the impacts of the economic and
financial crisis spread across the region.
FDI inflows to South-East Europe and the CIS increased for
the eighth consecutive year, reaching $114 billion – a record level – in
spite of financial turmoil and conflicts in certain parts of the region.
FDI inflows grew rapidly in both subregions, especially in the first
half of 2008. Whereas in South-East Europe most of the FDI inflows
were still driven by the privatization of remaining state-owned assets,
in the CIS investment by TNCs was motivated by a desire to gain
access to growing local consumer markets and to benefit from business
opportunities arising from the liberalization of selected industries. FDI
inflows continued to be unevenly distributed, with three countries (the
Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in that order) accounting
for 84 per cent of the region’s total. Large investments in the liberalized
power-generation industry, as well as in automotives and real estate,
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contributed to large FDI inflows into the Russian Federation, although
the bulk of FDI in the country continued to be in natural resource–related
projects. FDI in oil and natural gas projects in Kazakhstan and large
investments in the banking and steel industries in Ukraine drove 2008
flows upwards in both countries.
Outward FDI flows in 2008, again dominated by Russian TNCs
but also by some investment from Kazakhstan, maintained their upward
trend, despite some divestments in the Russian Federation that took place
in the second part of 2008. With the slowdown in foreign demand for their
products, TNCs from the region shifted their strategies from expanding
markets for their products abroad to gaining access to technological
innovations and advanced marketing and management know-how.
Good market opportunities resulted in an increase in cross-border
M&A sales of firms in the region’s manufacturing industries that are
not deemed “strategic” (mainly in the automotive and metallurgical
industries). Cross-border investment projects in the primary and services
sectors marked a pause following exceptionally high values in 2007.
However strategic investors continue to invest in the exploitation of vast
and complex oil and gas fields.
In 2008, countries in South-East Europe and the CIS continued
to liberalize their FDI regulations in certain industries such as electricity
generation, banking, retail and telecommunications. Conversely, some
natural resource–rich countries introduced certain policy changes less
favourable to foreign investors, such as strengthening their control over
natural resources through legislation. Countries in the region concluded
25 DTTs and 19 BITs in 2008.
The slowdown of economic growth in all the countries of SouthEast Europe and the CIS, and the fall in commodity prices, coupled with
the near-exhaustion of major privatization opportunities, is likely to lead
to a large decline in FDI in the region. Preliminary data for FDI and
cross-border M&As in the first quarter of 2009 and investors’ sentiments
– as reflected in the results of UNCTAD’s WIPS – support this forecast.
As the economic and financial crisis and the accelerating economic
downturn seriously affected all the major economies of the world, FDI
flows to and from developed countries fell sharply in 2008, after
reaching historic peaks in 2007. Inward FDI flows fell by 29 per cent
to $962 billion, and these declines occurred in all major host countries
except the United States. FDI flows into the EU-27 countries fell by 40
per cent in 2008, to $503 billion, as the financial crisis and the economic
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downturn contributed to a decline in inward FDI in the majority of them.
In contrast, FDI inflows into the United States, mainly from European
investors, rose by 17 per cent, to reach an all-time high of $316 billion.
The fall in FDI inflows into developed countries was more
pronounced in the manufacturing and services sectors, judging from
data on cross-border M&As, while the consolidation process in the
mining and quarrying industries and the increasing participation of large
companies from developing countries (notably from China) contributed
to the rise of FDI in the primary sector in 2008.
The decline of reinvested earnings, due to falling profits and the
re-channelling of loans from foreign affiliates to the headquarters of
TNCs, depressed FDI outflows from developed countries in 2008 by 17
per cent, to $1.5 trillion. However, as in the past, developed countries as a
group retained their position as the largest net outward investors. Among
the biggest FDI source countries, only Japan, Switzerland, Canada and
the Netherlands, in that order, saw a rise in their FDI outflows in 2008,
while the United States maintained its position as the largest outward
investor.
In 2008, FDI policy environments in developed countries were
influenced by the continuing public debate about the cross-border
investments of SWFs, and fears of new investment protectionism in
reaction to the financial and economic crisis. Concerns about possible
discriminatory measures vis-à-vis SWFs led to the establishment of the
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds and to agreement
on the Santiago Principles. In addition, some developed countries have
adopted or amended rules concerning the review of foreign investment
on national security grounds, while others have adopted measures aimed
at further liberalization of their investment regimes, or have changed tax
policies and other incentives to promote foreign investment. In 2008,
developed countries concluded 38 BITs (most of them with developing
countries), 16 DTTs and 15 other IIAs.
FDI to and from developed countries is expected to fall in 2009
because of the continuing effects of the financial crisis and weaker
economic growth in these economies. TNCs are expected to reduce their
investment programmes because of declining corporate profits, limited
access to financial resources and the higher cost of finance. Indeed, FDI
inflows in the first quarter of 2009 were 24 per cent lower than in the
last quarter of 2008, while cross-border M&As in the first half of 2009
declined by more than 40 per cent compared to their level in the second
half of 2008. This is confirmed by the WIPS.
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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Agriculture is central to the provision of food and the eradication
of poverty and hunger. Not only does it provide significant mass and
rural employment, it is also a major contributor to national economic
growth and a considerable foreign exchange earner for many
developing countries. Given the fundamental importance of agriculture
to most developing economies, its chronic neglect by many of them
has been of utmost concern for some time. However, several factors,
which are not mutually exclusive, have resulted in a recent upswing in
domestic private and foreign participation in agricultural industries in a
significant number of developing countries. Most of these factors are of
a structural nature, and are expected to drive agricultural investment in
the foreseeable future. In this context, foreign participation, as well as
domestic investment, can play a critical part in agricultural production
in developing countries, boosting productivity and supporting economic
development.
The main drivers of agricultural investment include the
availability of land and water in target locations, combined with fastgrowing demand and rising imports of food crops in various countries,
including both the more populous emerging countries such as Brazil,
China, India and the Republic of Korea, and land- and water-scarce
developing regions such as member States of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). International demand for agricultural commodities has
been further spurred by other factors, such as biofuel initiatives around
the world, resulting in a spate of investments in developing countries
in the cultivation of sugarcane, grains (such as maize) and oilseeds
(such as soya beans), as well as non-food crops such as jatropha. These
trends are intertwined with a rapid rise in food prices over the past few
years and subsequent shortages in commodities such as rice, which has
spawned a number of “new investors” and was also triggered a number
of speculative direct investments in agriculture and land.

Significance of FDI, by country, commodity and region
FDI in agriculture is on the rise, although its total size remains
limited (inward FDI stock in 2007 was $32 billion) and is small relative
to other industries (table 4). At the turn of the new century, world FDI
flows in agriculture remained at less than $1 billion per year, but by
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2005–2007 they had tripled to $3 billion annually (table 4). Moreover,
TNCs established in downstream segments of host-country value chains
(e.g. food processing and supermarkets) also invest in agricultural
production and contract farming, thereby multiplying the actual size of
their participation in the industry. In fact, after a rapid rate of growth
in the early 2000s, FDI flows in the food and beverages industry alone
(i.e. not including other downstream activities) exceeded $40 billion in
2005–2007 (table 4).
Although the share of FDI in agriculture remains small as a share
of total FDI in developed, developing and transition economies as a
whole, in some LDCs, including Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malawi, Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania,
the share of FDI in agriculture in total FDI flows or stocks is relatively
large (figure 3). This is also true for some non-LDCs, such as Ecuador,
Honduras, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam. The
high share in these countries is due to factors such as the structure of the
domestic economy, the availability of agricultural land (mostly for longterm lease), and national policies (including promotion of investment in
agriculture).
FDI is relatively large in certain cash crops such as sugarcane, cut
flowers and vegetables. The bulk of inward FDI in developing regions
is aimed at food and cash crops. There is also a growing interest in
crops for biofuel production through projects related to oilseed crops
in Africa and sugarcane in South America, for instance. In terms of the
main produce targeted by foreign investors in developing and transition
economies, some regional specialization is apparent. For example, South
American countries have attracted FDI in a wide range of products,
such as wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, flowers, soya beans, meat and
poultry; while in Central American countries, TNCs have focused
mostly on fruits and sugarcane. In Africa, foreign investors have shown
a particular interest in staple crops such as rice, wheat and oil crops;
but there is also TNC involvement in sugarcane and cotton in Southern
Africa, and in floriculture in East Africa. In South Asia, foreign investors
have targeted the large-scale production of rice and wheat, while their
activities in other Asian regions are concentrated more in cash crops,
meat and poultry. Finally, TNCs in the transition economies are largely
involved in dairy products, although more recently they have also been
seeking to invest in wheat and grains.
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Significance of contract farming in developing
countries
Contract farming is a significant component of TNCs’ participation
in agricultural production, in terms of its geographical distribution,
intensity of activity at the country level, coverage by commodities
and types of TNCs involved. In this context, contract farming can be
defined as non-equity contractual arrangements entered into by farmers
with TNC affiliates (or agents on behalf of TNCs), whereby the former
agree to deliver to the latter a quantity of farm outputs at an agreed
price, quality standard, delivery date and other specifications. It is
an attractive option for TNCs, because it allows better control over
product specifications and supply than spot markets. At the same time,
it is less capital-intensive, less risky and more flexible than land lease
or ownership. From the perspective of farmers, contract farming can
Table 4. Estimated FDI in agriculture, forestry and fishing,a and food and
beverages,b various years
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
FDI flows

FDI stock

Inflows
Region

Outflows

1989–1991 2005–2007 1989–1991 2005–2007

Inward stock

Outward stock

1990

2007

1990

2007

8.0

32.0

3.7

10.2

(a) Agriculture, forestry and fishinga
World

Developed economies

Developing economies

South-East Europe and the CIS

0.6

3.3

0.5

1.1

(0.3%)

(0.2%)

(0.2%)

(0.1%)

- 0.0

0.0

0.5

0.6

..

..

(0.2%)

..

(0.4%) (0.2%)
3.5

11.8

(0.2%) (0.1%)
4.6

18.0

(0.2%) (0.1%)
3.4

7.5

(0.2%) (0.1%)

0.6

3.0

0.0

0.5

(1.8%)

(0.8%)

(0.7%)

(0.4%)

..

0.3

..

0.0

..

2.2

..

0.3

..

(0.7%)

..

(18.2%)

..

(0.7%)

..

(1.3%)

80.3

450.0

73.4

461.9

(1.3%) (0.5%)

0.3

2.4

(1.5%) (0.1%)

(b) Food and beveragesb
World

Developed economies

Developing economies

South-East Europe and the CIS

7.2

40.5

12.5

48.3

(3.8%)

(2.8%)

(5.6%)

(3.3%)

4.8

34.1

12.2

45.7

(3.2%)

(3.2%)

(5.6%)

(3.4%)

2.4

5.1

0.3

2.6

(6.8%)

(1.4%)

(4.1%)

(1.9%)

..
..

1.4
(3.2%)

..
..

- 0.0
(-4.5%)

(4.1%) (2.9%)
69.9

390.7

(4.4%) (3.4%)
10.4

46.9

(2.9%) (1.2%)
..
..

12.4
(4.2%)

(4.1%) (2.8%)
73.1

458.1

(4.1%) (3.2%)
0.3

3.5

(1.4%) (0.2%)
..
..

0.3
(1.7%)

Source: UNCTAD,
World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural
Production and Development, table III.7.
a

Includes hunting.

b

Includes tobacco.
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provide predictable incomes, access to markets, and TNC support in
areas such as credit and know-how.
TNCs engaged in contract farming activities and other non-equity
forms are spread worldwide in over 110 countries across Africa, Asia
and Latin America. For example, in 2008, the food processor Nestlé
(Switzerland) had contracts with more than 600,000 farms in over 80
developing and transition economies as direct suppliers of various
agricultural commodities. Similarly, Olam (Singapore) has a globally
Figure 3. Share of agriculture in inward FDI of selected economies,
various years
(Per cent)
a) Flows, 2005–2007, or latest available three-year period average
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production
and Development, figure III.6.
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spread contract farming network, with approximately 200,000 suppliers
in 60 countries (most of them developing countries).
Contract farming is not only widespread, but also intensive in
many emerging and poorer countries. For instance, in Brazil, 75 per
cent of poultry production and 35 per cent of soya bean production are
sourced through contract farming, including by TNCs. In Viet Nam the
story is similar, with 90 per cent of cotton and fresh milk, 50 per cent of
tea, and 40 per cent of rice being purchased through farming contracts.
In Kenya, about 60 per cent of tea and sugar is produced through this
mode.
Moreover, contract faming arrangements cover a broad variety of
commodities, from livestock through staple food produce to cash crops.
For example, Olam sources globally for 17 agricultural commodities
(including cashew nuts, cotton, spices, coffee, cocoa and sugar).
Similarly, agricultural crops make up two thirds of Unilever’s (United
Kingdom/Netherlands) raw materials, and include palm and other
edible oils, tea and other infusions, tomatoes, peas and a wide range of
other vegetables. These are sourced from 100,000 smallholder farmers
and larger farms in developing countries, and also from third-party
suppliers.
Contractual farming arrangements enable different types of TNCs
in the downstream stages of agribusiness value chains, including food
manufacturers, biofuel producers, retailers and many others, to secure
agricultural inputs from local farmers in different host countries.

The universe of TNCs participating in agricultural
production
The 25 largest agriculture-based TNCs (i.e. companies that are
primarily located in the agricultural production segment of agribusiness,
such as farms and plantations) differ from the top agriculture-related
TNCs (i.e. those primarily in upstream or downstream stages of these
value chains): the former have a significant number of developingcountry firms among their ranks, while the latter do not (table 5). In terms
of foreign assets, the number of agriculture-based TNCs is split almost
evenly between developed- and developing-country firms, indicating
that firms from developing countries are also emerging as important
players in global food and non-food agricultural production. However,
developed-country firms still dominate among agriculture-related TNCs.
Twelve out of the top 25 agriculture-based TNCs are headquartered in
developing countries, and thirteen in developed countries. Indeed, the
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top position in the list is occupied by a developing-country TNC, Sime
Darby Berhad (Malaysia), while United States firms (Dole Food and
Del Monte) occupy the second and third positions (table 5).
The universe of agriculture-related TNCs includes food processors/
manufacturers, retailers, traders and suppliers of inputs. These TNCs are
usually larger than agricultural TNCs. For example, the world’s largest
food and beverages TNC, Nestlé (Switzerland), controls $66 billion in
foreign assets, and the largest food retailer, Wal-Mart (United States),
controls $63 billion. In contrast, the largest agricultural TNC, Sime Darby
(Malaysia), has only $5 billion of foreign assets. The list of the largest
TNC input suppliers to agriculture comprises only developed-country
firms. In food processing, 39 of the top 50 firms are headquartered in
developed countries. Compared to other TNCs in agribusiness, those in
food and beverages are very large: the nine largest, all headquartered in
developed countries, control about $20 billion of foreign assets each;
together, they represent more than two thirds of the foreign assets of the
top 50 firms. Retailing and supermarket TNCs also play a major role in
international agricultural supply chains. The majority of the 25 largest
TNCs in this industry (22) are again from developed countries (table 5).
Apart from traditional TNCs involved in agriculture, newcomers
such as state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds and international
institutions are increasingly active in agriculture. The main drivers of
(or motives for) the new investors are the intertwined twins of threat
and opportunity. For example, Agricapital (a state-owned fund based in
Bahrain) is investing in food crops overseas to support its government’s
food security policies. At the same time, supplying food to the world’s
burgeoning markets is seen as a lucrative opportunity by other actors,
thereby spurring international investment in agriculture by companies
and funds such as Vision 3 (United Arab Emirates) and Goldman Sachs
(United States).

The rise of South–South FDI
There are indications that South–South investment in
agricultural production is on the rise, and that this trend is set to
continue in the long term. Investors from developing countries became
major sources of cross-border takeovers in 2008. Their net cross-border
M&A purchases, amounting to $1,577 million, accounted for over 40
per cent of the world total ($3,563 million). Examples of South-South
investment projects include Sime Darby’s (Malaysia) $800 million
investment in a plantation in Liberia in 2009; Chinese investments
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)

139

and contract farming in commodities such as maize, sugar and rubber
in the Mekong region, especially in Cambodia and the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic; the regional expansion of Zambeef (Zambia)
into Ghana and Nigeria; and the expansion by Grupo Bimbo (Mexico)
across Latin America and the Caribbean.
In addition to commercial investment in agriculture – a common
feature of developed- and developing-country TNCs in the wake of
the food crisis – food security has also become a major driver of new
investors. These include companies and funds (some state-owned or
backed) from a variety of countries, especially the Republic of Korea
and GCC countries. To varying degrees, the governments of these source
countries have decided that investment in target host countries, giving
them control over crop production and export of the output back to their
home economy, is the most effective way of ensuring food security for
their populations. For many of these countries, the most crucial factor
or driver behind outward FDI in agriculture is not land per se, but rather
the availability of water resources to irrigate the land. Most of their
investment is in other developing countries.
The scale of South–South FDI driven by food security concerns
is not easy to determine because many relevant deals have only recently
been signed, although others are being considered or in negotiation. Of
the definite larger-scale investments involving land acquisitions (i.e.
outright ownership and long-term leases) undertaken thus far, the largest
investing countries from the South include Bahrain, China, Qatar, Kuwait,
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea and
the United Arab Emirates. The most important developing host countries
are in Africa, with Ethiopia, Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania
among the foremost FDI recipients (figure 4).

The impact of TNCs in agricultural production on
developing countries
A precisely quantified evaluation of the impact of TNC
involvement in agriculture on important development aspects, such
as contribution to capital formation, technology transfer and foreign
market access, is impeded by the limited availability of relevant hard
data collected by national authorities or available from international
sources. The actual impacts and implications vary enormously across
countries and by types of agricultural produce. In addition, they are
influenced by a range of factors, including the type of TNC involvement,
the institutional environment and the level of development of the host
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Table 5. Top 25 TNCs in agribusiness industries, ranked by foreign assets,
2007
(Companies in bold are based in a developing or transition economy)
Nestlé SA

Wal-Mart Stores

Privately owned (ranked
by agri-food sales)
Cargill Inc.

Bayer AGb
Dow Chemical
Companyb
Socfinal SA
Deere & Company
EI Du Pont De
Charoen Pokphand Foods
Public Company Ltd.d (Thailand) Nemours

Inbev SA
Kraft Foods Inc

Metro AG
Carrefour SA

Mars Inc.
Lactalis

Unilever
Coca-Cola Company

Tesco PLC
McDonalds Corp.

Suntory Ltd.
Dr August Oetker KG

SAB Miller
Diageo Plc

Delhaize Group
Koninklijke Ahold NV

Louis Dreyfus Group
Barilla

Pernod Ricard SA

Sodexo

Ferrero

Cadbury PLC

Compass Group PLC

Keystone Foods LLC

10

Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Syngenta AG
Yara International ASA
Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd.
(Malaysia)
KWS Saat AG
Potash Corp. of
Saskatchewan
Kubota Corp.
Kulim (Malaysia) Bhd.
(Malaysia)
Camellia PLC
Monsanto Company

Bunge Limited

Seven & I Holdings
Company Ltd.

McCain Foods Ltd

11

Seaboard Corp.

Agco Corporation

Heineken NV

OSI Group Companies

12
13

Sipef SA
Anglo-Eastern Plantations PLC

14

Tyson Foods Inc

The Mosaic Company
ICL-Israel Chemicals
Ltd
Provimi SA

China Resources
Enterprise Ltd. (Hong
Kong, China)
Yum! Brands, Inc.
Autogrill

Groupe Soufflet

15

PPB Group Bhd. (Malaysia)

Alimentation Couche
Tard Inc
Safeway Incorporated

16

Carsons Cumberbatch PLC
(Sri Lanka)

Sonae Sgsp

Groupe Castel

17

TSH Resources Bhd. (Malaysia) CLAAS KGaA
Sapec SA
Multi Vest Resources Bhd.
(Malaysia)

Carlsberg A/S

George Weston Limited

J.R. Simplot

HJ Heinz Company

Dairy Farm International Schreiber Foods
Holdings Ltd. (Hong
Kong, China)
Jeronimo Martins SA
Muller Gruppe

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

18
19

Agriculture-based
Sime Darby Bhd. (Malaysia)
Dole Food Company, Inc.
Fresh Del Monte Producec
a

Suppliers
BASF AG

b

Pepsico Inc
Molson Coors Brewing
Company
Kirin Holdings Company
Limited
Bucher Industries AG Archer-Daniels-Midland
Company
Nufarm Limited
Associated British Foods
PLC

Terra Industries Inc

20

Bakrie & Brothers Terbukae
(Indonesia)
PGI Group PLC

21

Firstfarms A/S

Genus PLC

22

New Britain Palm Oil Ltd.
(Papua New Guinea)

Scotts Miracle-Gro
Company

23

Karuturi Global Ltd. (India)
Nirefs SA

Kverneland ASA

24
25

Country Bird Holdings Ltd.
(South Africa)

Food and beverages

Danone

Aktieselskabet Schouw Anheuser-Busch
& Co.A/S
Companies Inc

Sakata Seed Corp.

Wilmar International
Ltd. (Singapore)
Sara Lee Corp.

Retail

Perdue Farms Inc.
Bacardi Ltd.

Golden State Foods

Kuwait Food Company
(Americana) (Kuwait)
Kesko OYJ

Bel

Starbucks Corp.

Rich Products

Perfetti Van Melle

Constellation Brands Inc Burger King Holdings, Inc. J. M. Smucker

Fraser & Neave Ltd.
(Singapore)
Auriga Industries A/S Danisco A/S

Maruha Nichiro Holdings, Haribo
Inc.
Familymart Company
Limited

Eckes-Granini

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production
and Development, table III.12.
a
b
c
d
e

A conglomerate with its core business in agriculture and plantations.
General chemical/pharmaceutical companies with significant activities in agricultural supply, especially crop
protection, seeds, plant science, animal health and pest management.
Legally unrelated to Del Monte Foods.
Members of the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group report their activities by company.
Diversified company with an important presence in agriculture.

Note:

Some companies are present in more than one agribusiness industry. In those cases, they
have been classified according to their main core business.
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country. A number of salient observations of TNCs’ involvement in
agriculture for developing countries nevertheless emerge.
Overall, TNC involvement in developing countries has promoted
the commercialization and modernization of agriculture. TNCs are by no
means the only – and seldom the main – agent driving this process, but they
have played an important role in a significant number of countries. They
have done so not only by investing directly in agricultural production,
but also through non-equity forms of involvement in agriculture, mostly
contract farming. Indeed, non-equity forms of participation have been
on the rise in recent years. In many cases, they have led to significant
transfers of skills, know-how and methods of production, facilitated
access to credit and various inputs, and given access to markets to a
very large number of small-scale farmers previously involved mostly in
subsistence farming.
Although TNC involvement in agriculture has contributed to
enhanced productivity and increased output in a number of developing
countries, there is lack of evidence on the extent to which their
involvement has allowed the developing world to increase its production
of staple foods and improve food security. Available evidence points to
TNCs being mostly involved in cash crops (except for the recent rise of
South–South FDI in this area). Such a finding reveals the development
challenges for developing countries in promoting TNC participation
in their agricultural industry to improve food security. However, food
security is not just about food supply. TNCs can also have an impact on
food access, stability of supply and food utilization, and, in the longer
run, their impacts on these aspects of food security are likely to prove
more important for host economies.
Positive impacts of TNC involvement in agriculture are not
gained automatically by developing countries. While TNCs have
at times generated employment and improved earnings in rural
communities, no clear trend is discernible. To the extent that TNCs
promote modernization of agriculture and a shift from subsistence to
commercial farming, their long-term impact is likely to accelerate the
long-term reduction in farm employment while raising earnings. Only
a limited number of developing countries have also been able to benefit
from transfers of technologies. In particular, the R&D and technological
innovations of the large TNCs are typically not geared towards the staple
foods produced in many developing countries.
Apart from the potentially large benefits that developing
countries can derive from TNC participation in their agriculture, past
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experiences and evidence indicate that governments need to be sensitive
to the negative impacts that can arise. A particular concern is that of the
asymmetry in the relationship between small farmers and a restricted
number of large buyers, which raises serious competition issues.
Recent experiences also underscore that developing-country
governments need to be aware of the environmental and social
consequences of TNCs involvement in agriculture, even though there
is no clear and definite pattern of impact. Case studies show that
TNCs’ have the potential to bring environmentally sound production
technologies, but their implication in extensive farming has also raised
concerns, together with their impact on biodiversity and water usage.
Similarly, TNCs’ involvement raises significant social and political
issues whenever they own or control large tracts of agricultural land.
Figure 4. Investor and target regions and countries in overseas land
investment for agricultural production, 2006–May 2009
(Number of signed or implemented deals)
4
2

1
6

1

1
1

3

4

1

1

1
1
2
1
1

2

4

1

3

6

4

1

1

1

2

2
1 2

1
2

2
1

1

1

Investor’s country

3

1
1

1

10

2
1

1

1

2
5

1

Target country

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production
and Development, figure III.14.
Notes:

This figure includes only confirmed deals that have been signed, of which some have been
implemented. However, not all signed deals were eventually implemented, and signed
deals that were rescinded by one or both parties before the end of May 2009 have been
excluded from the map. Prospective deals which have been reported in the press, but have
not progressed to the stage of agreements have been excluded. China and the Russian
Federation are both investors and targets for "land deals"; China is primarily an investor, and
the Russian Federation is primarily a target for such deals. The total number of deals is 48,
shown by both source and destination countries.
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Developing countries’ strategies towards TNC
participation in their agriculture industries
The expansion of agricultural production is vital for developing
countries, both to meet rising food needs and to revitalize the sector.
Therefore, policymakers need to promote more investment in this
sector, both private and public, and domestic and foreign. Given the
financial and technological constraints in many developing countries,
policymakers should devise strategies for agricultural development
and consider what role TNCs could play in implementing them. The
challenge is considerable, as agriculture is a sensitive industry. There
is a need to reflect the interests of all stakeholders, especially local
farmers, and include them, as far as possible, in the policy deliberation
and formulation process.
The key challenge for policymakers in developing countries is
to ensure that TNC involvement in agricultural production generates
development benefits. Both FDI and contractual arrangements between
TNCs and local farmers can bring specific benefits to the host country,
such as transfer of technology, employment creation and upgrading
the capacities of local farmers, together with higher productivity and
competitiveness. Therefore, policies need to be designed with a view to
maximizing these benefits.
It is equally important for policymakers to address social and
environmental concerns with regard to TNC involvement. Social and
environmental impacts need to be assessed carefully, and particular
attention needs to be paid to possible implications for domestic
agricultural development and food security in the long run. Negotiations
with foreign investors should be transparent with regard to the land
involved and the purpose of production, and local landholders should be
encouraged to participate in the process. Policies should be designed to
protect the traditional land tenure rights of local farmers in order to avoid
abuses of what might be considered underutilized or underdeveloped
land, and to make possible local farmers’ access to courts in case of
dispossession. Care needs to be taken to secure the right to food for the
domestic population and to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.

Promoting FDI and contractual arrangements between
TNCs and farmers in agricultural production
Numerous developing countries have started to actively
encourage FDI in agricultural production. A survey jointly undertaken
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by UNCTAD and the World Association of Investment Promotion
Agencies (WAIPA) on the role of investment promotion agencies (IPAs)
in attracting FDI in agricultural production revealed that the majority of
respondents, in particular those in developing countries, promote FDI in
this sector. Moreover, these respondents anticipate a still greater role for
FDI in this area in the future. TNCs are mainly expected to make new
technologies, finance and inputs available to the sector and to improve
access to foreign markets for cash crops.
Overall, developing countries are relatively open to TNC
involvement in agricultural production, although there are considerable
differences between individual countries based on cultural, socioeconomic and security-related considerations. The most frequently
found restriction for foreign investment in agricultural production relates
to land ownership, but in many cases foreign investors are allowed to
lease land.
Aside from promoting FDI in agricultural production, host
countries should pay particular attention to promoting contractual
arrangements between TNCs and local farmers, such as contract
farming, which would enable the latter to enhance their capacities and
become part of national or international food value chains. However, in
pursuing such strategies, host countries should be aware that, in general,
TNCs are more interested in contractual arrangements concerning the
production of cash crops. This means that promoting contract farming
for alleviating the food crisis remains a big challenge.
In this context, governments should address the specific obstacles
to efficient cooperation between TNCs and local farmers, such as (1)
lack of capacity of smallholders to supply products in a consistent and
standardized manner; (2) lack of availability of adequate technology;
(3) lack of capital; (4) remoteness of production and capacity for timely
delivery; (5) the limited role of farmer organizations; and (6) lack of
adequate legal instruments for dispute settlement. Various policy options
exist for tackling these bottlenecks. Among them are education and
training programmes for local farmers, the provision of governmentled extension services, the establishment of standards and certification
procedures, the granting of financial aid, matchmaking services to
connect local farmers to TNCs, support for the establishment of farmer
organizations, and improving the domestic court systems to increase
legal security. Governments could also consider the development of
model contracts to protect the interests of farmers in negotiating with
TNCs.
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Leveraging TNC participation for long-term agricultural
development: an integrated policy approach
Notwithstanding some reservations about FDI in agricultural
production, host countries should not underestimate the potential of
this form of TNC involvement for enhancing development objectives.
In particular, in light of the recent interest in outward FDI to secure
domestic food supply, there is potential for host countries to benefit
from such investment for their own staple food needs, provided that
the amount of production is shared between home and host countries.
The challenge for host countries is to match inward FDI with existing
domestic resources, such as abundant labour and available land, and to
create positive synergies to promote long-term agricultural development
and increase food security.
Key instruments for maximizing the contribution of FDI to
sustainable agricultural and rural development are the domestic
legislative framework and, especially as far as major land acquisitions
are involved, investment contracts between the host government and
foreign investors. These contracts should be designed in such a way
as to ensure that benefits for host countries and smallholders are
maximized. Critical issues to be considered include, in particular,
(1) entry regulations for TNCs; (2) the creation of employment
opportunities; (3) transfer of technology and R&D; (4) the welfare of
local farmers and communities; (5) production sharing; (6) distribution
of revenues; (7) local procurement of inputs; (8) requirements of target
markets; (9) development of agriculture-related infrastructure; and (10)
environmental protection. To ensure food security in host countries as
a result of FDI in staple food production by “new” investors, home
and host countries could consider output-sharing arrangements. Before
concluding an investment contract with foreign investors, governments
should conduct an environmental and social impact assessment of the
specific project. After the investment has been made, monitoring and
evaluating its impact on the host country’s overall development process
is critical.
IIAs can be an additional means to promote TNC participation
in agricultural production, but careful formulation is crucial with a
view to striking a proper balance between the obligations to protect and
promote foreign investment on the one hand, and policy space for the
right to regulate on the other hand. This is particularly important in the
case of agriculture, as the sector is highly regulated and sensitive, and
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government agricultural policies may be controversial and subject to
change.
There are several other policy areas relating to a broader economic
agenda that are determinants for TNC participation in agricultural
production and their development impact in the host country. These
should therefore be integrated into host-country strategies aimed at
attracting TNCs to agricultural production. Among them are those
related to infrastructure development, competition, trade and R&D.
Infrastructure development is critical as a means of trade
facilitation for agricultural goods. This includes improving existing
transportation systems, investing in trade facilitation, providing
sufficient post-harvest storage facilities and renovating outdated water
irrigation infrastructure. Given the high costs involved and the limited
ODA available, policymakers may wish to require TNCs to contribute to
infrastructure development when permitting large-scale projects.
Since farmers are generally the weakest link in the supply chain,
competition policy can play a vital role in protecting them against
potential abuses arising from the dominant position enjoyed by TNCs.
Tariffs and non-tariff barriers, as well as subsidies, may
substantially influence TNC involvement in agricultural production.
These kinds of policy measures in developed countries could discourage
investment and contract farming in developing countries where the
subsidizing country and the potential developing host country produce
identical agricultural products or close substitutes. Reducing subsidies
in developed countries could encourage FDI to poor countries.
Economies of scale is another challenge, particularly for small
developing countries. In their case, regional integration can be an
important instrument in making them more attractive for TNCs involved
in agricultural production and exports.
Host countries should also consider the role of R&D activities and
intellectual property rights for increasing agricultural production and
adapting the development of seeds and agricultural products to local and
regional conditions. Policies should aim at domestic capacity-building
to develop strong counterparts to TNCs in the host country – private or
public. In this regard, public–private partnerships (PPPs) for R&D can
serve as models for fostering innovation, for adapting the development
of seeds and products to local and regional conditions, for making
agricultural R&D more responsive to the needs of smallholders and to
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the challenges of sustainability, for reducing costs, and for mitigating
the commercial and financial risks of the venture through risk-sharing
between the partners.

Developing home countries’ FDI strategies to secure
food supplies
In the wake of recent food price hikes and export restrictions
by agricultural exporter countries, some food-importing countries
have established policies aimed at the development of overseas food
sources for their domestic food security. Despite some concerns that
these policies may aggravate food shortage in host countries, they have
the potential for increasing global food production and mitigating food
shortages in both home and host developing countries. Past attempts
by some governments to invest in overseas agriculture have not always
met their expectations. Indeed, there are lessons to be learnt. In addition
to outward FDI, home countries could consider whether overseas
food production in the form of contract farming may be a viable and
less controversial alternative to FDI. Besides focusing on agricultural
production itself, another option is to invest in trading houses and in
logistical infrastructure such as ports.

Developing an internationally agreed set of core
principles for large-scale land acquisitions by foreign
investors in agricultural production
Agriculture and food security have gained considerable
importance on the international policy agenda, both at the multilateral
and regional level. A major development was the establishment by
the United Nations of the High-Level Task Force on the Global Food
Security Crisis (HLTF) in April 2008. The aim of the HLTF was to
create a prioritized plan of action to address the global food crisis
and coordinate its implementation. The HLTF thus developed the
Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) – a framework for setting
out the joint position of HLTF members on proposed actions to address
the current threats and opportunities resulting from food price rises; to
create policy changes to avoid future food crises, and to contribute to
country, regional and global food and nutritional security. A number
of initiatives to boost agricultural productivity have also been taken
at the regional level, including the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) under the New Partnership for
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Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The G-8 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy,
in July 2009 made a commitment to mobilizing $20 billion over the next
three years for a comprehensive strategy for sustainable global food
security and for advancing by the end of 2009 the implementation of a
Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security. When deciding
how to make best use of these new ODA funds, consideration could
be given to agricultural development strategies that combine public
investments with maximizing benefits from TNC involvement. With
regard to possible future international initiatives, consideration should
be given to developing a set of core principles concerning major land
acquisitions, including rules on transparency, respect for existing land
rights, the right to food, protection of indigenous peoples, and social
and environmental sustainability.

Investing in a new green revolution
TNC participation in agriculture in developing countries through
FDI, contract farming and other forms has helped a number of pioneering
countries, including Brazil, China, Kenya and Viet Nam, to meet the
challenge of boosting investment in their agriculture, thereby making
the industry a lynchpin for economic development and modernization.
The route has not been easy, with costs and benefits arising from TNC
involvement. For most developing countries, many development
challenges still remain in the quest for agricultural development, food
security and modernization. Among these challenges – in which TNCs
can play a role – is how to build and reinforce domestic, regional and
international value chains, and how to harness technology in agriculture.
It is clear that for LDCs and other poor countries, in Africa and elsewhere,
a “new green revolution” is urgent, and an essential question to ask is
whether TNCs can play a role in its fulfilment.
The World Investment Report 2009 reveals a real and rising
interest by TNCs – from the South as well as the North – for investment
in developing countries’ agricultural industries. Moreover, a large
proportion of this interest is in poorer regions, such as Africa. TNCs
vary along the value chain, but overall they have the technological
and other assets available to support developing countries’ strategies
towards intensifying take-up of the green revolution. The World
Investment Report 2009 also demonstrates examples of this occurring
through partnerships and alliances with farmers, public research entities
and others. More needs to be done, but the building blocks are in place
for striking a new “grand bargain” to harness the green revolution in
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the service of Africa’s poor and hungry, and of the wider objectives of
development. Central to this programme are, firstly, investing in trade and
investment facilitation, and secondly, creating institutional arrangements
such as PPPs to advance the green revolution in the region by encouraging
and boosting critical flows of capital, information, knowledge and
skills from partners to the countryside. An important initiative in this
regard would be the establishment of seed and technology centres in
the form of PPPs, mandated with the task of fostering channels to adapt
relevant seed and farming technologies to make them suitable for local
conditions, distributing seeds to farmers, and in the longer term, building
and deepening indigenous capacity.

Geneva, July 2009		
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BOOK REVIEWS
Indian Multinationals in the World Economy:
Implications for Development
Jaya Prakash Pradhan
(Bookwell, New Delhi: Bookwell, 2008), xv+207 pages
Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from the developing countries,
though not a new phenomenon, has grown in volume since the late eighties.
And with it, so have the predictable debates on whether or not the phenomenon
jells with the received theory of FDI and statistical tests of its impact on the
host and home countries. Pradhan’s book departs from the beaten track in
many ways. Much of the book is based on information and data painstakingly
collected by the author from a variety of sources including the financial press
in India. The book includes extensive case studies of firms investing abroad, it
charts the birth, growth and overseas investments of India’s software industry
in some detail, and the econometric tests are carefully designed with their
limitations acknowledged.
What accounts for the sizeable growth in OFDI from India since the
late eighties, with the total stock at the beginning of the year 2006 amounting
to $8 billion compared with a stock of $75 million in the year 1986? The
obvious answer is that the Indian firms were muzzled in by various sorts of
bureaucratic regulations on their operations, including those governing outward
FDI. The relatively low levels of investment were mostly in low-technology
industries in neighbouring developing countries. The economic liberalization
measures, especially the post-1991 measures, that swept away a whole lot of
cumbersome rules and regulations, unleashed the pent-up dynamism of Indian
entrepreneurs, resulting in the growth of both exports and OFDI. OFDI prior
to 1991, the first wave, as Pradhan refers to it, was meagre compared to the
post-1990 investments, hardly amounting to 1 per cent of the total stock of $8
billion of overseas investments in the year 2006. The pre-1991 investments
were more a flutter than a wave, and there is not much evidence to say that
the investments, which were mostly in neighbouring developing countries,
were appropriate to the factor endowments of the host countries. A large
part of Indian manufacturing industry has always been relatively physical
and human-capital-intensive by design and intent of the policymakers. It is
the human-capital intensity of industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals
and machinery and equipment that endowed Indian firms with the so-called
ownership advantages, including product differentiation managerial skills and
relatively high labour productivity. As Pradhan notes, the emphasis placed on

science, engineering and management education for a long time by India’s
policymakers has paid off in the post liberalization years. The growth
in productivity, product differentiation, and increased R&D by Indian
firms mostly devoted to restructuring and adapting imported technology
and know-how are all fruits of investments in tertiary education in the
past dating back to the Nehruvian era.
No doubt Indian firms are equipped to invest abroad, but do they
possess advantages far superior to those possessed by firms in the host
countries? It is likely that domestic R&D has endowed the producers of
science-based products with unique advantages. In engineering skillsbased industries, it is the high labour productivity, or to be specific,
the low efficiency wage that may have endowed Indian firms with a
competitive advantage. Most firms may enjoy a low efficiency wage,
not only because of relatively low wage rates in India, but much more
so on account of increased labour productivity. The latter is mostly a
consequence of both the physical and human-capital intensity of the
production process and the growth in organizational efficiency induced
by increased competition in the post-liberalization era. The pronounced
tendency to acquire existing firms abroad – what Pradhan refers to as
the brownfield investments – rather than invest in greenfield ventures
may also stem from the organizational and managerial abilities of
Indian firms reflected in their high labour productivity. Acquisitions
may be motivated by the desire to acquire technology and know-how
possessed by the firms that are acquired, but the acquired know-how and
technology have to be organized and managed. That which is acquired
may be technology embodied in equipment and knowledge embodied in
blueprints and designs. This sort of technology and know-how has to be
translated into products and processes. It is here that the Indian firms may
possess an advantage over others. The fortunes of the acquired firms in
the developed countries, principally in the United States and the United
Kingdom, may be on the wane mostly because of an inelastic supply
of human capital including engineering and science-based skills. Indian
firms are able to acquire these firms mostly because of their access to an
elastic supply of such skills both in India and in the host countries from
India’s diaspora.
These advantages the Indian firms possess may be much more
pronounced in the software industry than in manufacturing. India appears
to possess a comparative advantage in the sort of mathematical skills that
software requires. Here again, it is the investment in tertiary education,
specifically in science and engineering, that has enabled Indian software
firms to operate with a relatively low wage. Pradhan’s detailed analysis
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of the birth and growth of India’s software industry identifies not only
the contribution of investment in tertiary education, but also state
support for the growth of the sector. There are, though, those who argue
that the software industry has flourished in India because of the benign
neglect of the sector by the state – neglect not by intent but because the
bureaucrats had no knowledge of the totally new industry. This may
be a harsh judgement of the bureaucrats; they should be credited with
providing infrastructure facilities for the sector including technology
parks and satellites. The state should be congratulated for facilitating
the growth of the sector rather than interfering with meddlesome rules
and regulations in the operations of the software firms. Pradhan is right
to emphasize the role of various institutions including the state and the
firms in the birth and impressive growth of the software sector, but it may
be an exaggeration to say that the sector owes its growth to a national
innovation system and a theory of innovation and internationalization
can be built around it.
The study recognizes one of the vital elements missing in much
of the discussion on India’s outward investment, namely the role of
entrepreneurs. Pradhan’s case studies of software firms refer to the role
of entrepreneurs in the growth of the sector. The role of entrepreneurs
is not confined to software; it is also present in pharmaceuticals, steel
and automobiles. This is an aspect of OFDI that cannot be captured in
regression equations; it requires detailed case studies of entrepreneurs,
analysing the factors that have motivated them and the manner in which
they have coped with risks and uncertainty and seized opportunities
others have overlooked. These sorts of interdisciplinary studies on
Indian entrepreneurship are unfortunately rare.
Apart from the determinants of OFDI, the book also discusses its
impact on employment and India’s exports, and the implications for future
policy. As the study notes, there are a number of statistical studies that
detect complementarity between exports and OFDI. Intuition suggests
that OFDI would displace exports from the home country of the firms
investing abroad. Pradhan, on the basis of a sophisticated econometric
model, suggests that “the empirical findings corroborate the hypothesis
that OFDI by Indian multinational firms has played an instrumental role
in their export performance. The complementary relationship between
OFDI by Indian multinationals and home country exports appears to
have dominated their substitution relationships” (p. 157). The statistical
tests also suggest that relatively young firms are prone to being much
more export-oriented than older firms; that the size of firms has a positive
impact on exports up to a threshold level; and that indigenous R&D has
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 2009)
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a positive impact on exports. These results, based on a sophisticated
econometric exercise with an extensive database that would be the
envy of most researchers, are not all that surprising. The explanation
for the complementarity between OFDI and exports is twofold. First,
OFDI promotes exports by providing market intelligence to exporters,
and after-sales service to customers. Second, OFDI generates demand
for components and raw materials from the home country. Whilst
both explanations seem plausible, they are yet to be verified. It is also
likely that the markets for the sort of goods that Indian firms export are
segmented from the sort of markets that firms investing abroad serve.
The latter may be for highly differentiated products with a relatively
high income elasticity of demand, and exploitation of these markets
requires the presence of the producers in the locale of the customers.
Here, market intelligence and an ability to respond to differing tastes of
customers with differentiated products may be crucial for the success of
the firms. The market for relatively cheap homogenized goods, however,
may be served by exports. There could, though, be synergies for the
exporters from the FDI operations of the firm. Thus, one and the same
firm may be engaged in both exporting and production abroad.
Employment creation by firms investing abroad is another
aspect of India’s OFDI examined in the book. Here again, Pradhan puts
his econometric expertise and access to data to good use and arrives at
the conclusion that OFDI promotes employment in the home country.
It does this by generating demand for raw materials and other inputs
from the home country. The explanation for the benign impact of OFDI
on employment is much the same as the explanation for its impact on
exports. Here again, there is room for much more detailed analysis.
In sum, Pradhan’s book caters to varied tastes: to researchers
interested in the relevance of received theory for an explanation of the
recent growth in India’s OFDI; to readers interested in details on the
scale, composition and regional distribution of India’s OFDI; to those
who relish case studies and detailed review of policy; and, of course,
to those who savour sophisticated econometric techniques. Pradhan
deserves to be congratulated on producing a book which caters to
a diverse readership on an important development in India’s recent
economic history.
V.N. Balasubramanyam
Department of Economics
Lancaster University Management School
Lancaster
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Multinational Companies from
Emerging Economies: Composition,
Conceptualization and Direction in the
Global Economy
Andrea Goldstein
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
205 pages
There are a number of important questions about transnational
corporations (TNCs) from emerging countries. Practically, the questions
revolve around the extent and growth of their activity, and whether their
impact on host countries is better or worse than “traditional” TNCs
from advanced “Western” countries. For theorists, the big issue is how
far existing theories of TNCs can explain their operations. In terms
of management, are new skills necessary, or can western management
techniques be adopted?
Andrea Goldstein’s book promises to confront these three
questions. Its subtitle is “Composition, Conceptualization and Direction
in the Global Economy”. The first four chapters after the introduction
provide the factual basis – examining Southern outward foreign direct
investment (OFDI), industry categorization, “New Asian Multinationals”
and “Multilatinas” (TNCs operating regionally across Latin America).
Chapter 6 examines existing theories and their relevance to emerging
country TNCs (ETNCs). The remaining chapters examine the external
impact of ETNCs – the role of governments, impact on financial markets
and host economies and companies for OECD governments, firms and
workers. Issue of management are dealt with in part of chapter 8 (diaspora
entrepreneurship and “the challenge of multinational management”).
The preponderance of the book is thus on extent and impact, less on
theory and management.
The factual chapters rely on UNCTAD data, although the author
has assembled data on, for instance, employment in ETNCs. The
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chapter on Translatinas is short and sketchy and has been superseded by
CEPAL’s 2007 Study, La Inversión Extranjera.
The chapter on New Asian Multinationals is the most interesting,
mixing macro data and case studies to good effect, although it is marred
by casual assumption of a “flying geese” model. This chapter and the
one on industry structure would have been better placed following a
hard look at theory, because an industry categorization would fall
out of a theoretical overview. Inevitably, a modified eclectic (OLI
paradigm) model is suggested as a theoretical overview. Goldstein
categorizes OLI as Why?(O), Where?(L) and How?(I). However a
deeper analysis, undertaken in more recent works on ETNCs (Buckley
et al. (2007) suggests that a deeper examination of context is necessary.
ETNCs respond to market imperfections in the source country, and this
reflects their internationalization path, industry structure and choice of
location.
Institutions, too, are important determinants of the activities of
ETNCs. Goldstein examines source country policies in chapter 7. His
analysis is perceptive and illustrates the importance of government
policies. The impact on host OECD countries is the subject of chapter 9.
The impact is clearly linked to the motivation and entry modes of ETNCs,
but this is not a fully worked-out analysis. As we have “far too few data
points” on performance (p. 139), it is inconclusive with warnings of the
risks of protectionism and the need for proactive strategies leading to a
diffuse conclusion.
Issues of management are considered in chapter 8. Expatriate
communities are found to be important in the strategies of ETNCs, and
the discussion of the challenge of multinational management is promising
and could, with profit, have become a full chapter. The same may be
said of the short but intriguing section on financial issues – centred on
the important question of whether ETNCs overpay for foreign assets.
The final section of this chapter on host country effects suffers from a
lack of hard evidence.
The conclusion, inevitably, is a plea for more research on this key
global phenomenon. Goldstein suggests that there are many missing
elements in a so-far incomplete future research agenda. This book is a
genuine attempt to pull together extant information in a concise way, and
it largely succeeds. It is, however, important that a tighter theoretical
perspective be brought to bear. Increasingly, eclectic agendas need to be
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simplified by the application of simple, powerful analytical approaches
that prevent the unnecessary multiplication of concepts.

Peter J. Buckley
Centre for International Business, University of Leeds (CIBUL)
United Kingdom
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II.

Style guide

A. Quotations should be accompanied by the page number(s) from
the original source.
B. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout the
text with Arabic-numeral superscripts. Important substantive
comments should be integrated in the text itself rather than placed
in footnotes.
C. Figures (charts, graphs, illustrations etc.) should have headers,
subheaders, labels and full sources. Footnotes to figures should be
preceded by lowercase letters and should appear after the sources.
Figures should be numbered consecutively. The position of figures
in the text should be indicated as follows:
Put figure 1 here
D. Tables should have headers, subheaders, column headers and full
sources. Table headers should indicate the year(s) of the data, if
applicable. The unavailability of data should be indicated by two
dots (..). If data are zero or negligible, this should be indicated by
a dash (–). Footnotes to tables should be preceded by lowercase
letters and should appear after the sources. Tables should be
numbered consecutively. The position of tables in the text should
be indicated as follows:
Put table 1 here
E. Abbreviations should be avoided whenever possible, except
for FDI (foreign direct investment) and TNCs (transnational
corporations).
F. Bibliographical references in the text should appear as: “John
Dunning (1979) reported that ...”, or “This finding has been widely
supported in the literature (Cantwell, 1991, p. 19)”. The author(s)
should ensure that there is a strict correspondence between names
and years appearing in the text and those appearing in the list of
references. All citations in the list of references should be complete.
Names of journals should not be abbreviated. The following are
examples for most citations:
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We believe that Transnational Corporations, already in its
fourteenth year of publication, has established itself as an important
channel for policy-oriented academic research on issues relating to
transnational corporations (TNCs) and foreign direct investment (FDI).
But we would like to know what you think of the journal. To this end,
we are carrying out a readership survey. As a token of thanks, every
respondent will receive an UNCTAD publication on TNCs! Please fill
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